

DELHI
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY.

Class No. 341.1
Book No. W28

DELHI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Cl. No. VI : 190409154 : N1 F1

Ac. No. 6831

Date of release for loan

This book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. An overdue charge of one anna will be charged for each day the book is kept overtime.

# The Limitation of Armaments

A Collection of the Projects Proposed for the Solution of the Problem, Preceded by an Historical Introduction

BY

DR. HANS WEHBERG

WASHINGTON
PUBLISHED BY THE ENDOWMENT
1921

COPYRIGHT 1921

BY THE

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

JUDD & DETWEILER, INC., PRINTERS, WASHINGTON

# NOTE

A Conference on the Limitation of Armament was called on August 11, 1921, by the Government of the United States, to meet in Washington on November 11, 1921, the third anniversary of the signing of the armistice between the victorious Allied and Associated Powers and Germany.

The representatives of the Powers originally invited to the Conference were the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, for the consideration of the question of the limitation of armament, and China for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. Later, representatives of Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal were invited to take part in the discussion of questions concerning the Pacific.

The tentative program agreed upon embraces the following subjects:

*Limitation of Armament*

1. Limitation of naval armament, under which shall be discussed:
   - (*a*) Basis of limitation.
   - (*b*) Extent.
   - (*c*) Fulfilment.
2. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
3. Limitation of land armament.

*Pacific and Far Eastern Questions*

1. Questions relating to China.
   First: Principles to be applied.
   Second: Application.
   Subjects:
   - (*a*) Territorial integrity.
   - (*b*) Administrative integrity.
   - (*c*) Open door—equality of commercial and industrial opportunity.
   - (*d*) Concessions, monopolies or preferential economic privileges.
   - (*e*) Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railway.
   - (*f*) Preferential railroad rates.
   - (*g*) Status of existing commitments.
2. Siberia (similar headings).
3. Mandated islands (unless questions earlier settled).
   Electrical communications in the Pacific.

Under the heading of "Status of Existing Commitments" it is expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of rights may hereafter be asserted.

In the belief that the dissemination of information regarding the status of armaments, the collection of official documents throwing light upon the situation in the Pacific, and the furnishing of accurate accounts of the issues involved in some of the more important problems confronting the Conference, would render a service to the public and perhaps even to the delegates to the Conference, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has undertaken the preparation and publication of a series of pamphlets of which the present pamphlet is one.

Dr. Wehberg's work was originally published in French under the title *Limitation des armements, relevé des projets émis pour la solution du problème, précédé d'une introduction historique* (Brussels, 1914), by the Interparliamentary Union, and the present translation, made by Dr. Edwin H. Zeydel of the Carnegie Endowment, is printed with the authorization of Mr. Chr. L. Lange, Secretary General of the Interparliamentary Union. Mr. Lange has also given permission to reprint a few pages from one of his own works, entitled *The Conditions of a Lasting Peace,* and this extract appears as an Appendix to this pamphlet.

The meeting of so many nations in conference, following upon the close of a great war, is in itself an event of no mean importance. The holding of a conference upon the limitation of armament in succession to the First Hague Peace Conference called to consider the burden of armaments and the means for its decrease, with the possibility of an agreement in conference upon some of the questions of international import in addition to armaments, is an indication that the world is returning to "normalcy" and turning to the experience of The Hague.

That the Conference may be successful in all the phases of its program should be the desire of men and women of good-will in all parts of the world.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,
*Director.*

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
*November 9, 1921.*

# CONTENTS

## PART I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION


PAGE

CHAPTER I. THE DEVELOPMENT UP TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ..... 5

CHAPTER II. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE RUSH-BAGOT CONVENTION ..... 7

CHAPTER III. FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS TO THE FIRST PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE ..... 11

CHAPTER IV. THE FIRST PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE ..... 14

§ 1. The Question of the Suspension of Armaments ..... 14

§ 2. The Question of the Limitation of the Means of War on Land ..... 17

I. The Question of Rifles ..... 17

II. The Question of Guns ..... 19

III. The Question of Power ..... 20

IV. The Question of Explosives ..... 20

§ 3. The Question of the Limitation of the Means of War on Sea .. 21

I. The Question of Guns ..... 21

II. The Question of Submarines and War Vessels with Rams ..... 22

CHAPTER V. THE CONVENTION BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE CONCERNING THEIR FLEETS ..... 23

CHAPTER VI. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT AS FAR AS THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE ..... 26

CHAPTER VII. THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE ..... 31

§ 1. The English Proposal to Communicate to One Another Naval Construction Plans ..... 31

§ 2. The Russian Proposal concerning the Beginning of Hostilities 32

CHAPTER VIII. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT UP TO THE PRESENT TIME ..... 33

CHAPTER IX. THE ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS ..... 35

§ 1. The Exchange of Information ..... 35

§ 2. *The 16 to 10 Proportion* ..... 35

§ 3. The One Year Naval Holiday ..... 38

CHAPTER X. UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS ..... 40

## PART II. THE PROJECTS

### TITLE I. INDIRECT MEANS


PAGE

§ 1. The Establishment of a Federation ..... 43
I. Umfrid ..... 43
II. Novicow ..... 46
§ 2. The Creation of a Society of Nations (Duplessix) ..... 46
§ 3. The Creation of a Tribunal of Compulsory Arbitration (Richet) ..... 47
§ 4. The Alliances of the States (Fried) ..... 47
§ 5. Suppression of Economic Tension (Glatzel) ..... 48
§ 6. Renunciation on the Part of Great Britain of the Two-Power Standard, and Establishment of Numerous Naval Stations for Germany (Brentano) ..... 49
§ 7. Suppression of Political Tension (Gobat, Butler) ..... 50
§ 8. Utilization of the Armies for Productive Labor (Durand) ... 50
§ 9. Taking Over and Exploitation of the Armament Industry by the State (Brentano) ..... 51
§ 10. Abolition of the Right of Maritime Capture (Dumas) ..... 52
§ 11. The Introduction of a Period of Grace between the Rupture of Diplomatic Negotiations and the Beginning of Hostilities (Michelson) ..... 54


### TITLE II. DIRECT MEANS

#### *I. The Means of Arriving at a Diminution of Armaments*


§ 12. Unilateral Limitation or Conventional Limitation ..... 55
I. Disarmament of a State (Ostwald) ..... 55
II. Disarmament of All the Small States (van Viersen-Trip) ..... 55
§ 13. Individual Agreements or a World Convention? (Quidde, Schücking) ..... 56
§ 14. Does the Question come under the Competence of the Hague Peace Conferences? (English Committee, Nippold, Davignon) ..... 56
§ 15. Initiative of the Small States (Universal Peace Congress of Geneva) ..... 58


#### *II. The Conventional Limitation of Armaments*


CHAPTER I. PROPOSALS WHICH INDICATE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES ... 59
§ 16. Proposals of Kamarowski ..... 59
§ 17. Proposals of Rogalla von Bieberstein ..... 59
§ 18. Proposals of the American Preparatory Committee ..... 60
§ 19. Proposals of the English Preparatory Committee ..... 60

PAGE

CHAPTER II. PROPOSALS OF A SPECIAL NATURE ..... 63
§ 20. The Proportion of 2 to 3 between Germany and Great Britain (Schlieper, etc.) ..... 63
§ 21. One Year Holiday in the Construction of Fleets (Churchill) ..... 64
§ 22. Construction of Fleets in accordance with the Importance of Exportation (Harms) ..... 65
§ 23. Exchange of Naval Construction Plans (Fry) ..... 65
§ 24. Disarmament of the Frontiers (Moch) ..... 66

CHAPTER III. LIMITATION OF THE MEANS OF WAR ..... 68
§ 25. *Limitation of the Means of War on Land* ..... 68
§ 26. Limitation of the Means of War on Sea ..... 69
I. Diminution of the Tonnage of Displacement (Persius) ... 69
II. Suppression of Submarines and Prohibition of the Perfection of Guns (First Hague Conference, Kalau vom Hofe) ..... 71

CHAPTER IV. DIMINUTION OF THE EFFECTIVES OF PEACE ..... 72
§ 27. General Proposals ..... 72
I. Russian Proposal of 1899 ..... 72
II. Project of Raoul de la Grasserie ..... 72
§ 28. Reduction of the Army in accordance with the Population .. 73
I. Proposal of Dudley Field ..... 73
II. Proposal of Blymyer ..... 73
III. Proposal of an Anonymous Writer ..... 74
§ 29. Reduction of the Army in accordance with the Extent of the Frontiers and the Colonies (Toinet) ..... 76
§ 30a. Introduction of the Militia System (Fried) ..... 76
§ 30b. Shortening of the Period of Service (Souchon) ..... 76

CHAPTER V. LIMITATION AND EVENTUAL REDUCTION OF THE BUDGETS ..... 78
§ 31. Proposal of the First Hague Conference ..... 78
§ 32. Twenty Per Cent. Reduction of the Budgets (Gothein) ..... 78
§ 33. Reduction of the Budget to the Amount appropriated for One of the Preceding Years (Bebel) ..... 79
§ 34. Proposal of the German Peace Society ..... 79
§ 35. Proposal of Quidde ..... 79

APPENDIX

Extract from "The Conditions of a Lasting Peace," by Chr. L. Lange .. 95

INDEX OF PERSONS ..... 103

[*The Title-Page of the Original French Edition*]

INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION

# LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

A Collection of the Projects Proposed for the Solution of the Problem, Preceded by an Historical Introduction

BY

DR. HANS WEHBERG

*Juridical Assessor at Düsseldorf*
*Director of the Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*

1914
MISCH AND THRON
Publishers
BRUSSELS
rue Royale, 126

# PREFATORY NOTE

The present work was undertaken upon the invitation of the Interparliamentary Bureau. It is intended to serve as a basis for the deliberations of the Special Commission of Investigation instituted by the Executive Committee of the Union, in accordance with a proposal of the Central Commission. The Commission is charged "with studying the possibility of drawing up a draft of an international convention for the limitation of armaments."

We express our gratitude to Dr. Wehberg for the excellent work which he has done for the Union.

*The Secretary General,*
CHR. L. LANGE.

# PART I

# HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

# CHAPTER I

## The Development Up to the End of the Eighteenth Century

The oldest peace writers who, since the Fourteenth Century intervened in the interest of the organization of the world, either did not mention the question of armaments at all or touched it only in passing. With them the diminution of armaments plays only a secondary part; to their mind it will be the natural consequence of the new organization. The significant plans of Dubois, Podebrad, Sully and Alberoni[1] envisaged the creation of an aggressive alliance against the Turks, and a suppression of the armies could naturally, at that time, not figure in the program of these men. Podebrad goes so far in his project as to urge the Pope to persuade the Italian nation to construct a fleet for a crusade against the Turks; accordingly, he was interested precisely in the opposite of a decrease of armaments.

The first important plan for a federation of States which was to be as complete as possible, including also the Turks, was that of the Abbot Charles-Irénée de Saint-Pierre.[2] In his *Projet* which appeared in 1713, he emphasizes the fact that the success of his proposal would render it possible to the various States to decrease materially their military expenses.

After the end of the Seven Years' War, the Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz proposed to Frederick the Great a concerted diminution of the troops of the two countries. The basis of the agreement was to be the restoration of the number of soldiers maintained at the time of the Peace of Hubertsburg, and thereupon three-fourths of these were to be dismissed. In order to assure the observation of the contract, commissioners were to take part in the respective revisions of the troops. But this plan, which Emperor Joseph II proposed once more in 1769, was not accepted by Frederick the Great.[3]

[1] Cf. Schücking, *Die Organisation der Welt* (1908); Meyer, *Die Staats-und völkerrechtlichen Ideen von Peter Dubois* (1908); Schwitzky, *Der europäische Fürstenbund Georgs von Podebrad* (1907); Vesnitch, *Le cardinal Alberoni pacifiste*, in the *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1912; Picard, *La question de la limitation des armements de nos jours* (1911), p. 16; Grosch, *Die Theoretiker der Friedensbewegung*, 1914 *et seq.*

[2] Borner, *Das Weltstaatsprojekt des Abbé de Saint-Pierre* (1913), pp. 32, 52; Picard, *op. cit*, pp. 19 *et seq.*

[3] Cf. Fried, *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (2d ed.), vol. II, pp. 32, 33.

In 1795 the celebrated treatise of Kant "On Eternal Peace" appeared. In this work Kant showed especially that the armaments of the nations do not only protect but at the same time menace the peace; he demanded the abolition of permanent armies. At about the same time Bentham conceived and worked out a project of general peace which, however, was not published until 1843.[1] For him the solution of the question of armaments is possible only by arrangement extending over all the States. He was likewise one of the first to have thrown full light upon the difficulties of an agreement with respect to armaments.

[1] *Principles of International Law*, Essay IV.

## CHAPTER II

### The Congress of Vienna and the Rush-Bagot Convention

Nothing definite is known of the plans which Napoleon I may have had with regard to the question of armaments, although this great statesman seems to have had the idea of organizing Europe in peace[1]; in passing we recall the fact that Prussia, at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit, had to bind herself to limit to a certain contingent the number of her troops, as also in 1830 the Pasha of Tripoli was forced to do toward France, with regard to his naval forces[2]; but these arrangements, being conditions of peace obtained by force and not conventions freely agreed to, can not be considered as precedents in the question of armaments.

After the Congress of Vienna, the plan of the Czar of Russia to effect an agreement in the question of armaments led to long negotiations. On March 21, 1816, he wrote to Lord Castlereagh his well-known letter, mentioned by Beernaert at the First Peace Conference at The Hague[3]:

> It is necessary that disarmament be effected with the same agreement and striking loyalty that has decided the safety of Europe and which alone can today ensure its happiness.[4]

In his reply Castlereagh set forth the difficulties of such an arrangement:

> It is nevertheless impossible not to perceive the complications which this question presents in the establishment of a scale of forces for so many Powers who are in such varying circumstances with regard to their relative means, their frontier, their position and their ability to arm themselves again.

The subsequent negotiations of Russia with France, Austria and Prussia resulted in a memorandum written by Prince Metternich on the organization of permanent armies. Finally, the upshot of all the efforts was the convention of February 10, 1817, whereby the States which were maintaining an army of occupation in France, agreed that

[1] Cf. Fried, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Picard, *ibid.*, p. 25.

[2] Cf. *Revue générale de droit international public*, 1905, pp. 336, 338.

[3] *Protocole* II, p. 5.

[4] Cf. with regard to this project, Daehne van Varick, *Actes et documents relatifs au programme de la Conférence de la Paix, 1899*, A, p. 1; Martens, *La question des armements dans la relation entre la Russie et l'Angleterre*, in the *Revue de droit international*, vol. xxvi, p. 573; Picard, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 27.

each of them should diminish its contingent in the said army by one-fifth.[1]

However, before Lord Castlereagh had received the aforementioned letter of the Czar, there had come to him from the United States of America a similar, although more limited project.[2]

The lakes situated between the United States and Canada had been the theatre of bloody combats during the last war between the two sister nations. After the war, the danger existed that the two States might augment permanently their warships upon these lakes. That is the reason why at the end of 1815 Monroe proposed to the English minister a respective limitation of the vessels stationed there. And on April 28, 1817, the following arrangement was made:[3]

By the President of the United States a proclamation. Whereas, an agreement was entered into at the city of Washington, in the month of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, between Richard Rush, esquire, at that time acting as secretary for the department of state of the United States, and the right honorable Charles Bagot, his Britannic Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, for and in behalf of his Britannic Majesty; which arrangement is in the words following, to wit: "The naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes, by his Majesty and the government of the United States, shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side; that is: On lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen pound cannon. On the upper lakes, to two vessels, not exceeding like burden, and armed with like force. All other armed vessels on these lakes shall be forthwith dismantled and no other vessels of war shall be there built and or armed (sic). If either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation, or should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice. The naval force so to be limited shall be restricted to such services as will, in no respect, interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party." And whereas the Senate of the United States have approved of the said arrangement, and recommended that it should be carried into effect; the same having also received the sanction of his Royal highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and in the behalf of his Britannic Majesty; now, therefore, I, James Monroe, President of the United

[1] MARTENS, *Nouveau recueil*, vol. III, p. 93.

[2] Cf. the instructions of Monroe to the American Ambassador at London in MOORE, *Digest of International Law* (Washington, 1906), vol. I, p. 691.

[3] Cf. CROSBY, in the *North American Review*, 1906, pp. 776, *et seq.*; *Friedenswarte*, 1907, p. 29, 1912, p. 28; SCOTT, *The Hague Peace Conferences*, vol. I, p. 670; *Report of the Lake Mohonk Conference* (1910), p. 107 (HENRY BUTLER, "The Agreement of 1817 regarding Armaments on the Great Lakes"); (1913), p. 40 (CALLAHAN, "A Century of Anglo-American Diplomatic Relations"); WAULTRIN, *Le traité Rush-Bagot concernant le nombre des bâtiments armés à entretenir sur les Grands Lacs et son application*, in the *Revue générale de droit international public*, 1911, p 584; RIDDELL, *The International Relations between the United States and Canada—an Historical Sketch*, in the *Proceedings of International Conference under the auspices of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes* (1913), pp. 30, *et seq.*

States, do, by this my proclamation, make known and declare that the arrangement aforesaid, and every stipulation thereof, has been duly entered into, concluded, and confirmed, and is of full force and effect. Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this twenty-eighth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, and of the independence of the United States the forty-second. James Monroe; by the President: John Quincy Adams, secretary of State.

Numerous writers, as Scott and Charles Henry Butler, have mentioned the fact that this arrangement rendered extraordinarily good services. René Waultrin has attempted to prove that America has not entirely respected the contract. He shows that in 1909 the United States possessed on these lakes ten vessels with a total of seventy-two cannon, while Canada had only one ship. Furthermore, on December 1, 1909, the deputy Foster interrogated the minister in the second Chamber and declared that under such conditions Canada was not bound by the contract either.[1]

But the minister replied that the convention, while not having been entirely respected by the United States, had rendered good services and that Canada continued to consider itself bound thereby; that he himself had tried, as a matter of fact, to have a modification made in the convention.

It is worth noting that in the Pan American movement, which begins at this period, there is no disarmament project and that the Pan American conferences have as yet not even examined this problem. The reason for this silence lies in the fact that in America the system of permanent armies is not as far developed as with us in Europe.

In 1831 the King of France, Louis Philippe, called together a conference on disarmament which met at Paris and in which the delegates of England, Austria, Russia and Prussia participated.[2]

The following protocol was signed:

The undersigned, for the purpose of strengthening the general peace and relieving the peoples of the burden of the extraordinary armaments which have been imposed upon them, have recognized with a keen satisfaction, after a careful examination of the present situation in Europe, that the relations of union and of good harmony happily established among the Powers and based upon the independence of the States, as well as upon the unalterable principle of the maintenance of treaties, rendered possible today the adoption of a measure which forms the object of the most ardent wishes of their Governments, namely, that of a general disarmament.

[1]Once before also the arrangement had failed to be denounced, namely in 1864, when differences of opinion arose which, however, were soon settled. Cf. the Peace Year Book, 1914, p. 94, etc.

[2]Desjardins, *Le désarmement, étude de droit international*, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 1, 1898.

Since then the question of armaments has been discussed again and again. In the English Parliament it was especially Robert Peel, Cobden and Disraeli who acted in favor of a convention. The partisans of the peace movement, which began its illustrious career at that period, raised this question so often in the parliaments or elsewhere that it would be impossible, within the restricted limits of this study, to enumerate all the impulses given. It must suffice to refer to the "Handbuch der Friedensbewegung" of Fried, who has reproduced them. Here we shall only be able to give the essential facts, the impulses coming from the Governments, and this too only if they possess a very special importance.

## CHAPTER III

### From the Peace of Paris to the First Peace Conference at the Hague

As early as in the Peace of Belgrade, in 1793, the Russians had to bind themselves not to construct vessels upon the Black Sea and to entrust Russian commerce exclusively to Turkish vessels. In the convention annexed to the Peace of Paris of 1856,[1] Russia and Turkey bound themselves mutually, for the purpose of neutralizing the Black Sea, to limit the number of their vessels on that sea. The convention stipulated:

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, taking into consideration the principle of the Neutralisation of the Black Sea established by the Preliminaries contained in the Protocol No. 1, signed at Paris on the 25th of February of the present year, and wishing, in consequence, to regulate by common agreement the number and the force of the Light Vessels which they have reserved to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea for the service of their coasts, have resolved to sign, with that view, a special Convention, and have named for that purpose . . .

Art. I. The High Contracting Parties mutually engage not to have in the Black Sea any other Vessels of War than those of which the number, the force, and the dimensions are hereinafter stipulated.

Art. II. The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves each to maintain in that Sea 6 steam-vessels of 50 meters in length at the line of flotation, of a tonnage of 800 tons at the maximum, and 4 light steam or sailing vessels of a tonnage which shall not exceed 200 tons each.

This arrangement was concluded only under the pressure of the other signatory Powers of the Peace of Paris; Russia for her part and alone, denounced it by a message of Prince Gortshakow to the Russian Embassy at Vienna on October 19/31, 1870.

On November 4, 1863, Napoleon III invited the European States to a disarmament conference. The invitation was coldly received, ex-

[1]It should also be mentioned that according to Article 3 of this convention Russia and Turkey bound themselves not to establish any kind of military arsenals on the shores of the Black Sea. Russia also bound herself not to fortify the Aland Islands. Later we find similar provisions in the Convention of Berlin of 1878 (Articles 11, 29 and 52), dismantling of all the Bulgarian fortifications along the Danube and a provision forbidding the establishment of new ones. It was decided in particular that no vessel of war should be maintained on the neutralized part of the Danube, of the Iron Gates at the mouth; that no fortification could be established along the Bojana; that Montenegro should not have any vessels of war. It should, furthermore, be mentioned that in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 France was forbidden to fortify Dunkerque (a provision which the Peace of Versailles of 1783 nullified); that in the Second Peace of Paris of 1815 dismantling of the French fortress of Hāmingue was decided upon; in the Convention of November 14, 1863, dismantling of the fortifications of Corfu, and in the Conference of London of May 11, 1867, the dismantling of the forts of Luxemburg. Moreover, according to the treaties of March 30, 1814, and April 19, 1839, Antwerp was not to be transformed into a port of war.

cept by Italy, Spain, Greece, Sweden and Switzerland. Thus the project had to be abandoned. Napoleon renewed his proposal upon two different occasions, the last time in 1870, when, through the mediation of England, he proposed to Bismarck a convention relative to armaments. Although France showed her goodwill by decreasing immediately, on March 21, 1870, her contingent of 100,000 men to 90,000, the negotiations failed on that occasion too.[1]

In 1887 Rolin-Jaequemyns proposed to the Institute of International Law, of which he was at the time president:

> That it examine from the point of view of international law whether, and to what extent, and by what means, it would be possible to restrict the effective forces of European States and the amount of their military expenses in time of peace within certain proportionate limits to be determined by treaties between those States.[2]

Men like Lorimer and Count Kamarowski supported the project, but several members declared that it could have no results and that it would be ridiculous to discuss it; they demanded its withdrawal. As a matter of fact the project was not discussed. Up to the First Peace Conference at The Hague, universal peace congresses busied themselves several times with the question of armaments. But no profound discussions were reached. In the Congress of Paris in 1849, of Frankfurt-on-the-Main in 1850, of London in 1851, of Paris in 1878, and in almost every recent universal peace congress, the series of which begins in 1889, a resolution was voted demanding the decrease of armaments or at least the study of the question of armaments.[3]

The Interparliamentary Union did not treat this problem before 1906. The International Law Association did not deal with the question either.[4]

The Lake Mohonk Conferences likewise discussed the question of armaments only to a slight extent, and that only in the last sessions.

Since about 1870 the disarmament proposals became particularly numerous in the parliaments.

In Germany also, in 1867, 1869 and 1878 motions were made for this purpose but were rejected invariably. Bismarck, in particular, was

[1] Cf. FRIED, *op. cit.*, pp. 75–80; PICARD, *ibid*, p. 32, *et seq*; DAEHNE VAN VARICK, *ibid.*, A., No. 2; *Friedenswarte*, 1913, p. 109; DUVAL, *Projets de désarmement franco-prussien en 1870*, in the *Revue de Paris*, Feb., 1914, *et seq.*

[2] *Revue de droit international*, 1887, p. 130, *et seq.*; MÉRIGNHAC, *L'arbitrage international*, 1895, p. 511.

[3] *Résolutions textuelles des Congrès universels de la Paix, Berne*, 1912, p. 61, *et seq.*

[4] *Annuaire de la vie internationale*, 1908/1909, pp. 819 *et seq.*

very unfavorably disposed to such ideas; neither did he accept a similar proposal of the Italian statesman Crispi.[1]

In 1889 Lord Salisbury had a confidential document drawn up, showing the annual expenses of militarism in Europe. It was proved in this document that in six years, from 1881 to 1886, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Russia, Spain and Italy had spent merely for their land and sea forces about 23 billions of francs. Lord Salisbury had the document sent to the Emperor of Germany who, it is said, was astounded by it. However, this step had no immediate result.

When in 1894 Sir I. Carmichale introduced in the English Parliament a motion for disarmament, Sir Edward Grey, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that the English Government was ready to examine any practical proposal. Already in this case it is possible to see the favorable attitude of the English Government toward the question of armaments, an attitude which this Government has often shown since that time.

[1]Cf. FRIED, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

# CHAPTER IV

## The First Peace Conference at the Hague

On August 12/24, 1898, the Czar of Russia issued his circular, which has now become famous, to call together the nations to the First Peace Conference at The Hague. His intention was, primarily, to put an end to the constantly increasing armaments. But the manifesto did not contain details concerning the manner in which the Russian Government conceived the execution of the project. The details were set forth only in the second circular of December 30, 1898/January 11, 1899. According to this second document, the Conference was to attempt to arrive at an agreement on the following points:

1. An understanding stipulating the non-augmentation, for a term to be agreed upon, of the present effective armed land and sea forces, as well as the war budgets pertaining to them; preliminary study of the ways in which even a reduction of the aforesaid effectives and budgets could be realized in the future.
2. Interdiction of the employment in armies and fleets of new firearms of every description and of new explosives, as well as powder more powerful than the kinds used at present, both for guns and cannons.
3. Limitation of the use in field fighting of explosives of a formidable power, such as are now in use, and prohibition of the discharge of any kind of projectile or explosive from balloons or by similar means.
4. Prohibition of the use in naval battles of submarine or diving torpedo-boats or of other engines of destruction of the same nature; agreement not to construct in the future war-ships armed with rams.

The deliberations of the Conference[1] dealt, on the one hand, with the question of the non-augmentation of the military forces on land and sea; on the other hand, with the limitation of the means of war. And in this latter regard both war on land and war on sea were considered. The discussions on these various points must be set forth separately.

### § 1. The Question of the Suspension of Armaments

The Conference had first of all to deal with the Gilinsky draft;

1. An international agreement for a term of five years, stipulating the non-increase of the present number of troops maintained in time of peace in each mother country.

[1]Cf. especially Mérignhac, *La Conférence Internationale de la Paix*, 1900; de Lapradelle, *La Conférence de la Paix* in the *Revue générale de droit international public*, 1900, p. 651, *et seq.*; Meurer, *Die Haager Friedenskonferenz*, Vol. II, 1907; Toinet, *La Limitation conventionnelle des armements*, 1912, p. 91, *et seq.*; Picard, p. 67, *et seq.*; Wehberg, *L'avenir des Conférences de la Paix*, in the *Revue générale*, 1912, p. 583, *et seq.*

2. The determination, in case of this agreement, if it is possible, of the number of troops to be maintained in time of peace by all the Powers, not including colonial troops.

3. The maintenance, for the same term of five years, of the size of the military budgets in force at the present time. (*Protocoles*, II, 33).

In the discussion, the German Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff (II, p. 36), among others, spoke as follows against the draft:

I think that the question of troops can not be considered entirely alone, separated from a crowd of other questions to which it is almost subordinate.

Such are, for example, the extent of public instruction, the length of active service, the number of established regiments, the troops in the army units, the number and duration of enrolments under the flag, that is to say, the military obligations of retired soldiers, the location of the army corps, the railway system, the number and situation of fortified places.

In a modern army all such things are connected with each other and form, together, the national defense which each people has organized according to its character, its history, and its traditions, taking into account its economic resources, its geographical situation, and the duties which devolve upon it.

I believe that it would be very difficult to replace this eminently national task by an international agreement. It would be impossible to determine the extent and the force of a single part of this complicated machinery.

It is impossible to speak of effectives without taking into account the other elements which I have enumerated in a very incomplete manner.

Again, mention has been made only of troops maintained in mother countries, and Colonel Gilinsky has given us the reason for this, but there are territories which are not part of the mother country, but are so close to it that troops stationed in them will certainly participate in a continental war, and the countries beyond the seas. How could they permit a limitation of their troops if colonial armies, which alone menace them, are left outside of the agreement?

Gentlemen, I have restricted myself to indicating, from a general point of view, some of the reasons which, to m mind, are opposed to the realization of the desire, surely unanimous, of reaching an agreement on the subject before us.

Permit me to add a few words regarding the special situation of the country that I have the honor to represent in this body.

In Germany the number of effectives is fixed by an agreement between the Government and the Reichstag, and in order not to repeat every year the same debates, the number was fixed for seven and later for five years.

This is one of the arguments advanced by Colonel Gilinsky when he declared that he asks of us nothing new. At first sight, gentlemen, it might seem that such an arrangement would facilitate our adhesion to a similar proposal.

But apart from the fact that there is a great difference between municipal law and an international convention, it is precisely our quinquennium which prevents us from making the proposed agreement.

There are two reasons against it. First, the international period of five years would not synchronize with the national period of five years, and this would be a serious inconvenience.

Furthermore, the military law which is today in force does not fix a special number of effectives, but on the contrary it provides for a continuous increase up to 1902 or 1903, in which year the reorganization begun this year will be finished. Until then, it would be impossible for us to maintain even for two consecutive years the same number of effectives.

Of the other addresses that of the delegate of Sweden and Norway, Baron Bildt, is also interesting to cite (*Protocoles*, II, p. 42):

> The Russian proposals, in short, make no difference between armies already organized according to the principles of modern military science, and those which are still governed by former conditions, even superannuated ones, or those which are in process of transformation.
>
> They make no distinction, moreover, between armies that constitute a complete military weapon, equally adapted to attack or defense, and those which either by the short duration of service, or by other distinctive qualities, manifestly show that they have merely a defensive character. This is precisely the case with the Swedish and Norwegian armies, organized on the basis of obligatory service of a few months and being in a state of transformation.

Finally, the Gilinsky draft was rejected.

A second draft, that of Captain Scheine, was expressed as follows (II, p. 33):

> To accept the principle of determining, for a period of three years, the size of the naval budget with an agreement not to increase the total sum during this triennial period, and the obligation to publish in advance during the same period—
>
> 1. The total tonnage of war-ships, which it is proposed to construct, without defining the types of the ships themselves;
> 2. The number of officers and men in the navy;
> 3. The expenses of coast fortifications, including forts, docks, arsenals, etc.

In the discussion of this draft the representatives of England, France, the United States of America, Portugal, etc., declared that the Governments can not bind themselves in the question of the eventual increase of budgets when the parliament still had its word to speak.[1]

This draft likewise failed, although its author had declared that the Governments had no need of taking their momentary budget as a basis; they could take one which was somewhat higher; Russia, for example, would exceed its budget by about 10 per cent.

Finally, the Conference adopted the following resolution and *vœu:*

> *Resolution.* The Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.
>
> *Vœu.* The Conference utters the *vœu* that the Governments, taking into consideration the proposals made at the Conference, may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets.

[1] Cf. WEHBERG, *Die Rüstungsfrage im Wandel der Zeiten*, in the *Friedenswarte*, 1911, p. 93: "The draft was rejected for reasons which men like Zorn, Renault, Lammasch, Scott, *et al.*, declare today to be false."

## § 2. The Question of the Limitation of the Means of War on Land

### *I. The question of rifles*

In this question two drafts had to be examined first of all:

*1. Russian propositions for the modification, improvement or transformation which may be made in guns within a period of time to be discussed* (II, p. 61).

(1) The minimum weight of the gun shall be 4 kg.
(2) The minimum caliber shall be 6½ mm.
(3) The weight of the bullet shall not be less than 10½ grams.
(4) The initial velocity shall not exceed 720 meters.
(5) The rapidity of fire shall be kept at 25 shots per minute.
(6) It is understood that explosive or expansive bullets, as well as automatic loading, are prohibited.

*2. Dutch project* (II, p. 61).

The nations agree not to use in their armies or fleets, during five years from the date of signature of the present documents, any other guns than those now in use or under consideration.

With respect to guns under consideration, only those of an existing type and of a caliber ranging between 6 and 8 mm. shall be allowed.

The improvements allowed shall be of such a nature as not to change the type, caliber, or initial velocity now prevailing.

*3. Dutch-Russian project* (II, p. 67).

The nations agree to use in their armies, for five years from the date on which the present act is signed, only the guns (small arms) in use at the present time.

The improvements permitted shall be of such a nature as not to change either the existing type or caliber.

This third motion was discussed first. The German Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff (II, p. 68), combated it in the following terms:

It would be very difficult to determine what improvements could be adopted without constituting as a whole a new type of gun. What changes should be permitted? Where is the authority who would decide these questions? In case of doubt it would be necessary, in order honestly to carry out the clauses of the Convention, to make the new model known to the other Powers and ask them for their consent before adopting it. As this is hardly possible, he regrets to have to vote against the proposition.

The United States of America, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Serbia and Turkey also voted against the motion.

The following voted in the affirmative: Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Persia, Russia, Siam Sweden and Norway, Switzerland. Bulgaria likewise voted in the affirmative on condition that each Power shall have the right to improve its rifle according to the most

advanced model introduced at the given moment in any army. Roumania abstained.

Thus, this third motion was rejected.

Thereupon the Russian proposition was discussed. Gross von Schwarzhoff arose again to oppose this (II, pp. 68, *et seq.*):

Mr. Gross von Schwarzhoff believes that it is much more humane to lighten the weight which the soldier must carry than to fix a minimum for the weight of a part of his armament. It is true that everything that is taken away from the weight of the gun would doubtless soon be replaced by an increase of cartridges. Then it would be necessary to clearly explain whether it is a question of the weight of the gun alone, unloaded, or of the gun when loaded and provided with a bayonet. In the first case the German delegate recalls to his military colleagues that several guns now in use do not fulfil the condition imposed. He believes these are the Belgian, Spanish, Italian, Norwegian, Roumanian, and German guns. Therefore, by prescribing a weight of 4 kg. we should be compelling the nations to make undesirable changes in their guns.

As to the weight of the bullet, there are likewise guns in use whose projectiles remain under the figure indicated. These are the Norwegian and Roumanian guns.

The delegate from Germany willingly grants that a velocity of 720 to 730 meters is not thus far exceeded and that it would be possible to stop at this figure; but the initial velocity depends at least as much on the powder used as on the system of the gun, the weight, and the form of the projectile. As the subcommission a few days ago reserved the liberty for each to adopt new powders, it would seem logical not to fix the initial velocity. For otherwise it might easily be possible to invent a new and less costly powder, more durable and efficacious than the powder now in use, without being able to adopt it because it would increase the initial force beyond 720 meters.

It will therefore be necessary at the very first to reverse the unanimous *decision reached at the meeting of May 29.*

The rapidity of fire depends no less on the skill and training of the firer than on the mechanism of the gun. In prescribing a maximum, it will therefore be necessary to state whether it is an average rapidity which the average soldier shall be permitted to attain or a rapidity which the best trained men shall not exceed.

He believes he has demonstrated that certain conditions do not sufficiently take into account the present status of armament, that others ought, if possible, to be defined with more precision, and that a condition in regard to initial velocity would amount to annulment of the previous vote. All these reasons compel him, to his great regret, to vote against the proposition. He wishes to add that he has expressed only his personal opinion; if the delegates do not indorse this view and if they agree on this proposition or on another formula the German Government will without doubt be quite ready to examine it.

Thereupon this first proposition was also rejected, being supported only by the Netherlands, Persia, Russia and Bulgaria (the latter making reservations). All the other States voted in the negative,

with the exception of France, which abstained, not having received instructions as yet. A special vote upon the question of the interdiction of the automatic rifle also had a purely negative result. To be sure, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Persia, Russia, Siam, Switzerland and Bulgaria voted for the interdiction. France, Japan, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia and Turkey abstained. The following voted in the negative: Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden and Norway.[1]

Then Holland made a last attempt by presenting the following motion:

*4. New form of the Dutch project* (II, p. 71).

For a period of five years from the date of the present act, the nations agree not to replace the guns now in use in their armies by guns of any other type.

However, they do not forbid themselves making any improvement or perfection in the guns now in use which may appear advantageous to them.

The nations which have a gun of an antiquated model, that is, of a caliber above 8 mm. or having no magazine, may adopt existing models.

But only Denmark, Bulgaria, Spain, the Netherlands, Persia, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Sweden and Norway, as well as Roumania (the latter with reservations) voted for the draft. Germany, the United States, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Japan and Italy voted against it.[2] Portugal and Switzerland abstained. Thus the project was finally rejected. But in a *vœu*, which it is well to mention,[3] the hope was expressed that a future Conference would again take up the question.

### *II. The question of guns*

With regard to this matter the following principle was involved:

Should the nations represented at the Conference prohibit themselves, for a certain period of time to be determined, and especially for purposes of economy, from modifying their ordnance equipment, precluding the use of any new invention, each thus preserving full freedom of action? (II, p. 64).

[1] Cf. the words of the General of Artillery von Deines in the *Tag* (Berlin) of March 16, 1912: "Everything indicates that France will some day present herself with an automatic rifle. It may be admitted that all the other countries have likewise assured themselves of a new model of rifle in order not to be taken unawares. Meanwhile every country would fear, in being the first to accept a new form of arms, that the others might learn from it and might in turn go it one better. Each one fears the enormous expenses which the new armament of an army of several millions of men would entail.

"It is therefore quite probable that for the present the countries will adhere to the systems of rifles now used, and we have reason to be satisfied on this score, as appears from the aforementioned considerations."

[2] II, 75, 10.

[3] See § 3, I, of this Chapter.

Before voting upon "this question of principle," there was a discussion of the following preliminary question as formulated by the president:

Is it understood that in case new improvements were prohibited conventionally this prohibition would nevertheless allow all to adopt the most improved types now in use? (II, p. 63).

Only the United States of America, Belgium, Italy, Persia, Serbia and Siam voted in the affirmative. The principal question was likewise answered negatively. No one voted in the affirmative.

### *III. The question of powder*

There was no formal proposal concerning the prohibition of the introduction of new powders. The delegates unanimously pronounced themselves in favor of the absolute liberty of each country in this matter after the following reflections of the American Captain Crozier (II, p. 57):

The suggestion to prohibit the use of more powerful powders than those at present adopted might run counter to one of the principal objects of the Russian proposition. Suppose that by a more powerful powder we mean a powder which imparts a greater velocity to a projectile of a given weight or the same velocity to a heavier projectile,—it is known that a powder is powerful in proportion to the production of the volume of gas furnished by the temperature of the combustion. Now, it might very well be supposed possible to produce a powder which, by furnishing a greater volume of gas at a lower temperature of combustion, might be more powerful than any powder now in use and which at the same time, by reason of the low temperature, would strain the gun less, which would enable the latter to be kept in service for a longer time.

### *IV. The question of explosives*

On this subject the Gilinsky motion (II, p. 64) was presented, proposing:

Not to use, for field artillery, high-explosive shells (*obus brisants ou à fougasses*) and to limit oneself to the existing explosives without having recourse to the formidable explosives employed for sieges.

The following voted for the Russian proposition: Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Serbia, Russia, Siam, Switzerland and Bulgaria. The following voted against it: Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Sweden and Norway, as well as Turkey.

"On the question as to whether it is in order to prohibit the use of new explosives hitherto not used," nine States (Belgium, the Nether-

lands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Switzerland, Bulgaria), voted yea. Twelve States (Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Sweden and Norway, Turkey) voted nay.

## § 3. The Question of the Limitation of the Means of War on Sea

### *I. The question of guns*

The subcommission on naval affairs did not have to deal with the question of the rifle, since the rifle plays only a small part in *war on sea*. The decisive question with it was the *question of guns*.

The proposal of van Karnebeek, which was not formally presented as a motion, was not discussed.

*1. Proposal of van Karnebeek* (II, p. 81).

The only effective means would perhaps be to have recourse to penal clauses against the inventors of new means of destruction.

*2. Péphau motion* (II, p. 84).

The contracting nations undertake, during a period of . . . beginning . . ., not to subject the existing types of cannon to a radical transformation similar to that by which the muzzle loader was replaced by the breech loader. In no case shall the calibers now in use be increased.

The English Admiral Fisher (II, p. 85), particularly, raised objections:

He points out again that the small nations, which have to seek their force in the quality of their equipment, will not easily be disposed to place restrictions upon themselves in regard to new inventions.

As to wars against savage peoples, these restrictions would redound solely to the detriment of the civilized nations.

Finally, he calls attention to the difficulty of supervision (control).

The Péphau motion was finally rejected, Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal and Turkey being opposed. The following were in favor: Denmark, Siam, the Netherlands, Japan, Roumania, Russia. Sweden and Norway abstained.

*3. Scheine motion.*

The Governments bind themselves:

1. Not to exceed a caliber of 17 inches, or 431.7 mm. for any kind of cannon.
2. That the length of cannon be fixed at a maximum of 45 calibers.
3. That the initial velocity does not exceed 3000 feet, of 914 meters.
4. For armor plates the maximum thickness will be 14 inches, or 355 mm., and of the same quality as that manufactured according to the latest Krupp patent.

The Roumanian Colonel Coanda (II, p. 93), expressed some scruples about placing limits only on the initial velocity, as this appeared insufficient to him; in limiting the velocity, the weight of the projectile ought also to be fixed, in order that the initial force may be calculated.

The limit imposed by fixing the length of the cannon depends on the powder used. If therefore only the initial velocity is limited, and on the other hand the maximum resistance for the armor plate is fixed, this would be dooming the armor plate in advance to be overcome.

This motion was not accepted either. It was finally agreed to express the following *vœu* with regard to the questions of guns and rifles:

The Conference utters the *vœu* that the questions with regard to rifles and naval guns, as considered by it, may be studied by the Governments, with the object of coming to an agreement respecting the employment of new types and calibers.

### *II. The question of submarines and war vessels with rams*

The second Russian circular for the Hague Conference proposed (No. 4):

An interdiction of the use in naval wars of torpedo boats, submarine or divers, or other engines of destruction of the same nature; an agreement not to construct in the future war vessels with rams.

These questions, which were eliminated, were not much discussed.

With regard to the "torpedo boats, submarine or divers" the following voted for an interdiction: Greece, Persia, Siam and Bulgaria. The following agreed to join these Powers on condition that unanimity be achieved: Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Japan and Roumania. The following voted negatively: The United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Spain, France, Portugal, Sweden and Norway, the Netherlands and Turkey. Russia, Serbia and Switzerland abstained (II, p. 26).

On the question of "war vessels with rams" the following voted for an interdiction: France, Greece, Siam and Bulgaria. The following agreed to join them on condition that unanimity be achieved: the United States of America, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Persia, the Netherlands and Roumania. The following were opposed: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Norway, and Turkey. Belgium, Russia, Serbia and Switzerland abstained. (II, p. 27).

# CHAPTER V

## The Convention Between Argentina and Chile Concerning Their Fleets

On May 28, 1902, the Governments of Argentina and Chile concluded the following convention, which was completed by a protocol annexed thereto:

### Convention Between Chile and the Argentine Republic on the Limitation of Naval Forces

Don José Antonio Terry, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Argentine Republic, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don José Francisco Vergara Donoso, having met together in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Chile, have agreed to include in the following Convention the various decisions arrived at for the limitation of the naval armaments of the two Republics, decisions which have been taken owing to the initiative and to the good offices of His Britannic Majesty's Government, represented in the Argentine Republic by its Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Sir W. A. C. Barrington, and in Chile by its Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Gerard Lowther:

Art. I. With the view of removing all motive for uneasiness or resentment in either country, the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of Chile desist from acquiring the vessels of war which they have in construction, and from henceforth making new acquisitions. Both Governments agree, moreover, to reduce their respective fleets, for which object they will continue to exert themselves until they arrive at an understanding which shall establish a just balance (of strength) between the said fleets.

This reduction shall take place within one year, counting from the date of exchange of ratifications of the present Convention.

II. The two Governments bind themselves not to increase, without previous notice, their naval armaments during five years; the one intending to increase them shall give the other eighteen months' notice. It is understood that all armaments for the fortification of the coasts and ports are excluded from this Agreement, and any floating machine destined exclusively for the defense of these, such as submarines, etc., can be acquired.

III. The two Contracting Parties shall not be at liberty to part with any vessels, in consequence of this Convention, in favor of countries having questions pending with one or the other.

IV. In order to facilitate the transfer of pending contracts, both Governments bind themselves to prolong for two months the term stipulated for the delivery of the vessels in construction, for which purpose they will give the necessary instructions immediately after this Convention has been signed.

V. The ratifications of this Convention shall be exchanged within the period of sixty days, or less if possible, and the exchange shall take place in the City of Santiago.

In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed and put their seals to two copies of this Convention in the city of Santiago, the 28th day of the month of May, 1902.

(L. S.) J. A. Terry.
(L. S.) J. Fco. Vergara Donoso.

## Protocol of the Convention of March 22, 1902, Between Chile and the Argentine Republic on the Limitation of Naval Forces

His Excellency Dr. Luis M. Drago, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship, and his Excellency Don Carlos Concha, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile, having met together in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Worship in Buenos Aires, on January 9, 1903, with the view of giving effect to the just balance which both countries have decided to establish between their respective fleets, in conformity with the Treaty on Naval Armaments signed on May 28, 1902, with the notes exchanged on the same day between the Chilean Ministry and the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Argentine Republic, and, with the Protocol which was signed on July 10, 1902, relating to the same matter, and, after having exchanged their respective powers, which were found in due form, have agreed to the following arrangement:

Art. I. The Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile shall hereafter, and in the shortest time possible, sell the vessels of war now building for them, for the former in the ship-yards of Ansaldo (Italy) and for the latter in those of Messrs. Vickers and Messrs. Armstrong (England), according to the stipulations set forth in paragraph 1 of Article I and Article III of the Agreement of May 28, 1902. In the event of its not being possible from any cause to carry out the sale immediately, the High Contracting Parties may continue the building of the said ships, until they are completed, but in no case shall they be added to the respective fleets—not even with the previous notice of eighteen months required for the increase of naval armaments by Article II of the above quoted Agreement.

II. Both the High Contracting Parties mutually agree immediately to put the vessels at present building at the disposal and at the orders of His Britannic Majesty, the Arbitrator appointed by the Treaty of May 28, 1902, informing him that they have agreed that the vessels shall not leave the yards where they actually are except only in case both High Parties jointly request it, either because their sale has been effected or in virtue of a subsequent Agreement.

III. The two High Contracting Parties shall immediately communicate to the ship-builders the fact that the vessels have been placed, by common consent of both Governments, at the disposal of the Arbitrator designated in the Treaty of May 28, 1902, without whose express order they may not be delivered to any nation or individual.

IV. In order to establish the just balance between the two fleets, the Republic of Chile shall proceed to disarm the battle-ship *Capitán Prat* and the Argentine Republic to disarm its battle-ships *Garibaldi* and *Pueyrredon*.

V. In order that the vessels may be considered disarmed in accordance with the foregoing Article, they must be moored in a basin or port, having on board only the necessary crew to attend to the preservation of the material which cannot be removed, and they must have landed—

All coal;
All powder and ammunition;
Artillery of small caliber;
Torpedo tubes and torpedoes;
Electric search-lights;

Boats;
All stores of whatever kind.
For their better preservation it is permissible to roof in the decks.

VI. The vessels mentioned in Article IV, which both Governments agree to disarm, shall remain in that state, and may not be rearmed without the previous notice of eighteen months which the Government which wishes to do so is obliged to give to the other Government, except in case of a subsequent agreement or of their alienation.

VII. Both Governments shall request the Arbitrator appointed by the Treaty of May 28, 1902, for the purpose of arranging difficulties to which questions on naval armaments may give rise, to accept the duties resulting from the present Agreement, for which purpose an authenticated copy thereof shall be sent to him.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries sign and seal the present in duplicate.

(L. S.) Luis M. Drago.
(L. S.) Carlos Concha.

With regard to this agreement, d'Estournelles de Constant declared in the French Senate: "This convention is of a capital importance."[1] On the other hand, Toinet[2] and Picard[3] deny the agreement any value at all. The latter expresses himself as follows:

In short, this celebrated convention reduces itself to the following terms: the making available of three vessels not yet constructed. This would be important if these renunciations and these disarmaments were final and irrevocable, but the extent of the convention is limited by reservations; the eventuality of the taking of possession of the vessels in construction which, not sold, would have necessitated a new convention for making them available analogous to that of the former vessels, and the possibility of rearming the three battleships made available . . . .

As a matter of fact all these provisions had only the value of beautiful promises which, contrary to necessity, would not have held.

Fried[4] says:

At the expiration of the convention, the two States seem to have taken up their armaments again. It has not been possible to discover anything more definite.

The Second Hague Peace Conference in its plenary session of August 17, 1907, expressed its congratulations to Chile and to Argentina with regard to these agreements.

[1] *Journal officiel*, April 12, 1905.

[2] *La limitation conventionnelle des armements*, 1912, pp. 86–90.

[3] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 163, 164.

[4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 173. Cf. Wehberg, *Die bisherigen Staatsbeschlüsse über Rüstungsbeschränkungen*, in the *Friedenswarte*, 1911, p. 205: "The fact which is worth noting is that this convention was faithfully observed by the two sides. It is, moreover, interesting to note that at the same time that the suspension of armaments in Argentina and Chile took place, a striking decrease of armaments can be noted in other States of South America."

## CHAPTER VI

### Subsequent Development as Far as the Second Hague Peace Conference

Meanwhile the British Government had begun its memorable campaign in the interests of the diminution of armaments; as early as March 9, 1899, the Chief of the Admiralty, Lord Goschen, had declared in the House of Commons, in the name of the Government, that Great Britain was ready to cut down its plans of naval building if the other Powers should do likewise. Since this period the English ministers have continually spoken in favor of the decrease of armaments, so that it is impossible to note here every single occasion upon which they did so.[1]

In July, 1903, the Minister Chamberlain supported the declaration of Lord Goschen and declared that for the English Cabinet it had maintained its full value.

When in 1905 Sweden and Norway dissolved their union and when both sides were already arming, a peaceful arrangement between the two States proved possible. A permanent neutral zone was created between Sweden and Norway according to the following convention:

#### Convention Relative to the Establishment of a Neutral Zone and to the Dismantling of Fortifications[2]

M. Thor Ditten, Plenipotentiary of Norway, and Count Axel Frederick Claesson Wachtmeister, Plenipotentiary of Sweden,

Having met for the purpose of converting into a formal Convention the draft of a convention relative to the establishment of a neutral zone, the dismantling of fortifications, etc., approved by the Norwegian Storthing on October 9, 1905, and by the Swedish Riksdag on October 13, 1905, and duly authorized for this purpose, have signed, without reservation of ratification, the following articles:

[1] All these cases are mentioned in Fried, cited above, p. 167 *et seq.* There is also an excellent survey of the subject in the report which Fried composed for the Universal Peace Congress of Stockholm in 1910, *Compte rendu*, pp. 315 *et seq.*

[2] Cf. also Perris, in the *Universal Peace Congress of London, 1908, Compte rendu*, p. 114. Cf. Art. III of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople of September 2/14, 1829: "It is agreed, none the less, that this right bank (that is, of the Danube), beginning at the point where the branch of St. George is separated from that of Sulina, shall remain uninhabited for a distance of two hours from this river and that no establishment of any kind shall be formed there, and that likewise upon the islands which shall remain in the possession of the Court of Russia, with the exception of the quarantines which shall be established there, it shall not be permitted to erect any other establishment or fortification." Cf. also Treaty of March 5, 1894, between Spain and Morocco and the Anglo-French Declaration of January 15, 1896 on the Upper Mekong.

Art. 1. In order to assure peaceful relations between the two States, there shall be established on the two sides of the joint frontier, a territory (neutral zone) which shall have the advantages of a perpetual neutrality.

This zone shall be limited as follows:

On the Norwegian side, by a line of demarcation running in a straight line through the Kirkö, touching the northwesterly point of the Singleö at the church of Ingedal and from there, forming a succession of straight lines passing by: the church of Rokke, the point situated on the northern bank of the mouth of the stream of Fredrikshald in the Femsjö, the mouth in the northeast corner of the Femsjö, of the stream passing near the farm of Rödd, at the eastern extremity of the Klosatjern, the eastern extremity of the Grefslivand (to the north of the church of Haerland), the point advancing to the Ögderensjö southeast of Kraaktorp, the strait between the Mjermen and the Gaasefjord, the Eidsdammen, the southwestern extremity of the Dyrerudtjern (at the northern extremity of the Liermosen), the church of Urskog, the southern extremity of the Holmtjern, the southern corner of the Digersjö, the northern extremity of the Skassensjö, as far as the point where the Ulvaa cuts the 61st parallel;

On the Swedish side, by a line of demarcation starting from the northern point of the Nordkoster, and forming a succession of straight lines passing through: the southern point of the Norra Långö, the northeastern extremity of the Lake of Fåringen, the northeastern extremity of the Lursjön, the mouth of the Kynne river in the Södra Bullaren, the southeastern extremity of the Södra Kornsjön, the southern extremity of the Stora Le, the western extremity of the Ojnesjön, the southern extremity of the Lysedstjärn, the southern extremity of the Nässjön, the southern extremity of the Bysjön, the northwestern extremity of the Lake of Kymmen, the northwestern extremity of the Grunnsjön, the northwestern extremity of the Kläggen, the northern extremity of the Mangen, the western extremity of the Bredsjön, as far as the point where the right bank of the Klarälfven cuts the 61st parallel.

In the said zone the islands, islets, and reefs are included, but not the parts of the sea itself with its gulfs which are situated within the limits of the zone.

The neutrality of the said zone shall be complete. It shall, therefore, be forbidden each of the two States to carry on within this zone any operation of war, to use it as a point of support or as a basis of operations of this character and to have stationed there (with the exception provided by Art. 6) or to concentrate there any armed military forces, except those which are necessary for the maintenance of public order or for giving assistance in case of accidents. If in one of the States there exists or if later there should be constructed railroads through a part of the neutral zone of this State, in a direction essentially parallel to the longitudinal axis of the zone, the present provisions shall not oppose the use of these railroads for the purpose of military transports. Neither shall they forbid persons domiciled in the part of the zone of one of the States and which belong to the army or to the navy of that State, from assembling there in order to be sent out of the zone without delay.

It shall be forbidden to preserve in the neutral zone, and there shall not be established therein in future, any fortifications, ports of war or provision depots intended for the army or the navy.

However, these provisions shall not be applicable in case the two States should bring each other assistance in a war against a common enemy. If one of the two States finds itself at war with a third Power, they shall not bind, for that part of the zone which belongs to each of them, either the one which

is at war, or the other, in so far as it is a question for the latter of enforcing the respect for its neutrality.

Art. 2. By virtue of the preceding provisions, the fortifications which are at present situated in the neutral zone as it has been established hereinbefore, shall be dismantled, to wit: the groups of Norwegian fortifications of Fredrikssten with Gyldenlöve, Overbjerget, Veden and Hjelmkollen, of Örje with Kroksund, and of Urskog (Dingsrud).

Art. 3. The fortifications mentioned in Art. 2 shall be rendered useless for serving as such. The former works of Fredrikssten and of the forts of Gyldenlöve and of Overbjerget shall, however, be reserved, but it shall be prohibited to construct any works of maintenance having the character of a fortification.

More detailed stipulations relative to the modern constructions of these three forts, as well as to the measures to be taken with regard to the other fortifications, shall be inserted in a separate act which shall have the same force and the same value as the present Convention.

Art. 4. The execution of the measures provided for in Art. 3 shall be made at the latest eight months after the coming into force of the present Convention.

Art. 5. A Commission composed of three officers of a foreign nationality (neither Norway nor Sweden) shall be charged with seeing to it that the measures provided for in Art. 3 shall be duly executed. Of these officers one shall be named by each of the two States and the third by the two officers thus designated or, in case they shall be unable to arrive at an agreement, by the President of the Swiss Federal Council.

More detailed provisions regarding this control shall be inserted in the separate act mentioned hereinbefore.

Art. 6. Fredrikssten shall continue to be the headquarters of the military command of the district and of the school for non-commissioned officers of the forces subject to this command, all essentially on the same footing as before the construction of the modern fortifications.

Art. 7. The group of fortifications of Kongsvinger shall not be increased either as regards constructions, armament or garrison, the size of the latter never having exceeded 300 men. There shall not be included in the garrison the men called together for the annual manoeuvres. In application of the aforementioned provision no new fortifications shall be established within a radius of 10 km. around the former fortress of Kongsvinger.

Art. 8. The differences relative to the interpretation or the application of the present Convention which can not be settled by direct diplomatic negotiations shall be, with the exception which follows from Art. 5, submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of three members, one of whom shall be named by each of the two States and the third by the two members thus designated, or if they can not agree upon this choice, by the President of the Swiss Federal Council, or in the manner provided for by the two last paragraphs of Art. 32 of the Hague Convention of July 29, 1899. None of the umpires may be the subject of either State or domiciled in their territories. They shall not have any interest in the questions which may form the subject of the arbitration.

In default of *compromis* clauses to the contrary, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the place of its meeting and the arbitral procedure.

Art. 9. The present Convention shall immediately come into force and shall be denounced only by common consent.

Done at Stockholm, in duplicate original, on October 26,1905.

(L. S.) v. DITTEN.

(L. S.) F. CLAESSON WACHTMEISTER.

In 1905 Gaston Moch, in France, proposed that France and Italy gradually do away with their respective fortifications in the Alps. Consequently, in December, 1906, the French Parliament, on the report of Messimy, reduced the costs for the fortifications along the Italian frontier from 290,000 francs to 190,000 francs According to Toinet,[1] Italy is said to have done the same.

The universal peace congresses which met between the First and Second Peace Conferences, often dealt with the question of armaments. An extremely important fact is that, at the Interparliamentary Conference at London, in 1906, the problem of armaments was debated for the first time and that Baron d'Estournelles de Constant and M. Messimy, later French Minister of War, drew up very remarkable reports on this problem.

Even during this period lively negotiations were under way with the object of including the question of armaments upon the program of the Second Hague Conference, and the English Premier Campbell-Bannermann said to the interparliamentary delegates:

> Insist, in the name of humanity, that you should go to this Conference at The Hague, as we ourselves hope to attend, for the purpose of decreasing the burdens of the war and naval budgets.[2]

A committee assembled at London, in 1906, to prepare for the Second Hague Peace Conference and composed of Lord Courtney, Lord Eversley, Lord Weardale, Lord Farrer, Lord Welby, Lord Reay, Major-General Sir Alfred Turner, Sir John Macdonell, Professor Westlake, Mr. J. M. Robertson, M. P., and others, adopted the following resolutions:

1. That the chief question to be brought before the Second Hague Conference should be that of an agreement for a general limitation of armaments; and that the British Government should make proposals to this end;
2. In any limitation of armaments, the armies and navies of the various nations should be treated separately;
3. That the simplest, though not the only standard of naval strength, is that of naval expenditure;
4*a*. That Great Britain seek to persuade the Powers to agree to a Proportional Reduction of Naval Expenditure for five years; or, failing such agreement, that Great Britain propose an arrest of expenditure for three years with a view to reduction at a later date;[3]

[1] *Op cit.* See also the *Friedenswarte*, 1907, p. 15.

[2] Official Report of the Conference held in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords, London, 1906, p. 221.

[3] A proposal similar to that of the deputy Ledebour (social democrat) before the German Reichstag of December 2, 1912.

4*b*. That the principle of reduction or the principle of arrest shall be applied not only to the total naval expenditure from all sources, but also to the annual provision for the construction of new ships;

5. All naval expenditure of colonies and dependencies should be included in the above-mentioned totals in so far as it is under the control of the contracting Powers;

6. Great Britian should be prepared to support any proposal for the limitation of land forces which may be laid before the Hague Conference;

7. That the terms of Resolution 4 be applied *mutatis mutandis*, to army as well as navy expenditure;

8. It is advisable to establish, in connection with the Permament Council of The Hague Court, Committees of Reference for the supervision of the carrying out of the aforesaid agreements, for the collection of all necessary information, including statistics of expenditure on armaments, and for reporting on any technical questions which may be referred to them;

9. That the Agreement should contain a provision for its being denounced by any of the Parties to it on two years, notice being given, and a provision for the reference to arbitration of any difference arising.

# CHAPTER VII

## The Second Hague Peace Conference

The attempt of various Governments, particularly the English and Russian Governments, to have the question of the limitation of armaments discussed at the Second Hague Conference failed as a result of the opposition of Germany. A special visit to the European cabinets, undertaken by the Councillor of State de Martens, had no result. Only twice during the Conference was the question of armaments touched.

### § 1. The English Proposal to Communicate to One Another Naval Construction Plans

In the plenary session of August 17, 1907, Sir Edward Fry delivered an address which he closed with this declaration:[1]

> The Government of His Britannic Majesty, recognizing that several Powers desire to restrict their military expenditure, and that this object can only be realized by the independent action of each Power, has thought it to be its duty to inquire whether there are any means for satisfying these aspirations. My Government has therefore authorized us to make the following declaration:
>
> The Government of Great Britain will be prepared to communicate annually to Powers which would pursue the same course the program for the construction of new ships of war and the expenditure which this program would entail. This exchange of information would facilitate an exchange of views between the Governments on the subject of the reductions which it might be possible to effect by mutual agreement.
>
> The British Government believes that in this way it might be possible to arrive at an understanding with regard to the expenditure which the States which should undertake to adopt this course would be justified in incorporating in their estimates.
>
> In conclusion, therefore, Mr. President, I have the honor to propose to you the adoption of the following resolution:
>
> The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination of this question.

After the United States of America, France and Spain had expressed their sympathy with the words of Fry, and the United States and Spain had expressly declared that at the time of the convocation of the Conference they had reserved the right of discussing the question of

[1] *Actes et documents*, I, p. 92.

armaments, the President proposed the adoption of the English motion, which was unanimously voted.

## § 2. The Russian Proposal Concerning the Beginning of Hostilities

A second proposal concerning the question of armaments was made at the Second Hague Conference. It did not come up, however, at the time of the discussion of this problem, properly speaking, but when the question of the beginning of hostilities was being debated. This proposal was not further discussed and soon disappeared as unnoticed as it had arisen.

When the subject of the declaration of war came up, Colonel Michelson developed the question in the Second Subcommission of the Second Commission of July 5, 1907, as follows:[1]

I wish to point out to you today the advantages which the nations could derive from a solution of this question which would prescribe a more or less extended delay between the rupture of peaceful relations and the beginning of military operations.

As you can not fail to understand, the problem of such a delay is intimately connected with the relation which exists between the peace and war establishments of every country. Consequently a result of its adoption would be a more or less considerable reduction of expenditures.

The time may not be so far distant after all when we shall be able to distinguish between the troops and other preparations for war which every country in its own sovereign judgment deems requisite in its political situation, and those that it is compelled to maintain only through the necessity of being constantly in readiness for fighting. By establishing a certain interval between the rupture of peaceful relations and the beginning of hostilities, an opportunity would be afforded to such countries as may desire it to realize certain economies during times of peace. It is undeniable that these economies would be beneficial in every way, and could not fail to bring about a great relief from the burden of armed peace, a relief all the more acceptable because it would in no way affect the right of each nation to fix its own forces and armament solely in accordance with its own views and needs.

There is still another advantage to be derived from the proposed delay. It would leave to friendly and neutral Powers some precious time which they could use in making efforts to bring about a reconciliation, or to persuade the disputants to submit their causes of difference to the high Court of Arbitration here.

But, while speaking of this subject of a delay, we must not lose sight of what is at present possible. The idea of any considerable delay is not yet developed in the consciences of the people of the nations.

Consequently it would perhaps not be wise to go too far with our desires, in order that we may not get beyond what it really possible in practice at the present day. So let us content ourselves with accepting the delay of twenty-four hours which has been proposed by the delegation of the Netherlands. . . .

[1] *Protocoles*, III, p. 167.

# CHAPTER VIII

## The Subsequent Development Up To the Present Time

The first detailed proposal made to a Peace Congress is probably that of G. H. Perris. For the proposals made prior to this were hardly debatable. At the Seventeenth Universal Peace Congress at London, in 1908 (*Protocole*, pp. 115 *et seq.*), Perris made the following statement:

> We suggest that the proper and practical method of approaching the problem is not to attempt to limit the size of rifles, or to suppress torpedoes, but to take the total expenditure, and agree for a short term of years not to increase that amount. We claim that that is an absolutely simple and practical idea in its application. England would agree, and Germany would agree, that for three years, let us suppose, they would not increase the total amount spent in the last three years. I think it can not be suggested that is a suppression of the capacities of mankind—as might be suggested if new inventions were ruled out—or that it is impracticable in working.
>
> I therefore beg leave to move two resolutions, as follows:
>
> I
>
> Considering that, as the first British Delegate stated at The Hague on August 17, 1907, the yearly expenditure on armaments of the Powers of Europe, the United States, and Japan, increased between the first and second Peace Conferences from £251,000,000 to £320,000,000, or £69,000,000 in eight years; and that, if it be not stopped, there will be a further increase of this horrible waste before the third Conference meets in 1914;
>
> Considering the perils of such a failure of international statesmanship, and the advice of M. Bourgeois, the first French Delegate, that between now and the next Conference the consideration of the question should be resolutely proceded with;
>
> And considering the offer of the British Government to negotiate with other Governments for a common arrest of naval armaments,
>
> The Congress urges that such negotiations should be immediately entered upon, and that a special Conference of the chief naval Powers should be called without delay; so that a practical plan for such a standstill may be elaborated, and may be put into operation before the meeting of the third Hague Conference, when, if it has worked successfully, it may lead to a more general agreement.
>
> The Congress further resolves that the British Government be earnestly requested to call such Conference at the earliest possible moment.
>
> II
>
> The Congress expresses the opinion that, for the moment, a practical method of such an arrest of armaments would be an agreement by the contracting States for a short term of years not to exceed the average total expenditure on army and navy, jointly or separately, during a similar preceding period.[1]

[1] Similarly, Robertson, *Patriotismus, Militarismus, Imperialismus*, 1910, p. 122; Delassus, *Précis d'enseignement pacifiste*, 1910, p. 129.

These resolutions were accepted.

Since the Second Hague Conference the parliaments have again taken up especially the question of armaments. We mention the fact that the American House of Representatives has repeatedly reduced the number of war-ships demanded by the Government.[1]

A very significant declaration was made in the German Reichstag on March 18, 1909, by the Prussian Minister of War, von Einem:

> Certainly, if things continue in such a way that better relations to England and an entente cordiale, even with France, may be achieved, it is possible to entertain the thought of decreasing the army and disarming.

An invitation which the United States, on the basis of the Bennett bill, made to the Powers in June, 1910, to establish a commission for the study of the question of armaments, was unsuccessful because the majority of the Governments were not interested in the matter.

As the last convention relative to the question of armaments, we mention the agreement made in March, 1913, between Austria-Hungary and Russia. In order to do away with the tension which existed between them, the two States bound themselves to reduce to 150 men, the normal strength of the Russian company, the companies which they maintained at the Galician frontier, while, before the conclusion of the agreement, the companies had 200 men.[2]

At the Universal Peace Congress at The Hague, in 1913, Professor Dr. Ludwig Quidde submitted a draft of an armament convention which is by far the most detailed and most profound that has been made, and which, certainly, marks a turning point in the discussion of the problem. Because of its great length, the text of the draft will be reserved for the second part of this work.

[1] Eighteenth Peace Congress, Stockholm, 1910, p. 349; and Nineteenth Peace Congress, Geneva, 1912, p. 96

[2] See also Art. 2, No. 4, and Art. 6 of the Treaty of Peace of Bucharest of 1913, whereby Bulgaria had to engage to raze various fortresses and to reduce its army within a short period to peace strength.

# CHAPTER IX

## The Anglo-German Negotiations

From 1911 on, Great Britain did not limit herself to general impulses in the question of armaments, but several times addressed direct proposals to Germany. In this connection three successive efforts must be considered.

### § 1. The Exchange of Information[1]

In an address before the British House of Commons on March 13, 1911, Sir Edward Grey spoke as follows:

I have always held that frank exchange of information between the two Governments, through their naval attachés, would guard against surprise. It would convince each nation and the world that neither was trying to steal a march upon the other, and it would have a pacific effect. It may be that within the limits of the German Naval Law some retardation of naval expenditure may be effected. It may be that agreement would make it certain that there would be no addition to the present program in Germany.

Thereupon the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg made the following declaration before the Reichstag on March 30, 1911:

The English minister has expressed the thought that an exchange of information between England and Germany concerning each other's naval constructions would guard against surprise and convince both nations that neither was trying to steal a march upon the other. By means of the exchange of information the other nations, too, would be informed as to the relation of England to Germany and that would also serve the general peace.

We have been able to agree with this thought all the more readily as our naval construction program has from the very beginning lain open to the eyes of the world, and, therefore, we have declared ourselves ready to arrive at an understanding with England, with the hope that thereby the expected assuagement of public opinion in England will take place.

### § 2. The 16 to 10 Proportion

On March 18, 1912, the English Minister of the Navy Churchill made the following declaration in the House of Commons:

When the next two strongest naval Powers were France and Russia, and when those two Powers were also what one might call the most probable adverse diplomatic combination, the two-Power standard was a convenient rule, based upon reality, for us to follow as a guide. The passage of time and the rise of the Navy of a single Power to the first place upon the Continent has changed this. We have no longer to contemplate as our greatest potential danger, the alliance, junction and co-operation of two naval Powers of approximately equal strength, with all the weakness and uncertainty

[1]See *Union interparlementaire, Documents interparlementaires*, No. 5, May, 1911, pp. 70 and 96.

inherent in such combinations, but we have had for some time to consider the growth and development of a very powerful homogeneous Navy, manned and trained by the greatest organising people of the world, obeying the authority of a single Government, and concentrated within easy distance of our shores. In consequence the two-Power standard, if applied to Europe alone, would be quite inapplicable, because wholly inadequate. On the facts of today, the Navy that we should require to secure us against the most probable adverse combination would not be very much greater than the Navy we should require to secure us against the next strongest naval Power. In order, therefore, to provide a reason for the necessary measures which have been taken during the last few years, it has become customary to extend the two-Power standard so as to include the United States of America, and thereby, I think, the two-Power standard has lost much of its good sense and its reality. The time has come to readjust our standards in closer accord with the actual facts and probable contingencies. The actual standard in new construction—I am not speaking of men or establishment—which the Admiralty has, in fact, followed during recent years, has been to develop a 60 per cent. superiority in vessels of the "Dreadnought" type over the German navy on the basis of the existing Fleet Law. There are other and higher standards for the smaller vessels, with which I will not complicate the argument, as they do not greatly affect finance.

If Germany were to adhere to her existing law we believe that standard would, in the absence of any unexpected development in other countries, continue to be a financial guide for the next four or five years so far, that it to say, as this capital class of vessel is concerned. Further than that it is idle to speculate. This, however, I must say. I must not be taken as agreeing that the ratio of sixteen to ten could be regarded as sufficient preponderance for British naval strength as a whole above that of the next strongest naval Power. Even if we possessed an Army two-thirds as strong as that of the strongest military Power, we could not agree to that. We are able for the present to adhere to so moderate a standard because of our great superiority in vessels of the pre-"Dreadnought" era, among which the eight King-Edwards and at least eight of the armored cruisers are quite unmatched among contemporary ships. As these vessels gradually decline in relative fighting value, our ratio of new construction will have to rise above the 60 per cent. standard. Every addition which Germany makes, or may make, to the new ships she lays down each year must accelerate the decline in the relative fighting value of our pre-"Dreadnoughts," and, therefore, requires special measures on our part. Applying the standard which I have outlined to the existing German navy law without any addition, that is to say, two ships a year for the next six years, for that is what the law prescribes, and guarding ourselves very carefully against developments in other countries which cannot now be foreseen, it would appear to be necessary to construct for the next six years four ships, and three ships in alternate years, beginning this year with four. That is a little above the 60 per cent. standard, it is over seventeen to ten, but that is the least which will maintain a 60 per cent. standard, and that is what we have had in our minds when we framed the Estimates which are now presented to the House of Commons. If we are now, as it would seem, and as I fear it is certain to be, confronted with an addition of two ships to German construction in the next six years—two "dreadnoughts"—[Hon. Members: "Annually?"] No, two ships spread over the six years, we should propose to meet that addition upon a higher ratio of superiority by laying down four ships in the same period, spreading them, however, con-

veniently over the six years so as to secure the greatest convenience in our finance. If, of course, we were confronted with three ships additional we should lay down six, and the forecast of new construction which I now make under all reserve, would become four, beginning with this year, five, four, four, four, four, as against the German construction of two, three, two, two, three, two. So alternatively, if three were laid down by Germany in the six years, our construction would become five, four, five, four, five, four, as against the German alternation of three's and two's. It is clear that this number could be varied to suit the circumstances.

Let us make clear, however, that any retardation or reduction in German construction, will, within certain limits, be promptly followed here, as soon as it is apparent, by large and fully proportioned reductions. For instance, if Germany elected to drop out any one, or even any two, of these annual quotas and to put her money into her pocket for the enjoyment of her people and the development of her own prosperity, we will at once, in the absence of any dangerous development not now foreseen, blot out our corresponding quota, and the slowing down by Germany will be accompanied naturally on our larger scale by us. Of course both Great Britain and Germany have to consider, among other things, the building of other Powers, though the lead of both these countries is at present very considerable over any other Power besides each other. Take, as an instance of this proposition which I am putting forward for general consideration, the year 1913. In that year, as I apprehend, Germany will build three capital ships, and it will be necessary for us to build five in consequence. Supposing we were both to take a holiday for that year. Supposing we both introduced a blank page in the book of misunderstanding; supposing that Germany were to build no ships in that year, she would save herself between £6,000,000 and £7,000,000 sterling. But that is not all. We should not in ordinary circumstances begin our ships until she had started hers. The three ships that she did not build would therefore automatically wipe out no fewer than five British potential super-"Dreadnoughts," and that is more than I expect them to hope to do in a brilliant naval action. As to the indirect results, even from a single year, they simply cannot be measured, not only between our two great brother nations, but to all the world. They are results immeasurable in their hope and brightness. This, then, is the position which we take up, that the Germans will be no gainers, so far as naval power is concerned, over us by any increases they may make, and no losers for the basis I have laid down by any diminution. Here, then, is a perfectly plain and simple plan of arrangement whereby without diplomatic negotiation, without any bargaining, without the slightest restriction upon the sovereign freedom of either Power, this keen and costly naval rivalry can be at any time abated. It is better, I am sure, to put it quite frankly, for the Parliaments and peoples to judge for themselves.

In the budget commission of the German Reichstag on February 7, 1913, Admiral von Tirpitz, according to a report of the *Kölnische Zeitung* of February 7, 1913 (evening edition), made the following declaration:

Von Tirpitz discussed in some detail the statements of the English Minister of the Navy of last March to the effect that a proportion of 10 to 16 between the German and English battle fleet would be acceptable for the following years. Von Tirpitz declares, for his part, that he, too, from the point of view of his office, would have no objections to such an arrangement. The com-

mission discussed these declarations further. It decided to publish the above declarations of the Secretary of State. The rest of the proceedings were strictly confidential.

In the session of the budget committee of the German Reichstag of February 4, 1914, von Tirpitz made a new declaration of the following tenor:

I did not consider it advisable, and I do not now consider it advisable, if in such a proportion the other types of vessels (cruisers, gunboats, torpedo-boats, submarines), are included. For if we wish to arrive at a proportion of any tangible value, it must be a simple one. The addition of the craft mentioned—especially since England has other needs with regard to the cruisers than we have—would only complicate matters. The two navies have not yet completed the organizations planned by them. Germany needs in her five fleets 41 ships of the line, England for her eight fleets 65 ships of the line. If we assume that the life of a vessel is twenty years, we require for Germany an average annual construction of two ships of the line for purposes of replenishment. *Nor do we intend to construct in excess of this program.* England requires for her 65 ships of the line an annual construction of three ships of the line for purposes of replenishment. But as a matter of fact she has constructed during the last five years: 24 ships of the line, that is 5 ships of the line per annum; 24 *instead of* 15 *ships of the line, which is quite far removed from the proportion of* 16 *to* 10. If under these circumstances we really desire to arrive at an understanding with regard to armaments, it is only natural that *England,* as being by far the most powerful naval nation of the world, would have to make the *positive proposals. I do not doubt that such positive proposals would be examined by us most minutely.*

## § 3. The One Year Naval Holiday

On March 26, 1913, the English Minister of the Navy Churchill made the following declaration in the House of Commons:

It is a practical question; I am not putting any sentiment into my examination of this subject. This is the question: If, for the space of a year, for twelve calendar months, no new ships were built by any nation, in what conceivable manner would the interests of any nation be affected or prejudiced? You have good ships today. They are the best in the world—till better ones are built. Can they not have at least one year's reign before they are dethroned? Why should we not take a naval holiday for one year, so far, at any rate, as new construction of capital ships is concerned?

That is the question that I foreshadowed last year. That is the proposal I repeat this year. It is a proposal, I should like to point out, which involves no alteration in the relative strength of the navies. It implies no abandonment of any scheme of naval organization or of naval increase. It is contrary to the system of no Navy Law. It imposes no check upon the development of true naval efficiency. It is so simple that it could lead to no misunderstanding. The finances of every country would obtain relief. No navy would sustain the slightest injury. We in Great Britian can speak with simplicity and directness upon such a subject. Our naval science is not inferior to that of any other country. Our resources are greater. Our experience is far greater. Our designs at every stage in the world's competition have maintained their old primacy, and, judged by the custom which we receive from other countries, our prices and the quality of our workmanship lie under no reproach. Each

year, so long as new ships are built, we shall build the best that science can project or money can buy. We shall do the utmost to preserve that leadership in design which is no less necessary to naval supremacy than is preponderance in numbers. Sir, it is no appeal of weakness, panting or lagging behind, that we make, but rather an appeal of strength striding on in front. It is an appeal which we address to all nations, and to no nation with more profound sincerity than to our great neighbor over the North Sea. Let me say at once how much we welcome the calm and friendly tone and temper which has characterized recent German naval discussions. After a period of active naval preparation and direct comparison of naval strength, it is very satisfactory to observe that the relations between the two countries have sensibly improved, and that from the perils and anxieties under which Europe has dwelt these many months Great Britian and Germany have known how to draw the conviction that both of them are earnest to preserve the peace unbroken. Sentiments of good will, the growth of mutual confidence and respect, do much to rob the naval rivalries of their alarms and dangers, and permit us to approach the iron facts of the situation with composure and with a certain sense of detachment. Consciousness of our strength and the resolution of all parties in the House to do what is necessary to maintain it, ought to banish from our discussions anything in the nature of scaremongering or bluster which when applied in distortion of military facts are a certain means of producing errors in one's own policy and ill will in the policy of others. There is another mistake which we ought to be able to avoid. We must not try to read into recent German naval declarations a meaning which we should like, but which they do not possess; nor ought we to seek to tie German naval policy down to our wishes by too precise interpretations of friendly language used in the German Reichstag with a good and reassuring purpose. If, for instance, I were to say that Admiral von Tirpitz had recognized that a British preponderance of sixteen to ten in "Dreadnoughts" was satisfactory to Germany, that such a preponderance exists almost exactly in the present period, and that in consequence Germany ought not to begin any more capital ships until we did, that might be a logical argument, but it would, I am sure, do a great deal of harm, and if my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs were to press this point upon the German Government and to urge them through diplomatic channels to build no new ships this year, it would only lead to a direct refusal and subsequent recrimination, which would be very injurious. As a matter of fact the increased German program of three vessels for the year 1913 has already passed the Reichstag, and there is good reason to believe that they will be begun without delay, and no remonstrance or appeal on our part would have any effect that would not be regrettable.

Churchill repeated this proposal on October 18, 1913, in an address which he delivered at Manchester, and in this he added nothing new. Up to the present time, the German Government has not replied.

## CHAPTER X

### Unilateral Reductions of Armaments

In conclusion I shall mention the examples which are known to me of unilateral reductions of armaments, although all of them are without practical importance. As I have stated, France, in March, 1870, reduced her contingent of 100,000 men to 90,000 men. Uruguay, according to the President's message of 1888, diminished her military forces by one-fourth.[1] In 1898, Brazil declined the invitation of the Czar to the First Hague Conference, basing her refusal on the fact that she had anticipated the Conference by selling her vessels of war, by abolishing a part of her arsenals and by reducing her army.[2] In the course of the discussions of the First Hague Conference the Serbian representative, Mijatovitch, declared that immediately after the circular of the Czar Serbia had diminished her peace effectives by one-fourth.[3] In 1906, as has been mentioned, France decreased her Italian frontier fortifications. Moneta alleged, at the Universal Peace Congress of London (1908), that Italy, several years before, had begun to disarm on her own account, but without finding imitators.[4] The Universal Peace Congress of Geneva, in 1912, paid homage, in a resolution which it passed, to the example of the United States of America which, during recent times, had repeatedly restricted their program of naval construction.[5]

[1] See Mérignhac, *L'arbitrage international*, p. 509.
[2] See Mérignhac, *La Conférence Internationale de la Paix*, p. 13.
[3] *Protocole de la Conférence*, II, p. 41.
[4] *Compte rendu*, p. 304.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 288.

# PART II

# THE PROJECTS

# TITLE I

## INDIRECT MEANS

### § 1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERATION

Pastor Otto Umfrid, in his work *Europa den Europäern* (1913, p. 86), expresses himself as follows:

"An effective reduction of armanemts will become possible only when the European Powers will decide to consider each other no longer as rivals inspired with envy, but as associates in a *common* enterprise which will bear the name: Protection of European Culture. This does not mean that it would be necessary to attempt the fusion of all the European Powers and make them one State, in the manner of the fusion of several commercial enterprises. The States would maintain their autonomy, but they would form a syndicate, assuring to each one of them the ownership of its possessions, and the possibility of developing its power with the expenditure of relatively moderate efforts. And what would be the principles which would govern this association of interests between the States? It would be necessary to determine the part of each Power in the burdens made requisite by the measures of collective security; this part would be proportionate to the individual resources of each State. And if by common consent a reduction of armaments were decided upon, it is understood that the quota of each of the Powers would be reduced in proportion. *It is in this reduction of the quota that we must seek the formula for the reduction of armaments.*

"But how shall we estimate equitably the resources of each particular nation? Were we not compelled to admit before that no common measure exists for estimating the lump value of the resources of a people? But it is quite different with the financial capacity of a State. An attempt has been made to draw up a table of the national revenues of the European States, but it has been necessary to adhere to simple evaluations. On the other hand, the finances officially established and published each year, furnish a sufficiently exact idea of the pecuniary capacity of a people.

"In the following table it should not be forgotten, however, that the figures there given are based upon purely arbitrary evaluations and that no one could guarantee their absolute exactness. The reason for this is as follows: In the first place the various States do not make their financial reports in the same manner: Austria, for example, draws up its budget for a period of two years, while the other States use annual budgets. On the other hand, a general survey is insufficient because the various Governments use very different administrative methods with regard to the different enterprises of public utility, such as railroads and education. In the case of some, the railroads and public education are assured by the State; in the case of others, these same services are entrusted to private or communal initiative. Finally, the German Empire presents a particularly difficult case. If, for instance, we should compare only the direct revenues of the Empire with those of the other States, we would arrive at this singular result, namely that Germany, in spite of its wealth, would figure only with 2900 millions of marks, while Russia, although being poor, would figure with 9500 millions. Moreover, we could not simply add

the revenues of the Empire and the revenues of the various German States in particular in order to obtain, in this case, a total revenue of 9000 millions in round numbers. This result would be erroneous not only because the profits from the operation of the railroads constitute for the German States a considerable source of revenue, while for the other European States this factor disappears for the almost exclusive benefit of private companies, but also because we must take the following fact into account: an important part of the expenses of the collective German budget is due to the particularism which exists to this day, while other nations have for a long time already adopted the principle of administrative centralization. This particularism, peculiar to the German political temperament, undoubtedly permits the State to exercise a very careful control in the various spheres of public life, but it also makes possible an exceptional increase of expenses in connection with administrative red tape. In order to make a comparison between the revenues of the State of Germany and other nations, we must for a moment consider the German Empire as a centralized State in which the railroad revenues, as well as the expenses of separate administration of the various confederate States, will not be taken into account. And we do not feel that we are exaggerating our estimate by deducing from this source 3000 millions of marks and by rating the financial capacity of the German Empire at 6000 millions of marks of State revenues. After these various preliminary considerations, the table shows the following figures:

| | |
|---|---|
| Great Britain, revenue in round numbers | 5,560,000,000 |
| Germany, " " " " | 6,000,000,000 |
| France, " " " " | 4,050,000,000 |
| Russia, " " " " | 9,520,000,000 |
| Austria, " " " " | 4,128,000,000 |
| Italy, " " " " | 2,046,000,000 |
| Total | 31,304,000,000 |

Since the war budget of all these great Powers together amounts to about 7000 millions of marks—until 1912—the respective expenses for each State, in proportion to its revenues, would be as follows:

If the expense corresponding to 31,300 millions of State revenues is 7000 millions of marks, we must figure for 1 million of revenues $\frac{7000}{31,300}$

According to a normal distribution, the quota of the various Powers would be as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Great Britain: | $\frac{7000.5560}{31,300}$ | = | 1243.87 millions of marks |
| Germany: | $\frac{7000.6000}{31,300}$ | = | 1341. 6 " " " |
| France: | $\frac{7000.4050}{31,300}$ | = | 905.58 " " " |
| Russia: | $\frac{7000.9520}{31,300}$ | = | 2128.67 " " " |
| Austria: | $\frac{7000.4128}{31,300}$ | = | 923.62 " " " |
| Italy: | $\frac{7000.2046}{31,300}$ | = | 457.48 " " " |

We refrain here from making a comparison between these figures corresponding to a norm and the actual figures of military and naval expenses which each of the Great European Powers imposes upon itself. Our basis always remains that which the collective budgets of all these States offer us for the year 1912. It would not be the same for the current year, the new requirements of which greatly modify matters and do not make it possible at the present time to give exact figures.

But if a general convention could be arrived at between the States under conditions such as we have indicated above, it would no longer be necessary for each one of the Powers to surpass the others in preparations for war, but to limit as much as possible the necessary quota, in order to face the expenses occasioned by the measures of general security. The pacifists say: we want a less burdensome peace. Their claim will finally become the device of the nations.

Moreover, by virtue of this general convention, the expenses of armaments could be reduced by one-half, since these armaments would henceforth concern only possible dangers from Asia, Africa or America. Under these conditions, the table for the reduction of armaments would be as follows:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany: | instead of | 1341.6 | millions of marks for war and naval budgets would have only | 670. 8 millions |
| France: | instead of | 905.58 | only | 452.79 " |
| Russia: | " " | 2128.67 | " | 1064.33 " |
| Austria-Hungary: | " " | 923.62 | " | 461.81 " |
| Italy: | " " | 451.48 | " | 228.74 " |
| Great Britain: | " " | 1243.87 | " | 621.93 " |

It is in this way that the possibility of solving the problem of the reduction of armaments appears. If the Powers do not succeed in arriving at an agreement on this basis, or on a similar basis, their economic situation, already so troublesome at present, will finally be hopeless. If, on the other hand, they adopt this proposal, they will speedily free themselves from a veritable bugbear, will breathe easier and will advance more carefree toward a brilliant future."

The project of Umfrid, which the deductions of Schlief (*Der Friede in Europa*, 1892, pp. 450 *et seq.*) had suggested, was supported by Schücking (*Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen*, 1912, p. 323) and Naumann (*Die Hilfe*, a weekly review, Berlin, 1911, p. 148). See also Paris in the *Friedenswarte*, 1907, p. 107.

On the other hand, the idea is attacked in the following words by Dr. Max Kolben in his work *Der aussichtsreichste Schritt zur Beschränkung der Seerüstungs-Ausgaben* (1912, pp. 26 *et seq.*):

The suspension of armaments can not, logically and in principle, form the subject of a hypothesis; in my opinion it is an error to consider it possible and the question is thereby complicated. As has been shown, the security with regard to possible attacks rests simply in the present state of strength. And a truce is not necessary any more than it has been up to the present time. But Umfrid, in the formula which lies at the bottom of his convention, goes further

than to presuppose a suspension of armaments: what he wishes is not only the Truce of God, in the sense of Jules Simon, included in the Police Project of Taft, as in his own defence trust; it is also the formal recognition of the *status quo*. But to all these demands—and Umfrid himself asks with good reason whether the time has come for his proposal—there are opposed, in any case, at the present time, not only the same considerations which render difficult a convention for the suspension of armaments, but other more grave considerations also. These considerations, which I have already brought forth in part in reply to Taft, are derived either from the great distrust which would obtain with respect to the observation of the truce, and this very particularly, or from the vertigo of sovereignty of each of the States.

Add to this the fact that the *status quo* precisely, which should not be attacked by arms, is either a very vague notion, to which the States would not submit, or, if it applies only to territorial conditions, is, on the contrary, too narrow.

II

The following are the remarks of Jacques Novicow at the Eleventh Universal Peace Congress, 1902, at Monaco (*Protocole*, p. 51):

The only possibility of arriving at general disarmament is a question of principles, a question of ideas. At the present time all the nations are imbued with one mad passion: the annexation of foreign territories. Disarmament under these conditions is a chimera. In order to render it possible, the pacifists must first of all show that violent conquest is a dangerous thing for him who commits it.[1]

(At the Universal Peace Congress of Munich, in 1907, Novicow simply said that the right of conquest should be annulled by the European Federation. *Protocole*, p. 70 *et seq.* See also the works of Novicow.)

### § 2. The Creation of a Society of Nations

Duplessix made the following proposal in a report presented to the Universal Peace Congress of London (*Protocole*, pp. 410 *et seq.*):

General disarmament must form the final stage and can only be the consequence of the projected international organization. If we accept neither the federation nor the union, there remains to us only the invention of a bond *sui generis* which is better adapted to the present political situation.

It seems to us that we should take the commercial companies as our model. In these companies, based solely upon interests, associates pool only those of their interests which they deem it advantageous to pool. . . . Very well, it seems to us that this mode of procedure is the only one which can harmonize with the present needs and tendencies of the States, for it is evident

[1]Similarly, Sir Max Waechter, *England, Deutschland und der Friede Europas*, in the May, 1913, number of the *Deutsche Revue*.

that these States would derive inestimable advantages from an association which would improve their common interests, and it is not less evident that they are not likely to include in the union their private life, where each nation must reserve the right of placing itself freely under the political, legislative, administrative and economic régime of its choice, and where, in a word, its home must be reserved, into which the other nations have no right to look, and where they have nothing to say and nothing to do. . . .

International authority will have to be entrusted to a collectivity constituted by means of delegates belonging to all the States comprising the Society of Nations. . . . This authority will be called upon, to be sure, to play a legislative part, but this part will be purely preparatory. The common law and the statutes of the Society will gain force only by virtue of the acceptance of the States. . . .

A legislative council, a judiciary power and an executive power will be instituted.

The executive authority will be constituted by means of an assembly of special delegates. It is this asembly which will set the whole mechanism of the international organization in motion, which will assemble the legislative council subsequently to the transitional period of establishment and will determine the program of its labors. . . . It will represent the entire international authority with regard to the States, will command the international police forces and will manage all the common interests which will be entrusted to it. . . .

## § 3. The Creation of a Tribunal of Compulsory Arbitration

Professor Charles Richet said in the Universal Peace Congress at Stockholm, in 1910 (*Rapport*, p. 177):

As soon as we shall have the compulsory treaty, disarmament will be like a ripe fruit. Consequently let us seek nothing insoluble in the problem which we can not truly solve, the problem of disarmament, when international justice does not exist.[1]

## § 4. The Alliances of the States

In the memorial drawn up upon the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the German Society for Peace, *Die Ausgestaltung der Friedensaktion in Deutschland* (printed in the *Friedenswarte*, 1902, p. 145), Alfred H. Fried said:

There are already in existence certain symptoms which may be considered a partial beginning of disarmament. Such are the military alliances which Great States have made with one another. The object of these alliances is to make it possible for the interested States to maintain their armies with a smaller effective than that which they would otherwise be obliged to have.

[1]Many authorized speakers such as Arnaud, Moch, Dumas, etc., frequently expressed the same thought in various peace congresses.

## § 5. Suppression of Economic Tension

Rear-Admiral Glatzel, retired, writes as follows in the November, 1911, issue of the *Deutsche Revue* (pp. 299 *et seq.*):

How and to what extent is it possible to solve the problem of military and naval expenses? History seems to furnish material facts on this subject which have an important usefulness. When we study the results of the circumstances under which armaments have developed, we note an evident corelation between the increase of these armaments and the aggravation of conditions of political tension; in Germany, for instance, there are sudden leaps in the rising movement of the war budget in the estimates for 1881, 1888 and 1890, that is to say, at periods of political difficulties. And if we consider the graph of the intermediary periods, we also find that there is a corelation: the curve decreases simultaneously in the table of variations of the political barometer and in the table of military expenses. As for naval armaments, one could not maintain, however, that the movement of their increases presents the same flexibility and adapts itself as readily to the jolts of acute political tension. But what counts here, in a necessarily similar degree, is the rivalry of interest which gradually arises in the field of economic and commercial politics. And it is possible to presume that in the future a certain improvement of international relations will automatically bring with it a reduction of armaments, if we limit ourselves to consider this reduction within the bounds of the only method possible at the present time, and which brings with it at least a reduction of increase in proportion to the movement of the population and public prosperity. If it is true that all the imaginable causes of political tension could not be suppressed, the mere attenuation of international rivalries would be practically sufficient. For in our day the interests in a case must be very important and very seriously violated in order to cause a conflict. But, whatever might be said, the origin of modern political tension is the rivalry of economic interests in the world market. As a necessary consequence, and in the sense as we understand it, the problem of the suppression of political tension is identical with that of the attenuation of international rivalry of economic interests. Thus restrained, and although the world's economic system presents constantly growing surfaces of friction, the problem which occupies us does not appear insoluble. There are methods of compensation. We must mention especially two such methods: 1—Private initiative of various economic groups which might form international associations and conventions by virtue of which acute competition would give way to collaboration; 2—The initiative of Governments which might conclude treaties intended to protect against exclusive occupation territories hitherto open and available to international economic competition.[1]

[1] Pandolfi, in an address delivered on June 18, 1893, already made a similar proposal (see the *Conférence interparlementaire*, 1893, p. 51). Similarly, the proposal of Daehne van Varick to establish the freedom of commerce (*Courrier de la Conférence* of October 5, 1907).

## § 6. Renunciation on the Part of Great Britain of the Two-Power Standard, and Establishment of Numerous Naval Stations for Germany

Professor Lujo Brentano, in his article entitled "English Naval Supremacy and Germany" (*Neue Freie Presse*, Vienna, December 24, 1911) says:

If the English were to indulge in calm reflection, they would be obliged to admit that all their overtures hitherto made with a view to a reduction of armaments and naval construction are unacceptable for Germany and do not further the solution of the difficulties. For all these proposals are derived from the principle that the absolute naval supremacy of England must be safeguarded at any price. But Germany could not, under any condition, accept the discussion on this *a priori* without ceding to England the right of control and possibly of destroying German commerce. At the time of the second deliberation on the policy of Sir Edward Grey, on December 14, Lord Charles Beresford declared that it would be a mistake for Great Britain to involve herself in the well founded policy of expansion of a great empire such as Germany; but he took care to repeat once more, in this same address, that it was the duty of England to make felt to the other Powers her firm decision of preserving intact the undisputed supremacy of her flag on the seas. As long as England will persist in this claim, Germany will not cease to develop her navy in accordance with the necessity of safeguarding her interests. Moreover, this English claim has no other effect than that of provoking an increase of the German fleet and of accelerating new construction in Germany. And if for every new unit which Germany constructs, England means to place on the stocks two corresponding units; if, on the other hand, the English people complain under the burden of the increasing taxation and public debt, this is solely due to the fact that Great Britain cannot renounce piracy. But there would be a means of avoiding a war, which is on all sides considered a catastrophe, the consequences of which would be incalculable. This means would lie in a return of England to its good political traditions of the second half of the Nineteenth century. Instead of watching jealously and of obstructing all the paths which the Germans are opening for the pacific development of their economic power, England ought to conclude a frank alliance with Germany. But in order to prove the frankness of such an allinace, England would finally have to consent to proceed, together with the other Powers, to the reform of maritime law, for a long time demanded by it; ocean traffic would once for all enjoy better conditions and would be freed of the nature which it has had since its very beginning and which smacks of piracy; furthermore, England would not only have to abstain from obstruction, but would have to assure her support to Germany when the latter establishes coaling stations and ports in a foreign country. All this would lie in the interest of England herself, for it is only at this price that England would succeed with her inadmissible proposals of restricting construction in the naval shipyards. For Germany would diminish on her own initiative the number of her constructions for the navy to the extent that it would be assured that her merchant marine, in case of war, would no longer be delivered, as the *Spectator*

(January 16, 1897), puts it, to the mercy of England. And at the same time, the English would be freed from the burden which now weighs upon them as the result of the obligation to bear the expenses for a navy which must remain doubly as strong as that of Germany.[1]

## § 7. Suppression of Political Tension

In his book entitled *Le cauchemar de l'Europe* (Strasbourg, Paris, 1912, p. 33), Albert Gobat writes as follows:

Since the armed peace, with the rapidity of a cancer, threatens the existence of the nations and civilization; since neither a federation nor compulsory arbitration will celebrate their triumph in the visible future, and since the expedients by means of which the progress of the ulcer could be arrested appear insufficient, there remains only one last resort, namely to obey the absolute logic of the relation of cause and effect.

The effect is the armed peace, the hideous plague of humanity; the cause is distrust. Once the latter has been suppressed, the former will no longer darken the horizon of the nations. Distrust has been born of Alsace-Lorraine. There its grave should be dug.

Others see in the diminution of the Anglo-German tension an important step for obtaining the reduction of armaments. The President of Columbia University, Butler, expressed himself as follows at the Lake Mohonk Conference of 1909 (*Protocol*, p. 17):

It is just now alike the interest and the highest opportunity for service of America and of the world to bring about the substitution of cordial friendship between England and Germany for the suspicion and distrust which are widely prevailing. When this is done, a long step toward an international agreement for the limitation of armaments will have been taken; new progress can then be made in the organization of the world on those very principles for which the English themselves have time-long stood, and for whose development and application they have made such stupendous sacrifices and performed such Herculean services.

## § 8. Utilization of the Armies for Productive Labor

Captain Ferdinand Durand in his work entitled *Des tendances pacifiques de la société Européenne, et du rôle des armées dans l'avenir* (Paris, 1841, pp. 257, 298) says:

If the French Government enters upon the path which many men point out to it, if it decides to utilize its army of a million men or more, it could preserve it in its entirety, not only without increasing the budget, but with

[1] It is interesting to recall that in 1842 the doctor of medicine, Marchand, in his *Nouveau projet de traité de paix perpétuelle* (Paris) wanted to give England the naval supremacy, as well as the rôle of protector of the seas; Russia, France, Austria and Prussia were to maintain only units of small tonnage to protect their traffic (p. 364 *et seq.*)

an immense advantage for France. The foreign Governments, in the risk of falling, would be compelled to imitate France, and this mass of men which is held united for the purpose of destruction, would be led, by the force of things, to devote itself to useful labor. It is for France to give the example. . . . The regiments of engineers and of artillery can be advantageously employed for the building of railroads, etc., the infantry could be employed for easier tasks. . . . The cavalry could be used especially for agricultural work. . . .

If the kings absolutely insist upon preserving their numerous armies, let them at least utilize them and let them thus lighten the burdens of their peoples. . . .[1]

## § 9. Taking Over and Exploitation of the Armament Industry by the State

Professor Lujo Brentano writes as follows in the *Berliner Tageblatt* (November 12, 1913, morning edition):

Why should a state possessing the monopoly of so many enterprises, not exploit itself the industries which above all touch the vital interests of the nation? It will be difficult to explain this to the unbiased. . . . The economies which would result therefrom with regard to military expenses would be considerable. During the last year there appeared from Methuen & Co., at London, a particularly instructive work by F. W. Hirst, editor-in-chief of the *Economist* of London. This work is entitled *The Six Panics*. It contains a masterly exposé of the methods used by the manufacturers of war materials in the various countries to goad on the zeal for armaments which produce such fine dividends. False reports are spread on what is being done in the war factories of neighboring countries, in order to bring about in the mother countries correspondingly important armament orders. All this would disappear as soon as the Great Powers would decide to furnish on their own account, by means of the industry of the State, all war material which they require. Thus, there would be made available, for the benefit of enterprizes engaged in positive economic development, incalculable millions hitherto devoted to works of destruction. An important cause of the international danger of war would be done away with; this cause is the *peculiar interest which the war industries have in international complications*. Hirst shows how much harm this interest has already caused in its influence upon the press. The hour does not yet seem to have arrived for Germany in which some Wilson will undertake, with iron energy, the work destined to free the German people from all the private interests which hold them by the throat. Until this hour

[1] This idea, already previously brought forth, especially by Ch. Fourier, was very much expanded later by Mme. Griess-Traut (*Transformation des armées guerrières destructives en armées pacifiques productives d'après la théorie de Ch. Fourier*, 1894). The Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Universal Peace Congresses took up the matter in passing. In the Seventh Congress, Gaston Moch attacked the project in a memorial entitled: *Comment se fera le désarmement*. The idea was again taken up by Krantz, *Étude sur l'application de l'armée aux travaux d'utilité publique* (Paris, 1847), by Raoul de la Grasserie, *De la transformation des armées destructives en armées productives* (Paris, 1897), and by Robert Haupt, *Wechselt die Waffen* (Hamburg, 1908). Opposed to this idea: Fried (*Friedenswarte*, 1908, p. 197). See also Bajer, *Armées et flottes productives* (Paris, 1896), also *La Conférence interparlementaire*, pp. 315, 331, 487.

shall have arrived, the friends of peace throughout the entire world must act in unison in their respective countries in order to bring about a control of the war materials industry by the State. A good understanding between the nations of Europe, a condition indispensable for the maintenance of European civilization, could derive advantages therefrom and the German people would see their financial burdens diminished in considerable proportions.[1]

## § 10. Abolition of the Right of Maritime Capture

In his report dealing with the influence which the abolition of the right of capture would have upon the reduction of military expenses, presented to the Seventh National French Peace Congress at Clermont-Ferrand, in 1911, Jacques Dumas speaks as follows (*Compte rendu*, pp. 131 *et seq.*):

If some contest the connection between the problem of the right of capture and that of disarmament *lato sensu*, no one can close his eyes to the influence which the right of capture exercises on naval expenses. But the naval budget represents the most disquieting part of military expenses, in the sense that its advance is much more rapid than that of the war budget. In France, while the war budget has increased only one-third in twenty years, increasing from 600 millions to 870 millions, the naval budget has doubled, increasing from about 200 millions to 400 millions. In Germany, in the same interval, the naval budget has more than quintupled, passing from 75 millions to 425 millions, while the war budget has increased only by one-seventh, passing from 900 millions to one and one-half billion. And as England has remained more attached than ever to her claim of always being in a position to keep abreast with the two most powerful navies of the world, it has appeared that she has suffered the effects of the armaments of her adversaries, since she has had to increase her naval expenses, which in 1890 amounted to only 400 millions, to a sum greatly exceeding one billion in 1910. The budgets of the French and German navies together reach a total only four-fifths as large as that of the English naval budget. We see then how much it costs England, as well the continental Powers, to wish to maintain nevertheless this right of capture, the ineffectiveness of which military history shows so clearly. We see also to what extent the suppression of this pretended right is the primary condition of a check or a slackening in the irregular leaps and bounds of a naval program which threatens to ruin the eventual captor even before the effective capture of a single vessel.

Shall we seek to turn aside this conclusion by maintaining that the great naval units which are constructed at so great an expense do not possess as their sole utility the protection of the merchant marine? If so, what purpose do they serve? That of defending our coasts? The danger of foreign invasion? But surely every one realizes that the hypothesis of a landing is becoming more and more unlikely. We are no longer living in times of the Normans when adventurers were plowing the seas in small boats which could land anywhere. Nowadays armed forces navigate only on vessels of such a tonnage that they require a considerable displacement. Hence, they can approach coasts only at points where the water remains deep up to the shore, and these points are in

[1] This is also the opinion of Dr. Adolf Richter (*Le Palais de la Paix*, 1913, p. 86).

general marked by inaccessible cliffs. Even at points where great ports have been constructed the coast is accessible only at high tide. Who does not know all the trouble which an ordinary steamboat experiences in order to reach the docks of Havre or Bordeaux? Frequently we see transatlantic liners in distress several miles from the shore, their propellers caught in the sand, and it requires the assistance of one or more tugs to drag them slowly and with difficulty to the nearest dock. If vessels of eight or ten thousand tons experience so many difficulties in time of peace and in ports which are especially designed for them, we do not see how larger naval units, two and three times as large, would succeed in landing anywhere at pleasure. If they should make an attempt, their opponent would have ample time to repulse them with success before they could disembark a single man. What the Japanese did at Port Arthur, far from the Russian bases of operation and supply, would be possible only with great difficulty on the shores of Europe within range of the garrisons. If this eventuality should be feared it would be met by coast guards and torpedo flotillas, not to mention the land forces, which would no doubt be able to hold the disembarking troops off, and henceforth those who contemplated the danger could fortify their coast in a less expensive and more final manner by means of defense works on land than by multiplying their squadrons at an extraordinary expense, squadrons which soon become antiquated or may even be swallowed up by the floods before the expiration of their normal period of service. Accordingly, it does not seem that the extraordinary naval program is designed for the safeguard of the coastal frontiers. . . .

I have the honor to submit to you the following draft of a resolution:

I

The Seventh National Peace Congress assembled on June 6, 1911, at Clermont-Ferrand, convinced that the suppression of the right of capture of private property on the sea is a condition essential to the reduction of armaments, or in any case to the limitation of the naval program in a large number of countries, respectfully insists of the French Government that, in the Third Hague Peace Conference, France should not again vote against this reform, as it did in 1907.

II

The Congress appeals to the eminent wisdom of the jurists, economists and pacifists of England that, faithful to the noble example which has been given to them by Richard Cobden, Henry Sumner Maine, Sir John Macdonell, and others of their compatriots, they take it upon themselves to defend in their country the cause of the suppression of the right of capture, which has become an essential condition for the organization of international peace.

The Congress unanimously adopted this resolution.[1]

[1]The same idea has been brought forth very frequently. Thus, for instance, by MACDONELL in his treatise *Some Plain Reasons for Immunity from Capture of Private Property at Sea* (London, 1910); by EICKHOFF at the Interparliamentary Conference at London in 1906; by VON BAR in the June 1, 1907, number of *Marz*, p. 403; by BRENTANO in *Le mouvement pacifiste*, 1912, p. 97; by BARBOSA and SATOW at the Second Hague Conference (*Protocole*, III, pp. 786, 788); the Universal Peace Conference in 1908 adopted a similar resolution. In 1911 KOLBEN expanded the idea, devoting a special treatise to it: *Der aussichtsreichste Schritt zur Beschrankung der Seerustungsausgaben*, Leipzig.

## § 11. The Introduction of a Period of Grace Between the Rupture of Diplomatic Negotiations and the Beginning of Hostilities.

The project of Colonel Michelson at the Second Hague Peace Conference (see Historical Introduction, p. 32) attempted to introduce a period of grace between the rupture of diplomatic negotiations and the beginning of hostilities, in order that the States might assemble their forces and might not be obliged, in time of peace, continually to keep their powerful effectives on a war footing.

# TITLE II

## DIRECT MEANS

### I. The Means of Arriving at a Diminution of Armaments

### § 12. UNILATERAL LIMITATION OR CONVENTIONAL LIMITATION?

#### I

Professor Wilhelm Ostwald writes as follows in his work entitled *Frankreich als Friedensbringer* (1911), pp. 8 *et seq.*:

In order to make clear what I wish to say, I refer my readers first of all to a generally known fact. For six years the Russian Empire has been from the military point of view, defenseless, so to speak. It has no fleet which can defend its ports and no army which can hinder a modern army from crossing its frontiers. Although these conditions prevail for more than a lustrum, it has not occurred to any neighbor to take advantage of this weakness. The result is as follows: If in our day, a European State should renounce its army and navy and trust in the honesty, or let us be more realistic and say in the practical and reciprocal compensation of the interests of its more or less important neighbors, this State would not run any risk with regard to its existence. Nay, it could devote itself to all its duties as a civilized country with the same calmness, yes with a greater calmness, than if it wished to continue, as up to the present time, to bear the almost unbearable expenses of armaments of its "peace army." But I am persuaded that nowhere is this as possible as in France. That is why I express the conviction that it is reserved to the French people to set the example in the accomplishment of the greatest political act of modern history, namely, spontaneous disarmament.[1]

#### II

Jonkheer G. W. van Viersen-Trip writes as follows in *De XX Eeuw* of 1907, p. 259:

In order to solve the question of armaments, Holland and the *small States* should disarm first. For these States do not possess in their armaments any

[1] This proposal has often been made, for instance, by NAQUET (*Le désarmement ou l'alliance anglaise*, 1908), and by GOBAT in the Universal Peace Congress at Stockholm in 1908 (*Protocole*, p. 172 *et seq.*).

According to JULES SIMON (*Almanach de la Paix*, 1891, p. 85) and VON GERLACH (*Documents du progrès*, July, 1908), it is Germany that should begin by disarming its land army. In 1903, at the Twelfth Universal Peace Congress at Havre, unilateral disarmament was proposed by Clark, and in the *Atlantic Monthly* of March, 1909, by JEFFERSON. The Universal Peace Congress of Munich, in 1907, also adopted a resolution in favor of unilateral disarmament (Protocols, p. 104).

The majority, however, is opposed to such a unilateral disarmament. Thus, Minister TITTONI in the Italian Chamber on June 16, 1906; SIR THOMAS BARCLAY in an address delivered before the Stock Exchange of Bremen on June 26, 1906 (see *Friedenswarte*, 1906, p. 131); SIR EDWARD GREY in an address delivered at London on May 14, 1908; MACKENNA before the English Parliament on July 26, 1909; ALFRED H. FRIED (*Das Rüstungsproblem*, 1905, p. 43); TOINET, p. 92 *et seq.*, and QUIDDE at the Interparliamentary Conference of Geneva in 1912 (Protocols, p. 248).

assurance for the protection of their rights; that is the reason why it is precisely in their interest to hasten the development of justice which alone can assure them security. This act in itself would mean more than all the peace conferences together. This indication of confidence would have for humanity the value of a true blessing.

## § 13. Individual Agreements or a World Convention?

In the Universal Peace Congress of Geneva, in 1912, Professor Quidde made the following declaration (Protocols, p. 248):

We could examine the method of individual agreements, as for instance, between England and Germany relative to the limitation of naval armaments. In this there is certainly nothing impossible. But it would not solve the problem, for such an agreement would lose all its value as soon as a third Power would take advantage of the situation and make an increase for its part. The only method would be, therefore, a general and international convention.

Professor Schücking in his work entitled *Die Organisation der Welt* (1909, p. 78 *et seq.*) says:

Of course an individual agreement between two rival naval Powers with regard to armaments is practically possible. And it is rather strange that the Secretary of State (von Tirpitz) has declared in the naval commission that the same conditions which argue against a collective international contract argue likewise against an individual agreement. When, at the Second Hague Conference, an international contract was to be concluded with regard to obligatory arbitration, it was precisely German diplomacy that kept emphasizing the immense difference between a collective contract and an individual agreement, in order to show how much easier it is to realize an individual agreement. And this is precisely true with regard to armaments. We can not yet at this time allow our armaments to be prescribed to us by the forty-six civilized States of all the continents, including those of Asia and America; but we can very well conclude an arrangement with a particular State, as Chile and Argentina have done. Can there be any doubt about the possibility of keeping watch over one another? If so, what is the advantage of having military and naval attachés in foreign countries? Such an individual agreement concerning the limitation of armaments could be concluded on this very day not only with England, but also with France and the German Empire with regard to their land armies. It would doubtless be all the easier to arrive at a conventional limitation of armaments with France, since France by the lack of increase in its population already had to abandon its competition with the German Empire.

## § 14. Does the Question Come Under the Competence of the Hague Peace Conference?

An English committee formed to make preparations for the Third Hague Peace Conference speaks as follows:

1. It would be very deplorable if the opportunity offered by the Third Hague Conference of furthering the solution of this problem were lost, and
2. It would be even more deplorable that the question should be raised again only in form of vague offers or promises and pious aspirations.

The supreme need of the situation is a definitive plan, drawn up with the expert knowledge and the authority of the officers of one of the Great Powers or, better still, of several of the Great Powers in cooperation, under which, when any two or more States are ready to make the experiment an arrest of armaments, partial or complete, may be brought about by international agreement.

The opinion that the question of armaments should be discussed in the Third Hague Conference was held especially by the Universal Peace Congresses (for example those of Geneva in 1912 and of The Hague in 1913), the Interparliamentary Conference of Geneva in 1912 and other peace congresses. See also Fried, in the *Friedenswarte*, 1914, p. 123.

However, some authorities are also opposed to this. Nippold writes (*Die zweite Haager Friedensconferenz* (1911), vol. II, pp. 265 *et seq.*):

For dealing with a political problem which is as complicated as that of disarmament and depends upon purely political considerations, they have, in view of their numerous other tasks, neither the necessary time nor place at their disposal.

It would naturally be different if the States would previously come to an agreement really to accomplish something in this field. Then it would be possible to undertake an examination of the question all the more readily because in addition to its solution there could easily be reached a compromise concerning other important questions.

*In truth, I believe that, although it is never the case, if the nations should* really approach each other with regard to an understanding on the question of disarmament, it would always be better to deal with this matter in a special conference which would concern itself solely with this question. The quite special importance of the discussion fully justifies the convocation of such a conference.

The English delegate to the Interparliamentary Conference of Geneva, Lough, shared the view of Nippold (*Compte rendu*, p. 252).

The following is a declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Davignon made before the Belgian Senate on March 25, 1914 (*Annales parlementaires*, p. 159):

We are convinced that this study can be made expediently by an international assembly only if each great military and naval Power has previously decided, through an expert national commission, what it will be able to accomplish, and in so far as a concert is established between these great Powers on the limitation of armaments.

## § 15. Initiative of the Small States

The Universal Peace Congress of Geneva, in 1912, adopted, among other resolutions, the following (*Compte rendu*, p. 289):

The International Bureau of Peace is charged with inviting the small European Powers (beginning with Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland), to negotiate jointly with the Great Powers with a view to persuading them to cease the increase of their armaments, and finally, to reduce them.

# CHAPTER I

## Proposals Which Indicate Several Possibilities

### § 16. Proposals of Kamarowski

Count Kamarowski, in his article entitled "Reflections on the Increasing Armaments of Europe," which appeared in the *Revue de droit international*, 1887, says:

We do not understand disarmament in the absolute sense of the term, but as a simultaneous and gradual measure executed by the European States in conformity with the principles decided upon by common agreement. The principles which fix the size of the armies may be settled in accordance with the indications of actual life. They would be, for instance, the size of the population, the exigencies of internal security, the size of the extra-European territories and colonies, etc., which would have to be taken into consideration in order to determine the effective of the armies. M. von Holtzendorff, in rejecting the idea of disarmament, remarks that the States situated in the center of Europe are more exposed to the danger of attack than those placed at its extremities. . . . M. von Holtzendorff seems to forget that the reform proposed by us would have to be general and simultaneous; therefore, it could not threaten the one group any more than the other. The greatest danger for all in our day consists without doubt in the general distrust and in the disposition of each one to attack his neighbor under the most frivolous pretexts.

In view of the extreme complexity of this reform and of its novelty in the practice of the States, its realization might be recommended for a certain period, in order to accustom the Governments and the peoples to its full realization in the future.

### § 17. Proposals of Rogalla von Bieberstein

The Lieutenant-Colonel, retired, Rogalla von Bieberstein, says in the *Zukunft* (Berlin, number for December 3, 1898):

The least that could be done with a view to a limitation of armaments would be this: the Powers, while reserving the future improvement of their war material and equipments, could bind themselves not to strengthen by numerical increase of the various land and sea units the present condition of their armaments; or again, there could be established for the numerical size of the permament armies a quota which would be in proportion to the number of able men in each country, but which would take into account the necessity of the small States for having at their disposal a proportionately larger quantity of men, in order to assure their security and to protect their colonies. This proportional quota would allow the great Powers a maximum of three-fourths per cent. with regard to the figure of their population; and if it were

desired to agree to still greater alleviations, this maximum might even be reduced to one-half per cent. But, on the other hand, the limitation of armaments might be determined also by an ordinary budget measure. The Governments would decide to restrict that part of the revenue which hitherto they allotted to the war budget; they would agree to reduce that part—about one-fourth or one-third in the case of the Great Powers—to one-sixth or one-eighth of the total revenue; and they would develop their armaments, within the limits of this principle, entirely at their will, even with respect to their permanent effectives.

## § 18. Proposals of the American Preparatory Committee

The opinion of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Hague Conference (*Advocate of Peace*, January, 1914, p. 10) is as follows:

The committee sees three ways for bringing this limitation to pass: First, by limiting armaments or budgets, by fixing a standard which is beyond the present efficiency; second, by fixing the standard of armaments or budgets at the present efficiency; third, by fixing the standard of armaments or budgets below the present efficiency.

## § 19. Proposals of the English Preparatory Committee

A committee formed in England for the Third Hague Peace Conference reached the following conclusions:

This committee is conscious that the inquiries proposed above can be carried out adequately only by the Governments themselves; and it regards its main work as accomplished in urging that these inquiries should be undertaken forthwith. As, however, the Committee has had before it the results of a close study of what occurred in 1899 and 1907, and of the discussions of the subject, it ventures to add, for what they may be worth, certain conclusions at which it has arrived with regard to the British aspect of the problem in particular, and the path along which a solution may be most easily attained. These conclusions are as follows:

A. A limitation of armaments may be either partial or general, applying to armies only, or navies only, or to both, and being carried out by agreement between only two, or between a number of States. We would urge the British Government to be prepared to support any of the possible alternatives, and to participate in any experiment, great or small.

B. The three great factors in the problem are Money, Men and Material: that is to say existing expenditure may be limited, en bloc or in detail; the existing number of men under arms or at call may be limited; the existing weapons, ammunition, and other material of war may be stereotyped, the adoption of new types being forbidden. Of these three factors, that of expenditure appears to be by far the easiest of regulation.

The relative strength of armies and navies in men and material is evidently measurable, for it is, in fact, measured every year by rival War Offices and admiralties for the purpose of counter-preparations. But the fact that one State has to estimate for its own purposes the value of the ships, regiments, guns, rifles, etc., . . . of one or more other States, gives us no assurance

that a common international measure could be agreed upon. Certainly, it would be very complicated, and difficult to arrive at; and, when arrived at, it would seem to require very extensive supervision if differences were not constantly to occur.

The debates at The Hague in 1899 sufficiently showed the strength of the opposition likely to be evoked by any attempt to stereotype weapons, that is, to restrain the use of new inventions.

The money test, on the other hand, appears to be comparatively easy of application. It covers all other factors. It effectively enlists public interest, and in every parliamentary State it enlists, also, the vigilance of deputies accustomed to the control of national expenditure. For this reason, an agreement to limit expenditure is assured of important national support for its scrupulous fulfilment, the simplest and most convenient kind of control.

C. Probably this financial basis is the only one on which an agreement between a number of Powers covering both military and naval establishments could at the outset be arrived at. Most of the objections raised at The Hague in 1899 would be irrelevant to a formula so simple as this:

"The signatory States agree that, during the three years following the date of the signature of the present Act, their peace expenditure upon military forces, naval forces, and military and naval works respectively, shall not exceed the average of such formal and recurring expenditure during the three years preceding the signature of the present Act."

The invention of new weapons would continue; but the agreement would put a heavy brake on the process. Presently, more detailed agreements as to the number of ships, military units, and men, might be adopted. Then, finally, an attempt might be made to stereotype weapons and munitions. One step at a time; and the financial step is at once the simplest and most far-reaching.

D. In view of the peculiar position of Great Britain and the Empire, the British Government may conclude that the only initiative it could itself usefully propose would be for an arrest of naval competition. For this step, the outlook is much more favorable than it formerly was. The support of two Great Naval Powers—the United States and France—as well as of Spain and several smaller States, is already assured. That of Japan and Italy is highly probable. If Russia will not now follow France and England, there must be something strangely wrong with the Triple Entente. There remain Germany and Austria-Hungary. In fact, the relations of England and Germany are the heart of the problem, and the declaration of Admiral von Tirpitz quoted above gives ground for hoping that Germany will not prove as irreconcilable as in 1899 and 1907.

Should she do so, the question of a naval standstill between the other States named, supported by a naval defense treaty, must inevitably arise.

E. An agreement for a naval arrest should apply not only to the total annual expenditure during the period, but also, specifically, to the expenditure on new shipbuilding.

F. In making any such proposal, the British Government must carry with it the self-governing Dominions; it must be made perfectly clear that the whole armaments expenditure of the Empire is included in the agreement, and that it will not be stultified by "gifts" of warships, or other aid.

G. A certain machinery of technical supervision may be regarded as necessary. In the case of a limited agreement—for instance an Anglo-German naval arrest—this machinery would, perhaps, best take the form of a Joint Commission of naval, financial, and other experts appointed by the two Governments directly with power to appoint a referee in case of difference. In the case of a larger agreement, embracing a number of Powers, a series of Technical Committees might be named by the Permanent Council at The Hague. In either case, the agreement should provide for the reference of any dispute as to its execution to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

## CHAPTER II

### Proposals of a Special Nature

### § 20. The Proportion of 2 to 3 Between Germany and Great Britain

Rear-Admiral Schlieper in the *Tag* (Berlin) of February 11, 1912, says:

> It might be possible to arrive at an understanding with England to the effect that a proportion of 3 to 2 be recognized; but we must have a strong fleet even for England.

The same opinion is expressed in an anonymous article of the *Deutsche Revue* (February, 1912, p. 129) entitled "The Anglo-German Agreement," as well as by Barker in the *Deutsche Revue* (April, 1912, p. 2).

Admiral von Tirpitz declared on February 7, 1913, in the Budget Commission of the German Reichstag, that a proportion of 10 to 16 between the German and English fighting fleets appeared to him to be acceptable (see *Historical Introduction*, p. 38).

The Vice-Admiral, retired, von Ahlefeld, speaks against such plans in an article entitled "A Basis for an Anglo-German Agreement," in the *Deutsche Revue* of May, 1912, p. 142. He says:

> What would numbers alone mean in fixing the actual strength of a fleet if the size of each vessel has not also been determined? Each navy in this case would increase to the greatest possible limits the size of its vessels, and even more rapidly than up to this time we would advance from vessels of 25,000 tons to vessels of 50,000 tons and more. And even if, for the purpose of preventing this, we should desire to determine the displacement likewise, there would be nothing gained. For it is very easy for the engineers, in their building plans of a vessel, to transfer the water-line one-half meter lower. They would thus indicate an official figure of displacement which the displacement of the vessel ready for action could easily exceed by ten per cent; in other words, they would construct a vessel which, to judge by the plans, would measure 27,000 tons, for example, but perhaps 30,000 in reality. Or shall we perhaps, in order to prevent such "arrangements," station someone upon our respective ships to watch over construction and displacement? That is doubtless hardly possible. Meanwhile, even if the principal measurements of vessels, their length, their breadth of beam, their displacement, should be fixed, that would not yet have any great significance with regard to their actual fighting force. The machines, cannon, torpedoes, etc., would only be more rapidly perfected and would be more expensive. Admitting, however, that in spite of all it might be possible to conclude an agreement which besides the number of large vessels would fix also the strength of each unit—as

I have said, I dispute the possibility of such an agreement—the two navies would still have entire liberty to construct not only large vessels but also vessels of another type, perhaps hardly smaller, and that in unlimited number, by which the strength of such a fleet would perhaps become quite different from what it would be expected to be, according to the proportion fixed in the agreement. In fact the English have already placed under construction such an intermediary type, from which I infer that the idea of considering as a basis of the agreement the number of large vessels has already taken a greater hold upon them than upon us. And now, in case I should find agreement with what I have set forth, but it should be objected that under those circumstances a more detailed agreement must be worked out instead of one which includes a simple numerical proportion, I shall state that there would still remain the inequality of preparation of the crews.

### § 21. One Year Holiday in the Construction of Fleets

The project of a one year holiday in the construction of fleets was recently suggested, on March 26 and October 18, 1913, by Churchill (see *Historical Introduction*, p. 38). As early as 1894 Jules Simon, in the *Figaro*, had proposed a "Truce of God" which was to last until the end of the century (see also p. 70).

In this connection we mention the considerations of the naval captain, retired, L. Persius, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of March 27, 1913 (evening edition), and of November 8, 1913 (morning edition):

The idea of composing the squadrons of 7 or 6 vessels only, in place of 8, as was hitherto the case, and of trying to reach an agreement on this subject, in order to decrease the number of vessels placed into service, would not be practicable for tactical reasons. A whole squadron could be dropped and even a whole division; but it will never be possible to reduce by one or two units the number of vessels in a squadron. But this does not prevent us from paying homage to the project. . . .

But several questions might be asked. Thus: Is not the idea of applying the one year holiday to the construction of vessels of war alone a litttle complicated? Then, where is the dividing line between "large" and "small" fighting vessels? Would it not be better not to permit during a period of twelve months *any* new construction, be it of vessels of the line, cruisers, torpedo boats or submarines? Would not such a determination prevent many divergencies of estimate? In deciding that no article intended for any new construction should be included in the naval budget of a certain year, the difficulties which might arise would be avoided in the simplest manner possible. Doubtless Churchill is convinced when he proposes his arrangement that it presupposes a loyal observance everywhere. Is he absolutely certain that no irregularity and no inequality would result? And how does he conceive of the settlement of the possible differences? Would he be in favor of *international control*? If so, how would that be exercised? A reply to all these questions is lacking in the address of Churchill, still the reply is

necessary if we wish the project to become popular. It is not necessary that the program should lack certain bases.

And now, and this is the principal point, Lord Churchill has put the cart before the horse in making his offer first to Germany. He ought to know that the greatest pride of the German is his navy. The German often considers as a personal insult any attack made by any one who can inflict any harm at all, against the progress of his fleet. Churchill should never have failed to take this factor into account. Before turning to Germany with his proposal of a one year universal holiday in the construction of war-ships, he should have shown black on white the good intentions of the *United States* and above all of *France* and *Russia* with regard to such an arrangement. It is probable that he can hope for the approval of the United States, to judge by discussions which took place in that country several days ago in the House of Representatives, discussions in the course of which the Speaker Champ Clark characterized as the "height of idiocy" the present international rivalry in the construction of fleets. Furthermore, if all the others lead the way, it is very unlikely that Germany will remain outside. There is no reason for believing that German chauvinism is as violent as that. Practical reason will win the day.

## § 22. Construction of Fleets in Accordance with the Importance of Exportation

Professor Bernhard Harms, in his article entitled "England and Germany" (*Deutsche Revue*, March, 1910, p. 291) says:

Perhaps we could accept an arrangement by virtue of which the two Powers would bind themselves to develop their navy only in proportion with the importance of their export commerce;—but the English would probably not be able to control their vexation in view of the new credits which we would have to add in this case to our naval budget. But, in spite of all, the only basis possible for the establishment of international conventions relative to naval armaments is the interests[1] of export commerce.

## § 23. Exchange of Naval Construction Plans

The idea of an exchange of information concerning naval construction plans was suggested, especially by the English delegate Sir Edward Fry in the plenary session of August 17, 1907, of the Second Hague Peace Conference (see *Historical Introduction*, p. 29).

Thereupon Sir Edward Grey renewed this proposal in the House of Commons on March 29, 1909, and March 13, 1911. The Chancellor of the German Empire von Bethmann-Hollweg declared in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that Germany and England had concluded an

[1] The conservative *Reichsbote*, Berlin, speaks as follows on this subject on March 26, 1911: "This proposal is worth being taken into consideration, for Germany could then construct a fleet which would only be inferior by 15 per cent. to that of England."

arrangement in the proposed sense (see *Historical Introduction*, pp. 33–34).

In the Peace Congress of Stockholm (*Protocole*, p. 176), Lucien le Foyer renewed this project. (See also the article of Friedlaender in the *Völker-Friede* of 1911, p. 66 *et seq.*) The *Deutsche Warte* Berlin, wrote on April 1, 1911:

It is unfortunately probable that the information will deal also with the size and the *armament* of the projected units. But it is not in our interest that England should learn anything with regard to this. Once we have admitted the construction of large battleships, we have slowly and laboriously arrived at our present manner of considering the question, which is that we must construct stronger units than those of our most probable opponent. This is a military necessity. Why should we not profit by our technical ability to build, from the military point of view, more perfectly than England? We should sacrifice this opportunity if we permitted communications in advance to be made to England. And who will guarantee us that our information will not some fine day *travel to Paris* or to some other quarter, if it should conform with the political requirements of England? Therefore: *videant consules!*

## § 24. Disarmament of the Frontiers

Gaston Moch, in his treatise entitled *Vers la fédération d'occident: désarmons les Alpes* (1905, p. 31 *et seq.*[1]) says:

Separated by a mass of mountains in which the passes are very few, France and Italy have fortified these passes and created special troops intended for the defense of these difficult regions. Thus, each of them possesses fortifications which have no reason except the enmity of their neighbor, and troops intended solely to fight against this neighbor. All this has become useless now that a condition of juridical peace has been established along the frontier from Mont Blanc to Menton.

The Alpine troops, on the other hand, are not, by reason of their specialization, of any relative use in other possible theaters of war. Hence, if they were abolished (or at least partially, to begin with) neither France nor Italy would be weakened at all.

For this abolishment no negotiations of any kind are necessary; such discussions would be all the more delicate since external influence might be brought to bear in order to complicate matters.

No, not negotiations, but only the free initiative of one of the interested Powers. The other Government, in case it should not be inclined to act, would be immediately obliged by the most formidable pressure of public opinion to enter in its turn upon the path of disarmament. . . .

We have, in the Alps, at Albertville, at Grenoble, at Mont Cenis, at Briançon, at Nice, useless forts leading the most difficult and hence the most useless

[1]Cf. the Rush-Bagot Convention; the neutralization of the Black Sea and of the zone between Sweden and Norway; the resolution made in December, 1906, by the French Chamber, to diminish the credits for the fortifications against Italy; similarly the Russo-Austro-Hungarian Agreement of 1913 (see *Historical Introduction*).

existence, often within range of an Italian troop with which they fraternize. Let us abolish the garrisons and leave the works, until they are dismantled, under the supervision of a plain caretaker, as is already done during the bad season in the case of the highest points. And let us also disband our Alpine troops!

Let the faint-hearted be reassured; this will not be done instantaneously, but gradually, which will make it possible to affect the future conduct of Italy.

It goes without saying that these troops should not be directed to other garrisons; for in that case, while disarming the Alps, we would only be reinforcing the armaments throughout the rest of the country. They must be disbanded purely and simply. . . .[1]

[1]Cf. also the proposal of BLYMYER, § 28, II, p. 77 *et seq.*

It is worth while, in connection with the project that has just been presented, to consider the contents of the correspondence sent from Milan to the *Kölnische Zeitung* of April 21, 1914 (first morning edition, first page). The article is entitled "The Military Activity of France at the Frontier."

"A few years ago the political relations of France and Italy were still so friendly that the two States paid only little attention to the fortification of their frontiers. But the Tripoli expedition changed matters considerably. France regarded the Italian conquests in Northern Africa with envious eyes, and her feelings were clearly shown in the so-called Manouba incident.

"Henceforth Italian sentiment with regard to France likewise changed, and all the efforts of a small number of Italians, who formed a Franco-Italian Committee of Friendship, did not succeed in destroying the distrust, once it had taken root. Under these conditions the military activity of France at the Italian frontier deserves to be considered with greater attention.

"Thus, quite recently the stronghold of Bourg-Saint-Maurice in Savoy was considerably reinforced and provided with large barracks in which there is room for more than 1000 men. Furthermore, two new forts are under construction, *Courbaton* and *Des Têtes*, each of which can hold about 300 defenders. Not long ago the strategic railway from Moutiers to Bourg-Saint-Maurice was opened, whereby the concentration of 100,000 men is made possible in that part of Isère which is near the Italian frontier. A military purpose is also to be ascribed to the line starting from Saint-Gervais, passing Contamines and Bonhomme and ending at Bourg-Saint-Maurice. In Italy, naturally, these preparations are followed with the greatest interest and, from the military side, corresponding measures are loudly demanded. Up to the present the train does not pass Aoste and the question is being studied as to whether it is desirable to prolong the line by 30 km. as far as Pré-Saint-Didier, in order to facilitate the eventual march of the Italian troops. In view of the tension which exists between the two Latin sister States, a tension which instead of diminishing is increasing, it is very probable that this project will soon be carried out."

# CHAPTER III

## Limitation of the Means of War

### § 25. Limitation of the Means of War on Land

This question was dealt with in a detailed manner at the First Hague Peace Conference as far as the perfection of rifles, guns, powder and explosives is concerned (see *Historical Introduction*, p. 13 *et seq.*). Thereupon, *Professor H. Fatio* at the Universal Peace Congress of Lucerne in 1905 (*Rapport*, p. 188 *et seq.*), presented the question of the abolition of artillery:

We have seen that the principal cause for the failure of the means proposed up to the present, is the lack of confidence.

What can we do to gain confidence?

We need more security, and in order to obtain this as far as possible, the first thing to do for the present (without including, of course, the development of propaganda and arbitration), *is to render war more difficult*, which leads us to formulate the problem as follows:

*To increase the difficulties of the offensive, while decreasing those of the defensive.* In order to attain this result, the best means is not, as we have seen, to begin with the diminution of the effectives, while leaving the armies intact in all their parts, but to mutilate them.

It should not be forgotten that an army is a complete organization, composed of various branches assisting and complementing one another.

Our idea would consist primarily in proposing the abolition of one of the most important branches, namely, the artillery, which plays the preponderating part because of its long range, its precision, its rapidity, and the fatal effect of its fire, together with its extreme mobility.

But this does not suffice, for if everything else remains equal in the offensive and the defensive, we should only have obliged military men to modify their fighting methods and we should have perhaps rendered war a little less frightful.

What we desire to do is to place the offensive in a state of marked inferiority with regard to the defensive, and, in order to obtain this result, if we should propose to abolish all movable artillery, on the other hand, we propose to preserve the fortifications of every kind, well armed with cannon which remain fixed in their places, with an absolute prohibition of having them follow in any manner the armies on the march, each country remaining free to fortify itself to the extent that it considers it necessary.

The objection has already been made that certain countries have frontiers exposed over large stretches of territory and that it is not possible to fortify them completely. We do not think that is a very serious objection against the practicality of our idea; for if it is not possible to prevent absolutely an army from invading enemy territory, the means that we indicate would at least render the invasion very difficult and so dangerous that the Governments would be more readily disposed to accept the settlement of their differences by arbitration. Our ambition does not go any further for the time being.

In fact, we do not see how an army not possessing any cannon, after having passed the defensive works of the frontier, could maintain itself against an army disposing of impregnable points, making the great highways, the passages and the railroads impracticable, while the strategic and political points can not be forced.

The defense would have all the more freedom of action and mobility in proportion as its strongholds were judiciously chosen and more numerous.

We do not claim, we repeat, that in adopting our proposal war will become entirely impossible, but it seems to us manifest that the invading armies, when once in enemy territory, would be *in an unpleasant situation and would surely find it impossible to gain a serious and decisive advantage.*

But the problem is complicated; alas, war is waged not only on the land and beneath it, it is waged also on the sea and under the sea, while it will soon be waged also in the air.

Let us see how we can weaken the offensive of the navies.

In our great ignorance in matters of the sea, the only means which seems to us to correspond to the abolition of movable artillery on land, is *the abolition of the high seas torpedoes, the other torpedoes being maintained for the defense of the coast. With the absolute interdiction of landing artillery* it seems to us that we shall have rendered as equivalent as possible the difficulties of the offensive in war on sea and in war on land.

## § 26. Limitation of the Means of War on Sea

### I. *Diminution of the tonnage of displacement*

The naval captain, retired, L. Persius, in his article entitled "A Method for the Diminution of the Cost of Fleets," which appeared in the evening edition of the *Berliner Tageblatt* of February 3, 1914, says:

Outside of the prospects which may some day confront us as a result of the increase of the French fleet and perhaps of the Russian fleet, England finds herself faced by this very simple fact: If she means to continue her advance at the rate of 16 units to 10, she must have 98 vessels of high tonnage for 61 German vessels of similar tonnage. And if we figure twenty years as a period of renewal, Germany must place on the stocks three units per annum and England must construct five at the same time. Thus, without mentioning the costs of maintenance or of special credits for the construction of cruisers, torpedo-boats, submarines, dirigibles, airplanes, etc., the British taxpayers must every year face expenses necessary for placing five dreadnoughts on the stocks. Doubtless that is not frightening the fanatical partisans of armaments. But do they still feel at ease when confronted by the following question? If the increase of tonnage of displacement continues, what will the budget amount to in several years, when at the present time it has already reached a billion? Sixteen years ago, when Germany passed her first law for the navy, the vessels in question had a displacement of 12,000 tons and cost 24 millions of marks. These figures were slightly higher for England. In our day, vessels of 30,000 tons with a net cost of 60 millions of marks in round figures are in style. It is in order to examine whether this "style," like so

many others, could not be changed to the greatest advantage of the taxpayers. In the case of the last ten years there has been no cessation of the increase of the displacement tonnage of war vessels; there has been no cessation of the increase of their equipment with regard to the caliber of the guns and the torpedoes; there has been no cessation of the increase of their resistance, their dimensions and the quality of their armor; finally, there has been no cessation of the increase of their speed, since the pistons and coal have been replaced by turbine motors and oil fuel. And it is certain that various factors of perfection, as those of pyrotechnics and mechanics, can not be eliminated. It is neither possible nor permissible to hinder the progress of mechanics and the creative genius of inventors. In retaliation we may ask ourselves whether a limitation of the displacement tonnage is not possible. Whether the construction of smaller vessels of war could not bring about economies which are so imperative in these days. England should not be deceived by the conclusion of a convention with Germany on the subject of a reduction of armaments based on figures, however much these two Powers may be interested in this reduction. Such a convention can not be considered because England and Germany could not *alone* undertake, for instance, a one year holiday in the construction of vessels of war. The other naval Powers would have to do the same thing. But France and Russia have not greeted the Churchill proposal very warmly, and, therefore, Lloyd George and Churchill had better seek some other means of diminishing the burdens of armaments. One of these means lies in the *return to moderate displacement tonnage.*

The nation which possesses the most powerful fleet and which is at the head of the movement with regard to the naval industry and technical questions in the whole world, has every opportunity to act according to the prevailing "style." Doubtless the Americans like everything which is "big," and even today they are constructing the largest vessels of the line But the fighting vessel, with a uniform caliber, the dreadnought, is a product of England, while the increase of the caliber of projectiles, now having reached 38 cm., was also effected by the English navy. The United States adopted, only in 1910, the 35.6 cm. piece, after England had introduced on her vessels of the "Orion" type in 1909 the 34.3 cm. piece. As far as Germany is concerned, it was always with little enthusiasm that she fell in with England. But the United States would at the present time be inclined to adopt a reduction of displacement tonnage. With them the question of the limitation of the burdens of armaments finds spokesmen who always have an audience. The House of Representatives adopted with a very great majority—317 votes against 11—the Churchill proposal in favor of a one year holiday in the naval industry. And while Germany, because of its naval law, could hardly restrict the number of its units, the naval administration would certainly be inclined—on condition, of course, that England will give her adhesion, that is to say, that she will take the initiative—to proceed to a reduction of the displacement tonnage. That would bring with it a diminution of expenses. In the first place, the construction expenses would be decreased and in the second place, maintenance would become less burdensome. A vessel of moderate tonnage requires less material for its operation and a smaller crew.

This idea was already previously suggested by Roosevelt in his letter to the First National Peace Congress at New York in 1907 (*Protocole,*

p. 33), as well as by the King of Italy (see Gervais, *Un projet inconnu du roi d'Italie*, in the *Matin* of July 26, 1910).

### *II. Suppression of submarines and prohibition of the perfection of guns.*

The question of the limitation of the means of war on sea was already discussed at the First Hague Conference, as far as the perfection of guns and the use of submarines and vessels with rams are concerned. (*Historical Introduction*, p. 17 *et seq.*).

Recently, in the October, 1910, number of the *Deutsche Revue*, p. 12, the Rear-Admiral, retired, Kalau vom Hofe wrote as follows with regard to the question of submarines:

It appears urgently desirable that the various peace authorities should familiarize themselves with the dangers of submarines and consider whether the *suppression of submarines* for war purposes should not be made a basic demand. This demand would meet with general approval all the more readily since, as far as it is concerned, it is highly important that the war potentiality of the rival fleets of the great naval Powers is not influenced by the existence or the non-existence of submarines. It has no influence upon military effectiveness if France has 100 such craft, England 50 and Germany 10. The number of submarines merely makes it possible for us to estimate the amount of second hand material which will soon encumber the docks of the navies in question. There will soon be international agreement as to the relatively great danger of submarines for modern vessels of war, if the pride of the inventors, the jealousy of the public and private builders, and blind ambition, as well as greed for gain, have been excluded from the deciding council. Of course, opposition may be expected from the naval administrations, which have for years squandered large sums in their search for success. Therefore, an international prohibition of submarines for war purposes should be urgently demanded everywhere in the interest of humanity, and the diminution of superfluous expenses for armaments.

## CHAPTER IV

### Diminution of the Effectives of Peace

### § 27. General Proposals

#### *I. Russian proposal of 1899*

The non-augmentation of the *effectives of peace* was proposed in the Russian motion presented at the First Hague Peace Conference (see *Historical Introduction*, p. 11 *et seq.*).

This project was again suggested and renewed by others at various times. For instance, by Mérignhac, *L'arbitrage international* (1895), p. 513, and by Rühle in the *Friedenswarte*, 1906, p. 62. See also the naval treaty between Argentina and Chile.

As early as 1875, Dr. Fischhof in his treatise entitled *Zur Reduktion der Kontinentalen Heere* (Vienna, 1875, vol. I, p. 8), proposed a proportional reduction of the peace effectives.

#### *II. Project of Raoul de la Grasserie*

Raoul de la Grasserie, doctor of law, judge in the court of Rennes, in his book entitled *Des moyens pratiques pour parvenir à la suppression de la paix armée et de la guerre* (1894), makes the following proposal in his project, on page 88:

TITLE II. TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OR PERIOD OF DISARMAMENT

Art. 20. Ten years after the going into force of the present convention, the disarmament of all the contracting nations shall be begun. This disarmament shall be ordered by a decree of the international government.

Art. 21. It shall affect only two-fifths of the active armies, the remaining three-fifths having already been disarmed in the preparatory period. It shall affect also the effective of the reserves, and, on the other hand, munitions, and artillery engines and materials.

Art. 22. The fortresses situated on the frontiers shall be abandoned; only forts situated in the interior of the country shall be preserved for purposes of internal defense, within the limits assigned by the international court.

Art. 23. Disarmament shall take place under the supervision of an international commissioner belonging to another nation. It shall take place in a period of six months.

Art. 24. Disarmament of the war vessels shall take place in the same manner.

Art. 25 Each nation shall preserve effectives in the form of a land army and sea forces for the purpose of maintaining internal order, and the size of these forces shall be fixed in each case by the international court.

Art. 26. This court shall determine also the amount of arms and ammunition of every kind which shall remain in the arsenals.

Art. 27. Every nation shall, besides the active army and the gendarmerie, maintain internal militia composed of all the men having served in the active army of the contingent which the nation has preserved the right to maintain, or in the international army. This militia shall not be subject to periodical training. It shall be called upon only when the internal order is threatened or in order to lend its support to the international army. In every case an authorization of the international court shall be necessary, except in case of urgency. The necessary arms and ammunition shall, if necessary, be preserved by each nation in the manner authorized, and their repository shall be local and not centralized.

Art. 35. The organs of internal arbitration are: 1. the international court; 2. the international government; 3. the international army.

Art. 45. The international court is competent to decide: . . .

6. On concealed armaments.

## § 28. Reduction of the Army in Accordance with the Population

### *I. Proposal of Dudley Field*

David Dudley Field in his *Draft-Outlines of an international code*, New York, 1872, p. 367, proposes the following:

Art. 528. In time of peace, the number of persons employed at any one time in the military service of a nation, whether intended for land or sea, shall not exceed in number one for every thousand inhabitants.

Art. 529. The last article shall not prevent a nation from building and arming, in its discretion, fortresses and ships of war, or from organizing, arming, and, for not more than one month in each year, drilling all or any portion of its able-bodied men between twenty and forty years of age, as a force of militia, to be called into active service, as provided in article 531.

Art. 530. By the "time of peace" mentioned in article 528, is to be understood that period during which Austria, France, Great Britian, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain and the United States are at peace with each other.[1]

### *II. Proposal of Blymyer*

H. William Blymyer in his *Mémoire sur la sanction des arbitrages* (second part), written for the Universal Peace Congress of Berne, 1892, (*Protocole*, p. 210), proposes:[2]

[1] The American General Miles and Villiaumé, *L'esprit de la guerre*, 1861, p. 51, are of the same opinion. Toinet, p. 142 *et seq.* and Picard, p. 136, are opposed Baron von Bunsen proposed, during the eastern crisis of 1856, to reduce the armies to their footing of 1848. (See Christian Karl Josias Baron von Bunsen, *Aus seinen Briefen und nach eigener Erinnerung geschildert von seiner Witwe,*" vol III, 1871, p. 244). The assessor, retired, Reuter, in 1905, in the *Friedenswarte*, also proposed that the States should bind themselves not to call to the colors any man over thirty years of age (see Toinet, p. 160 *et seq*). Bertillon proposed that only one son in every family should be required to serve.

[2] Also reprinted in the Supplement to the Protocols of the Universal Peace Congress of Havre of 1903, pp. 260 *et seq.*

DISARMAMENT

1. That beginning with January, 1895, each of the signatory nations of the treaty shall have reduced the number of its soldiers to a figure which shall not exceed one for every 1000 inhabitants and that this figure shall be maintained during the duration of the treaty;
2. That soldiers of every class be included in this figure; but that it shall be permitted to retain officers on condition that the aforementioned proportion shall not be exceeded;
3. That it shall be forbidden every nation to construct, within one year, more vessels of more than 3000 tons of displacement which may, with or without modifications, be used as vessels of war;
4. That it shall be forbidden every nation to construct fortifications, unless they be more than 20 km. distant from its frontiers;
5. That the fortifications which now exist in this zone may be preserved, but not improved.

## *III. Proposal of an Anonymous Writer*

An anonymous writer in the *Völkerfriede* (Stuttgart, 1909, pp. 53 *et seq.*) makes the following remarks on disarmament:

All these factors furnish so many contingencies for the solution of the problem which confronts us. Let us choose. In order to determine the respective importance for the Powers of the permament effectives on land and sea, that is the respective importance of their war equipments, let us see how matters would look if we should take the population as a basis for our calculations.

Let us take 50 tons for the navy and 10 men for the army as a *unit of war*. Let us assume that these figures have been adopted by two contracting Powers for the purpose of determining the respective importance of their permanent effectives. Let us further assume that these figures are applied at the rate of one unit per 700 inhabitants and that in the given case the test is to be made with regard to two European States, as Germany and England. I select Germany and England, not only because their war equipments are affected by very different conditions but also because precisely in England the most prominent statesmen have pleaded for scores of years for the cause of the reduction of military and naval burdens. They are Robert Peel, Cobden, Disraeli, and Salisbury; more recently—and our readers will recollect—they are Campbell-Bannermann, Goschen and Sir Edward Grey.

Now, in taking one war unit for 700 inhabitants of a State, Germany, with her 63 millions of subjects would rightfully be entitled to 90,000 war units; England would be entitled to 64,300 for her 45 millions of citizens.

If we estimate—without claiming absolute accuracy—the permament effectives of the German army at 619,000 men and the net tonnage of the navy at 580,000, this would mean that Germany maintains at the present time 3,500 war units, which are proportioned as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Land army: (10 men=1 unit) | 619,000 men | = | 61,900 units |
| Navy: | 580,000 tons | = | 11,600 " |
| Total | | | 73,500 " |

For England, the figures are as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Land army: | 250,000 men | = | 25,000 " |
| Navy: | 1,700,000 tons | = | 34,000 " |
| Total | | | 59,000 " |

Consequently, Germany could still increase her military and naval forces by 16,500 units before attaining the limit provided for; for example, 325,000 tons and 100,000 men. The margin for England would be 5,300 units.

At first sight it appears that the delicate point in such an arrangement is the determination of the respective figures of the war units to be distributed between the navy and the land army. In my calculation I have established at random the equation of 10 men and 50 tons. But granting that the two Powers declare their willingness to maintain the *status quo* of their permanent effectives, on condition that each of the contracting Powers, as well as all the other States in question, do likewise, it appears that the question is not the same; in order to maintain, without change, the present forces, the equation would have to be changed to 50 tons per unit and 6 men per unit.

The figures would then be as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| England: | | |
| Navy: | 34,000 | units of 50 tons |
| Land army: | 41,700 | " " 6 men |
| Total | 75,700 | " |
| Germany: | | |
| Navy: | 11,600 | units of 50 tons |
| Land army: | 103,100 | " " 6 men |
| Total | 114,700 | " |

Thus, we should have the number of units corresponding approximately to the populations of 45 millions and 63 millions.

In short, it would be a question of establishing between the naval units and the land units a proportion as nearly equitable as possible which could be accepted by each of the contracting parties. This is a diplomatic task. It is neither insoluble nor without interest: nor would it endanger the relations of the Powers if it were to become the subject of an exchange of views. I have no fears on this subject, and it would lend to the problem of armaments an academic or scientific character by virtue of which the question would inevitably be discussed in an impartial and calm manner.

## § 29. Reduction of the Army in Accordance with the Extent of the Frontiers and the Colonies

Toinet in his work *La limitation conventionnelle des armements* (Paris, 1912, p. 151 *et seq.*) says:

In fact there would only be one equitable and acceptable limit; it would be one which would give the States the right to arm themselves according to necessity. But here again the objections that we have encountered appear under a new aspect, and no less discouraging.

It is impossible to calculate the necessities, for they depend upon a thousand incalulable and continually changing factors. The necessities of defense are cruel. They vary with the extent of the frontiers. A nation which must defend itself on several sides necessarily requires more troops, more forts, more strategic lines, etc. . . .

Should we distinguish between colonizing nations and the others? Doubtless the former need larger armies and particularly larger navies with more stations.[1]

## § 30*a*. Introduction of the Militia System

Alfred H. Fried, in his treatise entitled *Weder Sedan, noch Jena* (1914, pp. 46 *et seq.*) says:

The formula for disarmament should not be sought in the principle of a reduction of effectives, but in that of an entire reorganization of the military system. This reorganization would be conceived solely in accordance with the requirements of defense and the assertion of the authority of the State. From this there would result simplifications which would make it possible for the States to develop their power to a much larger extent than has hitherto been the case. . . . And in fact, the militia system, militia in the modern sense, exactly adapted to the needs of a great Power, will be the military organization which will sooner or later impress itself upon the great European States.[2]

## § 30*b*. Shortening of the Period of Service

A. Souchon, Fellow in the Faculty of Law at Lyons, makes the following proposal in the *Revue générale de droit international public*, 1894, p. 518:

There remains the thought which, in all countries, would limit active service in times of peace to one year. This seems to recommend itself for two good reasons. In the first place, it reduces to a minimum the sacrifices required of the Powers. For in time of war they would dispose of armies just as numerous as the armies of today, composed of men who, all of them, would have served with the colors. It is true that they would have remained there

[1] General Pédoya also expresses similar thoughts in his treatise on the Hague Conferences, 1907, p. 164.

[2] The same idea is expressed by Gaston Moch, *La Réforme militaire, vive la milice* 1901; and Jaurès, *La nouvelle armée*, 1912.

only one year, but let us recall with what facility France passed from the seven years' service first to the five-year period and then to the three-year period. Let us also remember that Germany dismisses her contingents after two years of service. It must be admitted that the reduction of military service to one year would not seem to any one an excessive sacrifice.

On the other hand, when the convention has once been concluded, its execution would be readily assured. For manifestly the European Governments, even if they should desire to do so, would not be able to keep men in the service who felt that they were legally entitled to release.[1]

[1] JULES SIMON made a similar proposal, and later also ALFRED H. FRIED (*Friedenswarte*, 1903, pp. 52 *et seq.*).

## CHAPTER V

### Limitation and Eventual Reduction of the Budgets

### § 31. Proposal of the First Hague Conference

The Commission formed in England in order to prepare for the Hague Conference states in its report that only a reduction of the budgets can bring about an agreement. (Cf. § 19.) This opinion was already held by Lorimer (*Revue de droit international*, 1887, p. 473). A joint proposal, tending to introduce a suspension for several years and later a reduction, was made by the English Commission charged with preparing for the Second Hague Conference (see *Historical Introduction*, pp. 27 *et seq.*) and was already contained in part in the Russian project for the First Hague Conference. (See *Historical Introduction*, pp. 11 *et seq.*).

The Russian project of the First Hague Conference is very definite with regard to the reduction of naval armaments; it demands that there be fixed at the same time the total tonnage of the vessels and the number of the members of the crew. There should also be mentioned here the proposal of Perris at the Universal Peace Congress of London (see *Historical Introduction*, pp. 31 *et seq.*). Compare also the proposal of Blymyer (§ 28, II.).

### 32. Twenty Per Cent. Reduction of the Budgets

The Deputy Gothein, member of the German Reichstag, in *Dokumente des Fortschritts* (1910, part 2) says:

> We shall have to consider the military and naval budgets as established facts and conclude international conventions according to which the contracting powers would reduce to a certain extent, let us say by twenty per cent., their respective budgets. Even when in certain states the naval and military budgets present a very general and unclear character, the total amounts of these budgets are given, and it would be easy to determine exactly the reduction which would have to be made. (Similarly in the *Friedenswarte*, 1913, p. 125).[1]

[1]The former Deputy of the German Reichstag von Gerlach (*Dokumente des Forschritts*, July, 1908) makes a similar proposal. He recommends a reduction of ten per cent.

## § 33. Reduction of the Budget to the Amount Appropriated for One of the Preceding Years

The Deputy to the Reichstag August Bebel (Social Democrat) in an election speech delivered at Hamburg in March, 1911 (*Friedens-warte*, 1911, p. 122), said:

Disarmament is at present possible if only it is seriously desired. . . . With regard to armaments properly so called, there would be a possibility of reducing them in a manner which could be fixed as follows: No power would have the right to appropriate for its army and its navy a greater amount than that provided in the budget of 1911, for example. For the following year it would be the preceding year that would apply; for 1912 we would take the budget of 1910 as a standard; for 1913 we would apply the figures for 1909, and so forth. . . .

## § 34. Proposal of the German Peace Society

The German Peace Society, in a letter addressed at the end of 1909 to the Central English Committee of the International Union for Arbitration and Peace (*Völker-Friede*, 1910, p. 4), makes the following proposal:

It seems to us that the "formula for disarmament" can be founded on some such basis as the following: The stipulation would be made for example that if Germany were authorized to expend for her naval armaments an annual sum of 350 millions of marks, England would be entitled to expend up to 700 millions of marks. But one of two things would be required. Either Germany and England would conclude something like a naval convention according to which the two powers would bind themselves mutually to assist each other in case of attack by a third Power; or a third Hague Conference would decree the obligation for all the other naval Powers to fix in a final way the amount of their naval budgets.

## § 35. Proposal of Quidde[1]

DRAFT OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY FOR THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE TWENTIETH UNIVERSAL PEACE CONGRESS AT THE HAGUE IN 1913.

(TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN)

The undersigned Sovereigns and Governments, inspired by the desire to develop the moral and material welfare of the peoples, in conformity with the resolution of the First Hague Conference of 1899, have concluded this day, provisionally and for a limited time, the following treaty relative to the limitation of the armaments of their armies and navies.

[1]See *Historical Introduction*, p. 33.

## PART I. LIMITATION OF EXPENSES FOR ARMAMENTS

ARTICLE 1. The contracting Powers recognize and declare that the present normal state of their expenses for one year, including both their ordinary expenses and their extraordinary expenses, permanent as well as provisional excepting however such expenses as are actually extraordinary, for example, those serving for the reparation of losses experienced in war or for other similar purposes, is as follows:

(Statistical data follow.)

| Countries in alphabetical order | A. Army | B. Navy | C. Retirement and pension funds | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|---|

To these expenses are added those for the defense of the colonies, the protectorates or other territories depending upon one of the contracting States:

| Countries in alphabetical order | Expenses borne by the contracting States | | Expenses borne by the colonies themselves | | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | D. Army | E. Navy | F. Army | G. Navy | |

ART. 2. The contracting Powers bind themselves for the duration of this treaty not to exceed, in their annual budgets, the sums intended for armaments as they have been enumerated in Article 1. However, it is permissible to increase to the amount of 5 per cent. the various expenses enumerated in the two above tables, on condition that the table be not exceeded.

ART. 3. The limit established by the present treaty does not apply to the expenses which, during the years enumerated above, may be incurred by the aforementioned States for temporary enterprises, for example for the execution of a program in course and for the reestablishment of armaments destroyed by war. These restrictions are in agreement with the exceptions stipulated in Article 1.

(The exact enumeration of the various States and their annual expenditures follows.)

These sums may be expended only for the purposes above fixed and not for other armaments.

ART. 4. The limit established by the present treaty does not apply either to expenses serving exclusively for the repression of insurrections in the colonies or for defense against neighbors not included in this treaty.

Upon the budget of these expenses there can be included only those intended for the land troops and never those for the war fleet.

ART. 5. During the duration of the present treaty the contracting Powers shall not place under construction or into service any battle-ships exceeding . . . tons. They furthermore limit the number of battle-ships of the largest model (of . . . tons and more) as follows:

Germany to . . .

The battle-ships intended to replace former vessels shall be placed on the stocks only . . . years after their entrance into the service.

ART. 6. The Powers bind themselves to conform loyally to the spirit of this treaty and to refrain from evading its provisions. Articles 7 to 9 delimit the operations permitted or prohibited.

ART. 7. Expenditures incurred for the benefit of the military forces, not inscribed in the army budget, the navy budget or the pensions budget, but included in other budgets or imposed upon other organizations, for instance the municipalities, may be continued in conformity with the established rules. They remain outside of the expenses limited by the present treaty.

There are included among the latter the expenditures for military recruiting, mobilization, subventions granted for military training of the youth, for new horses, etc., as far as these expenditures are included in the civil budgets.

ART. 8. On the other hand, expenditures of this nature which might be newly included in this budget or imposed upon other organizations, shall be included among the limited expenditures.

There are included in this category donations made in favor of armaments by individuals, subscriptions, etc.

ART. 9. The contracting Powers bind themselves not to have constructed in any manner (whether the order be given to a private company or to an allied nation) any vessels of war other than those provided for in the expenditures authorized by the treaty.

It is also understood that no contracting Power may sell vessels of war to another Power without the consent of all the contracting Powers.

If a war breaks out while a belligerent country has vessels of war building for a foreign country, it is not permitted to the first country to seize these vessels and make use of them.

ART. 10. If the expenditures incurred by a Power for its armaments and admitted by the treaty have not attained during a certain year the amount provided for, they may be carried forward to one of the two following years to the amount of five per cent. of the total budget, on condition that the annual amount of the expenditures for armaments shall never exceed by five per cent. the maximum admitted by the treaty, either with regard to their total or with regard to any one of columns A. to G.

ART. 11. If one of the contracting Powers takes measures to improve the financial condition of its officers, soldiers or marines, active and retired, or of their families, without including thereby an increase of armaments, the surplus of expenditure shall not be considered in connection with the sums limited by the treaty.

It is thus not permitted that economies made to the prejudice of these persons be deducted from the expenditures authorized by the treaty.

## PART II. SUPPLEMENTARY RULES

ART. 12. The contracting Powers will refrain during the duration of this treaty from changing the garrisons of their troops and the stations of their vessels of war.

If, however, they should consider themselves obliged for any reasons whatsoever to make these changes, they shall communicate the fact six months in advance, to all the contracting Powers, and they shall take the objections of these Powers into friendly consideration.

ART. 13. If one of the contracting Powers declares that such a measure is equivalent for it to an increase of armaments, and that it is not able to reply thereto without increasing its own military expenses, the question as to whether the said measure is admissible—in view of the object of the treaty—or whether the opposing Power should be permitted to increase its expenditures, should be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the third part of the treaty.

ART. 14. It is likewise with regard to the construction of important strategic railways which would change the relation of military power obtaining between two Powers. Articles 12 and 13 are here applicable.

## PART III. RECOURSE TO ARBITRATION FOR DISPUTES RELATIVE TO THE PRESENT TREATY

ART. 15. Considering that the application of this treaty, by reason of its novelty and numerous difficulties of execution connected therewith, might, in spite of the best intentions on the part of the interested parties, give rise to a controversy for which an impartial solution must be found, the contracting Powers establish a Special Permanent Court of Arbitration charged with settling all disputes which might arise.

ART. 16. They declare likewise that they will never consider as an unfriendly act an objection raised by one of the contracting Powers against measures taken by another Power which it considers contrary to the treaty, nor the proposal to bring the matter before the Court of Arbitration.

ART. 17. The Court is composed of three Chambers:

Chamber I, for expenditures concerning land armies; Chamber II, for those concerning the navy; Chamber III, for the expenditures concerning the navy and the land forces combined, and colonial expenditures.

Each Chamber has a president and a vice-president. The three presidents form the Presidency of the Court; they alternate each year as regards the first Presidency.

ART. 18. The members of the Court of Justice are named as follows:

Of the eight Powers:

Germany,
The United States of America,
Austria-Hungary,
France,
Great Britain,
Italy,
Japan,
Russia,

each names one member for each of the three Chambers. Each of the other contracting Powers names *one* member.

At the same time a deputy is named for every member.

ART. 19. The presidents and vice-presidents of the three Chambers are named by the Governments of

Belgium,
Denmark,
Norway,
The Netherlands,
Sweden,
Switzerland,

in such a way that Belgium and Sweden together name those of the first, Norway and the Netherlands those of the second, Denmark and Switzerland those of the third Chamber.

If the two Governments charged with a joint nomination can not reach an agreement, it shall be decided by lot which of the two persons elected shall be president and which shall be vice-president.

ART. 20. The three Chambers are composed, outside of the president and the vice-president, of a member of each of the following Governments:

Germany,
The United States of America,
Austria-Hungary,
France,
Great Britain,
Italy,
Japan,
Russia.

The other members of the Court are designated by the Presidency.

ART. 21. The members of the Permanent Court may be chosen only from among persons of a known competency in questions of international law, enjoying the highest moral reputation and disposed to accept the functions of judge.

ART. 22. The members of the Court are named for the duration of the treaty and can not be recalled without their consent. In case of infirmity which might hinder them in the fulfilment of their functions, their consent may be replaced by a decision of the Court, three-fourths of the votes deciding.

In the exercise of their functions outside of their own country, the members of the Court enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

ART. 23. The members bind themselves to render judgment only with full objectivity and in accordance with the principles of law and justice, without allowing themselves to be influenced by the consideration of special interests of their country, and to reject every appeal made to alleged patriotic duties, as well as every promise of advantage and every threat.

This engagement shall be taken in public session by all the members, and later by each newly installed member before the asembled Court.

ART. 24. The contracting Powers declare that they assure the members of the Court full and entire liberty in their decisions and that they will refrain from exercising any influence over them.

At the same time they assure the members whom they have named, besides their salaries, the opportunity of resuming under the same conditions the positions occupied by them before their nomination. They shall grant them, if they have not occupied an official position, a pension equal to two-thirds of their salary.

ART. 25. The seat of the Court is The Hague. Its members and their deputies are obliged to reside there (or in the immediate vicinity thereof).

ART. 26. The Chambers reach all their decisions in plenary session.

The members belonging to that one of the nations whose interests are at stake may likewise take part in the voting.

The deputy members are present at all sessions and have an advisory voice.

ART. 27. When the dispute concerns a country to which a president of the competent Chamber belongs, he transfers the position of the Presidency

to his vice-president; if the same applies to the latter, the case passes to another Chamber, in such a way that Chambers I and II are replaced by Chamber III, and Chamber III by I or II.

ART. 28. The Presidency fixes a recess of two months per annum.

For the expedition of urgent cases, a recess Chamber is established which shall be preferably composed of deputy members who have taken their vacation at some other time.

If a case has been submitted to the Chamber during the recess, it shall be taken up by the Chamber at the time of re-opening.

ART. 29. If one of the contracting Powers protests against any measure or method of computation of one of the contracting Powers, it must bring its complaint before the tribunal. The complaint shall contain the proposal of the plaintiff with reasons in support thereof.

At the same time the plaintiff government shall appoint one or more agents with the power of plenipotentiary chargé d'affaires for the purpose of defending the complaint orally.

ART. 30. As soon as the complaint has been presented, the Presidency decides within a period of one week at most, to which Chamber the question shall be submitted.

ART. 31. The president shall call together the Chamber to which the complaint has been referred, within a week at the latest.

ART. 32. In this session a period of grace shall be assigned to the defendant Power to reply in writing to the complaint and to send its agents for its personal representation before the tribunal.

The period of grace should be measured in such a way that the defendant State has time to prepare its reply; it should not, however, be protracted.

For questions concerning Europe, the period should not as a general rule exceed one month. With regard to questions for the examination of which it is necessary to procure documents from other continents, the period shall be prolonged.

ART. 33. In the same session the Chamber shall name a commission composed of three members who shall belong neither to the nationality of the plaintiff State nor to that of the defendant State and shall not be named by either one of them.

This commission shall study the case and prepare the solution thereof.

ART. 34. The plaintiff party may in this session call for a conditional and provisional solution.

The Commission constituted by the Chamber for this preparatory examination shall within one week decide whether and to what extent this demand can be acceded to.

This conditional decision has the effect of an adjournment. It shall not in any case prejudice the award.

ART. 35. The judgment shall be rendered as a rule at latest within three months from the expiration of the period fixed for the defendant party for replying to the complaint.

This period shall be prolonged only with the consent of the two parties.

ART. 36. The pleadings are public. The Chamber deliberates behind closed doors.

The Chamber and the two parties are free, if they deem it expedient, to invite experts to attend the pleadings.

The Chamber has the right to call to its deliberations experts with an advisory voice. Each of the parties is authorized to name three experts who shall likewise have an advisory voice.

ART. 37. The parties shall plead in any language; if necessary, interpreters shall be designated.

The award must be drawn up in French. It shall be officially translated for the day on which it is rendered, in each of the national languages which the parties may designate. In case of textual divergencies the French text shall decide.

ART. 38. The award is pronounced in public session and submitted to the parties in writing.

It contains the reasons of fact and of law.

ART. 39. The awards are published in an official organ designated by the Court.

ART. 40. Each of the two parties may appeal within one month to the plenary Court.

The procedure to be followed by the plenary Court is laid down according to the provisions of Articles 29 to 39.

ART. 41. The plenary Court as a court of appeals is presided over by that one of the presidents who shall have the function on the day when the appeal is presented, unless he belongs to the Chamber against the judgment of which the appeal is lodged. In this case the president of the first Chamber shall be replaced by the president of the second, the president of the second by the president of the third, and the president of the third by the president of the first.

If it is found that the president designated in this manner belongs to one of the States which are parties to the dispute or has been named by one of them, he shall be replaced by his deputy.

If the latter is prevented in his turn by the same reasons, the supervision of the pleadings shall devolve, in conformity with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, upon the president of another Chamber, if necessary upon his deputy.

ART. 42. The principles expressed by each Chamber for the solution of a case binds it for subsequent cases, as long as these principles have not been modified by a decision of the plenary Court.

ART. 43. If a Chamber, confronted by a new case, shows hesitation in applying the principles previously enunciated by it, it may itself appeal therefrom to the decision of the plenary Court.

Likewise each Chamber has the right, if in dealing with a dispute it entertains any scruples about following the decision of the plenary Court, to call for a new decision of the latter.

There is no appeal from the decisions of the plenary Court rendered in this manner in the first instance.

ART. 44. If principles expressed in a preceding award are annulled by a decision of the plenary Court, each party has the right to demand also a revision of the preceding case.

This demand for a revision shall be treated, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 29 to 41, as a new complaint.

ART. 45. Except in so far as Articles 29 to 44 provide otherwise, the provisions of the Convention of October 18, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of

nternational Disputes, in Articles 68 to 80, shall be applied to the procedure ›efore the Court.

ART. 46. The salaries of the three presidents and vice-presidents shall be ixed by decision of the contracting Powers. If they do not reach an under- ,tanding, the eight Powers authorized to appoint three judges shall decide, *ıpon the proposal of the six Governments which name the presidents. In* ›ase a majority decision can not be reached, the smaller sum shall be allotted.

The salaries of the other judges of the Court are fixed by the Government ›f each of the countries which has named them. The contracting Powers shall ›ee to it that the salaries are as equal as possible.

ART. 47. The Presidency of the Court chooses the personnel, fixes the ıalaries and decides upon the general expenses.

ART. 48. With regard to administration and financial organization, the *Government of the Netherlands shall name a commissioner who shall be subject* o the orders of the president and otherwise under the control of the administrative council of the Court of The Hague (Hague Convention of 1907, Article 49).

The examination of the accounts shall be entrusted to the Court of Accounts ›f the Netherlands.

ART. 49. The expenses of the Court shall be covered in the following nanner. Each State shall pay the salaries of the judges chosen by it; those ›f the president and vice-president, as well as all other expenses, shall be borne ›y all the contracting Powers, in the proportion established for the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

ART. 50. The contracting Powers shall place in the hands of the commissioner, within one month after the signing of the treaty, a sum of 10,000 rancs for each of the judges named by it: the eight Powers named in Article .8, 30,000 francs; all the others 10,000 francs.

### PART IV. THE ENTRANCE INTO FORCE AND THE DURATION OF THE TREATY

ART. 51. The present treaty shall enter into force beginning with this lay, without waiting for any other ratification; it binds the Governments, nder the reservation, however, that all the Powers concluding this treaty ıhall be free to withdraw, in case one of the contracting States should be ›efused the ratification of the parliament provided for in its constitution.

The present treaty affects the current budget year or each contracting State.

ART. 52. It can not be denounced during the current year and the five ollowing years.

ART. 53. If before the end of the fifth year or one year before the termination of its validity, the treaty has not been denounced, it remains in force for ıix additional years, on condition that the expenditures authorized by Article I for armaments shall be reduced by 5 per cent. for the six additional years.

This provision shall apply each time at the end of a new period of the present treaty, on condition that each time the expenditures for armaments permitted ıhall be decreased by 5 per cent. with respect to the preceding limit in force.

ART. 54. If one of the contracting Powers denounces the treaty, which ıhould be done at latest one year before the expiration of the period, this fact brings with it the annulment of the treaty for all the contracting Powers.

Those who may desire to continue their agreement will have to conclude a special arrangement.

ART. 55. If one of the contracting Powers refuses during the duration of the treaty to submit to an award of the Court, each of the other Powers has the right to denounce the treaty without delay, even during the period in which it is in force, thus causing the annulment of the treaty for all the Powers, with the reservation of the right of concluding a new agreement.

In support of his draft Professor Quidde, in the Universal Peace Congress at The Hague in 1913 (*Compte rendu*, pp. 51–65), spoke as follows.

ADDRESS OF M. QUIDDE

When we discussed at Geneva the question of armaments, I promised you, somewhat carelessly it is true, to work out a memorial upon the problems which would confront us if we should desire to conclude an international agreement for the limitation of armaments. This work was to be communicated to the commission as soon as possible in order to enable it to discuss it and to present a report upon it to the next congress. Unfortunately it has been impossible for me to keep my promise. . . .

But today I offer you something else, something which would have to be the outcome of such a memorial, namely the draft of an international treaty for the limitation of armaments.

All that remains for the Powers to do is to add some figures and to affix their signatures, and we shall have the limitation of armaments and even disarmament, which, as you see, is the automatic consequence thereof. But, joking aside, I know that it is not so easy and that we are confronted by a complicated problem. It is precisely for the purpose of discussing all these difficulties that I worked out this project. Before going into details, permit me to make some general remarks upon the present status of the question

*General remarks*

We other pacifists have repeatedly insisted that he who wishes to begin with disarmament is placing the cart before the horse. I had the occasion of recalling this recently, when I spoke of the manifesto of the Emperor of Russia. We must begin with the reform and improvement of international law. But there are those among us who, being too ardent in our partizanship of this idea, have declared that we do not wish to deal with the question of armaments until that of international law has been finally settled and peace has been assured. That is going too far; it is my conviction that it is not and will never be very difficult to assure peace on paper by means of treaties, but that much time will pass before the period will come when the respect due to these treaties will be absolutely guaranteed in case of serious conflict.

Such a state of affairs would mark a complete revolution in the ancient and time-worn manner of thinking of the nations. Who can foresee when it will finally become established? Will we have to wait a few score years, several generations or several centuries? Who knows? It is my opinion that we must still count by centuries. I seem to you to be a pessimist. But others are still more so and they think that we shall never attain that happy state. I am an optimist and believe that we shall reach it, but by a very slow process of evolution. If we still find ourselves together in the year 2013, you will perhaps have the pleasure of seeing that I was right. (Laughter.)

However, I could not advise the pacifists to wait until then in order to take ssue in the question of armaments. We must not remain the inactive wit- nesses of their continual increase. Our English and American friends who, in he heart of the pacifist movement, continually insist that a means should be ound of relieving the peoples' burden which in this connection weighs upon hem, are perfectly correct. But in what way can we arrive at a practical esult? Some of our friends see salvation in individual treaties between the arious States. Without doubt these individual treaties have their value and heir merit. I approve with all my heart the tacit agreement which England nd Germany have reached with regard to the limitation of armaments as ar as Dreadnoughts are concerned, even if this agreement is only transitory, for everal years ago it was declared to be quite impossible. Of course progress an be made in this way; but every treaty concluded between two States nly has a weak spot. This lies in the fact that it has no hold upon their eighbors and *that if a third Power increases its armaments without regard for* he agreement which binds the two others, the two contracting parties may each this declaration: We should like very much to bind ourselves by the terms f our treaty, but it is no longer possible.

Others think that the question could be solved if one great Power should ake the initiative and furnish the example. They are perhaps right, but I hould not like to make this proposal to my own country or to any other State, nd, although it is not absolutely impossible that this means may some day e used, it is at least hardly probable.

It may also be supposed that some day a powerful international popular novement will sweep over all increases and all paragraphs concerning arma- nents, that a revolution will violently compel the governments finally to set o work. This is also possible, but a movement of this kind is uncertain and an not be prepared systematically.

We must seek in other quarters the solution of our problem, which may be tated as follows: Is it possible to conclude a general and international treaty n the limitation of armaments, and, if so, how can it be done? It was with he intention of solving the question as nearly as possible that I worked out *he draft which I have the honor of submitting to you. First of all I must* ay to you that this draft can not in any way engage the responsibility of he Congress. We can not even take up the discussion of it, since no dis- ussion can take place in the Congress without having been prepared by the Commission. Furthermore we do not desire to bind you in anything, we do ot even ask you to approve of the fundamental idea of this draft, but we nly propose to you to add to your order of the day the resolution that it s timely to continue the study of this question.

I believe, however, that I am correct in declaring that this project offers omething new and that it is worth the trouble of a detailed study.

I am following a twofold purpose in submitting it to you, in the first place o show you where the difficulties lie—this is a first step toward their solu- ion—and in the second place to suggest to you certain solutions which lo not seem to me to be unattainable. Do not think that I am naïvely leceiving myself with regard to the nature and the number of these diffi- culties. I am as much convinced as anyone that they are very great and very numerous.

I shall not present to you the entire text of the draft; I shall limit myself to giving you a resumé of the problems that it suggests and to indicating to you the solutions upon which I have decided.

*Basis of the draft*

We have already established, in the course of one our preceding discussions, that if we wish to reach an agreement with regard to the limitation of armaments, the total annual expenditures of each State for its armed forces on land and sea must be taken as a basis. But this brings in the first difficulty. What should we include in the total expenses? It seems very simple. But whoever has studied the question more closely has soon perceived that it is not easy to decide. We must begin with sums which are spent annually at the present time (or with sums which will be spent annually at the time when the treaty shall be concluded). And the difficulty immediately arises: The annual budgets of a number of States are encumbered with extraordinary expenditures which could not be considered because these expenses are the result of exceptional and temporary circumstances.

For instance, during the next few years the Balkan States will have to devote millions and millions in order to build up again their armaments destroyed by the war, and if our treaty should, for instance, be concluded in 1915, Bulgaria would doubtless have annual expenditures greatly exceeding its normal budget. Let us suppose that she will expend from 80 to 100 millions at that time; we shall have to declare to her that we can not at all accept this figure as a normal one, since it would include 30 to 50 millions intended to repair the disasters of war, and that we can not grant her more than 50 millions.

It would surely not be an easy matter to arrive at an understanding on this point, and those who shall have to determine these figures will have an arduous and delicate task. I for my part have not sought to fix them, not even approximately, and I thank Heaven that lack of time has happily prevented me from venturing upon this difficult undertaking. I leave to the experts the care of solving this question and inscribing the figures. That is one of the problems. See Article 1.

We must take as a basis for the future the normal amount of the sums expended for one year up to this very day, and herein lies a second difficulty analagous to the first. Some States will ask concessions for several years at least, claiming that they are obliged either to realize certain plans of organization or to reestablish their armaments destroyed by war. They will say to us: Since in your Article 1 you forbid us to include upon our budget the sums necessary for this purpose, you should allow us to enter them elsewhere, as long as the need makes itself felt.

This objection is provided for in Article 3. Referring to this article, we shall be able to reply to Bulgaria: For 1915 and 1916 we authorize you to increase your budget by 30 millions, but after that period, beginning with 1917, you will have to adhere absolutely to the figures provided for as being normal.

A third difficulty presents itself. There are armaments necessary to assure the defense of colonies or to assure a State against an enemy not included in the treaty. I have combined these two points (Article 4), but perhaps it would be preferable to separate them. It goes without saying that the expenditures incurred solely for preventing insurrections of natives are internal police

ieasures which have no influence, at least no direct influence, upon the relaions of the military forces of one Power to those of another, but the question is s to how far these measures can go and how the limit may be fixed.

With regard to the second point, let us take a concrete example. Let us supose that all the South American States, with the exception of Ecuador, have dhered to the treaty. It is understood that the countries bordering upon Ecuador will have to be enabled to arm themselves against the armaments f their neighbor. But here again, where shall we fix the limit between the neasures which should affect only Ecuador and those which might violate the quilibrium guaranteed by the treaty? This is what Article 4 of the draft eeks to fix. In the second paragraph of this article, I establish the fact that nly the expenditures intended for the land troops may be included upon the udget of these expenditures, and never those concerning the war fleet. The reason for this restriction is easy to understand. The war vessels may e used in all parts of the world much more effectively than any police troops, vhich only serve as a colonial police force and can hardly be expected to serve utside of the colonies.

*Inclusion of credits in other budgets*

Articles 6-9 provide for the fact that a State might seek to evade the provisions of the treaty by burdening the civil budget or even the municipalities with expenses which ordinarily come into the sphere of the war and naval budgets. We might for instance imagine a law which, in Germany, would mpose upon the city of Berlin the obligation of constructing every three ye ars a large war vessel; we might even be confronted by private undertakings to which the government would not at all be a part. A national movement could furnish 50 millions for the construction of a cruiser, or a subscription might realize the funds necessary for the development of military air service. What shall we do in such cases? I propose the following solution: All the expenditures incurred up to the present time for the benefit of the military forces and which do not figure in the army budget, the navy budget or the pensions budget, but are included in other budgets or imposed upon other organizations, for instance the municipalities, may be continued in conformity with the established rules and remain outside of the expenses limited by the present treaty. On the other hand, the expenses of this nature newly inscribed upon such civil budgets or imposed upon other organizations, or again covered by public subscriptions or private donations, must be included in the normal budget of expenses and must figure therein. Thus the gifts of this kind will bring no advantage to the governments, since a sum equivalent to the value of these gifts will have to be deducted from the sums fixed as normal limits for their annual naval and war budgets.

But there is still a question of a very particular kind, and I am very proud to have approached it.

If we tighten the belts of the governments by limiting thus their naval budgets, they will perhaps be tempted to seek compensation to the detriment of the men, the officers, the sailors, active or retired, or the families of soldiers dependent upon a pension, etc. We could not admit any measure of this kind. We must, on the contrary, demand that the lot of the men who perform military service, as well as that of their families, be assured to the greatest possible extent. In France measures have been taken for the purpose

of guaranteeing to the soldiers sent to the barracks a sufficient amount of pay and of placing at their disposal not only good food but also quarters which leave nothing to be desired with regard to hygiene. The German military bill also contains provisions in favor of families specially burdened by military service. These measures can only be approved, and every attempt to realize economies to the prejudice of the people should be opposed. That is why, in Article 11, I declare that if a State takes measures to improve the financial condition of its soldiers or their families, the increased expense occasioned by this fact should not enter into account in connection with the sums limited by the treaty, while economies made to the prejudice of these persons are to be deducted from the expenses authorized by the treaty.

The amount brought forward in the budget as the result of sums unexpended in the course of a year is also a question to be considered. It is clear that we must admit amounts of this kind to a certain extent, and we can not demand that the whole sum fixed by the treaty should be exhausted on December 31; but we must set bounds to this. Otherwise unusual things might occur. Suppose we admit that Germany has the right to spend each year one billion, and that during four consecutive years her expenses do not exceed 900 millions. Thus she would save 100 millions per annum, and at the end of the fourth year she could expend an additional 400 millions all at once besides the billion for which provision is made. Such eventualities should be excluded, and I make provision for them in Article 10.

At this point I must go back a little, since one fact has quite escaped my mind. It is not sufficient to limit all the expenses in a lump. The treaty for the limitation of armaments will only have real value if we make special provisions for naval expenditures. I have attempted to settle this question in Article 5. The figures are still lacking. The experts may insert them.

*Displacement of troops and fleets*

I now reach the second part of my draft, namely, Articles 12–14. We are far from having reached the end of our task when we have attempted to fix the figure of the total expenditures and to regulate by special provisions the naval budget. For a Power may take measures which, without increasing its expenditures, will change the relation of its military strength toward that of another Power more than an increase of expenditures of several hundred millions might have done. Such measures may consist of displacement of troops or naval units. If Russia withdraws four army corps from Asia and transfers them to Poland, stationing them along the frontier, it is evident that the change thus effected in the relation of her military forces with regard to Germany and Austria is much greater than if Russia had increased her military budget by 100 millions. Or if England transfers her Mediterranean fleet to the North Sea, this is likewise a displacement of forces with regard to Germany.

I have asked myself whether under such circumstances it would not be in order to authorize the power affected by these measures to increase its budget, and I think that this question and also that of strategic railways should not be settled otherwise than by arbitration.

*Problem of control*

I now reach the culminating point of the problem, if I may be permitted to say so. It is absolutely impossible to foresee in a treaty for the limitation

of armaments all the difficulties which may arise. There is one, namely that of control, which I have left completely aside, for I consider it to be one of the lesser difficulties. I believe that today no truly important measure can for a long time escape the public eye and that the Powers will themselves very quickly find out whether one of them seeks to evade the treaty on some important point. I doubt, on the other hand, whether a Court of Accounts to which all the accounts would be submitted can exercise a very efficient control. This Court would hardly succeed in preventing the Powers from deceiving one another if they desire to do so, and, once more, I rely much more in this matter upon the publicity of our modern life.

But if differences should arise with regard to the execution of the treaty—and I am convinced in advance that every day new disputes will present themselves, even if we take for granted an honest desire to conform to the treaty—if difficulties should arise on this point, it would require a special instance to settle them. That is why the draft proposes the establishment of a tribunal mentioned in Articles 15–50. We do not think of the present Hague Court in this connection. My draft provides for a second Hague Court, for we require in our new task a permanent tribunal, a fixed court which will have its absolutely binding laws and traditions. The principle invoked today to settle a dispute between Germany and France must absolutely be applied tomorrow in a difference between Italy and Austria or between Russia and Japan.

I have attempted to establish a Court of this kind and I beg you to examine my draft a little more carefully. I should not like to take too much of your time and I fear that our president is already becoming impatient. I shall simply tell you that I have attempted to take into account the just demands of the Great Powers, while seeking at the same time to assure the Court an independent existence. This Court is divided into three chambers. All the Great Powers are represented in each of these three chambers, but the presidency thereof is entrusted to persons named by Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (Articles 17–20).

You might also consider the manner in which I believe I have assured the impartiality of the judges (Articles 21–24) and the impartiality of the supervision of the pleadings in case a dispute should concern a country to which the president of the competent chamber should belong (Article 27).

Another question arises which I must deal with briefly. Should the Court which renders the award be composed of jurists or experts, that is to say military men? The military men will doubtless say that the matter concerns technical questions and that the jurists, however competent they may be, can not decide in these questions. As for myself, I consider it quite impossible to entrust the decision to the military men. They are not impartial in questions concerning their profession. They will be called upon as experts and as such they will have an advisory voice, but the award must be rendered by judges offering the same guarantees as those who today compose the Hague Court. I have also made use of the regulations of this Court in drawing up my draft, and have even copied certain provisions (see Articles 21 and 22, § 2). But I also desire to give to these professional men, called in as experts, a very special place. The jurists will perhaps be very angry at me, but this idea appears to me new and interesting. According to my draft, the experts will be present not only in the public pleadings but they will also take part, with an advisory voice, in the deliberations behind closed doors; for I say to myself that the questions to be decided will be so special and so technical that if the experts are not

there up to the very last moment, we shall run the risk of seeing the award pronounced by the jurists shattered against reefs which none of them had suspected. I refer to Article 36.

Moreover a despatch as quickly as possible of all cases entrusted to the Court should be assured. With regard to questions brought before the Hague Court it is often desirable that the Court should not be too hasty in pronouncing its award, in order that the passions aroused by the case may have time to be calmed. It is quite different with the matter before us. We are dealing with things which must be settled as soon as possible. The provisions concerning the determination of periods of grace are found in Articles 30–35. Conditional decisions are provided for; but in no case should they prejudice the award (Article 34). Article 33 prescribes for each case the election of a special commission of three members charged with studying this particular case and preparing for the decision of the chamber.

The fact that the Court is composed of three chambers one of which deals with the expenditures concerning the land armies, the second with those concerning the fleet, and the third with mixed questions and colonial expenditures, makes an appeal from the chamber of first instance to the plenary Court possible (Articles 40–41).

We also require provisions capable of assuring the uniformity of justice (Article 42); moreover a revision is possible whenever the validity of a principle invoked in a case is placed in doubt (Articles 43 and 44).

Administrative questions and questions concerning expenses (Articles 46–50) offer the least difficulties.

*Entrance into force and duration of the treaty*

The question of the entrance into force of the treaty and its duration is more complicated. The treaty should enter into force on the day of its signing; for if we should have to wait for ratification, we may well have lost our labor. For we know by experience how many pretexts can be invoked and how many means can be found for referring a measure of this kind *ad kalendas graecas*. If the constitution of a country obliges its government to submit a treaty to parliament for ratification and this ratification is refused, all the signatory powers of the treaty will have the right to withdraw. The treaty is valid for the current year in which it is signed and for the five following years. If, before the end of the fifth year, or one year before the expiration of its validity, the treaty has not been denounced, it remains in force for six additional years (Articles 51–53). For these six additional years the expenditures authorized by Article 1 will be reduced by 5 per cent., and a new reduction of 5 per cent. to take the place of the preceding one will be provided for ea additional period of six years (Article 53). The treaty for the limitation of armaments would thus be transformed automatically into a treaty for the diminution of armaments and would finally result in disarmament. If the treaty measures up to expectations, all the parties will agree to it; if not, it will be promptly denounced. If the application of the treaty should present difficulties not foreseen at the time of its entrance into force, the short duration of its validity would always make it possible to remedy these difficulties before they could seriously threaten the security of a country. Finally—and I now reach my last point—many of you have probably already asked yourselves what will happen if a Power refused to observe the clauses of the treaty

and to submit to an award pronounced against it. According to my point of view, I should not recommend force or coercive measures against it. We shall discuss these questions further during the next days. The only point which I have established is that if a Power refuses to submit to an award, each of the other contracting Powers has the right to denounce the contract without delay and without any further procedure, which brings with it annulment with regard to all signatory States.

*Importance of an examination*

Ladies and gentlemen, I have already declared to you that we have no intention of binding the responsibility of the Congress either with regard to details or with regard to the large outlines of this draft. We propose to you only to recommend its examination to the peace societies and to all who have to deal with the question. I should like to add also all those who are called upon to do so by their official functions, the parliaments and the governments. As for me, the critics may come along; they may tear my work to pieces and reject it as a worthless scrap of paper. I have made up my mind. Although not a single stone of the edifice which I have attempted to construct may remain, I have still made up my mind. But while admitting this cruel possibility, I believe that it will not have been quite useless to show in a completely elaborated draft the facts of the problem and the possible solutions. Perchance things will turn out better for me. Perchance after one year our commission will already declare that Dr. Quidde has not only done a meritorious work in publishing his draft and in thus furnishing a positive basis for discussion, but that he has accomplished something which can be used. Doubtless it would be a great joy for me if I had not only stated the problem but also proposed practical solutions, and especially if the governments should desire to find therein a subject for discussion. Perhaps these dreams will not be realized. But I said to myself that one of us must make the attempt and offer himself as a sacrifice to the critics, in order that the governments may be forced to take issue in certain positive questions. The governments declare that they will examine, but they have examined nothing. That is why I now say to them—and I beg the Congress at least to support me on this point—: You have promised to study the question. Now get to work! You always say: "It is not possible"; we desire to compel you to tell us in what respect and why it is not possible. Up to the present time you have beat about the bush and spoken only generalities; tell us now why the statements of the reporter of the Twentieth Peace Congress are so bereft of sense and so impracticable. And even if we should succeed only in forcing the governments to speak, that itself would be useful; but perhaps we shall go further, perhaps it will be said some day: "It was in the Twentieth Peace Congress that the bases of the treaty for the limitation of armaments which binds the whole world were enunciated." I further ask you, without discussing our draft any further, without binding you in the matter, but only in order to give it more weight, to vote the following resolution which the commission proposes to you:

The Congress recommends to the members of the Congress, the peace societies and all those interested in the question, the study of the draft relative to the limitation of armaments presented by Dr. Quidde. It charges the commission D to make the draft the subject of a profound examination and of a report to the next Congress.

# APPENDIX

## LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS[1]

The Union took up this exceedingly difficult problem at a relatively late period. From the very beginning it has considered the problem as an *international* one, but the Union has also emphasized the importance of studying the question from a national point of view, in order thus to prepare the solution which can only be found internationally. It was for instance thus the Interparliamentary Conference in London, 1906, expressed its view of the matter.

As is well known the question was not really discussed at all at the Second Peace Conference at The Hague, and the resolution passed by this body on August 17, 1907, was of a purely platonic character.

At the initiative of the Interparliamentary Bureau the question was reopened in 1910. A Commission of study[2] prepared a statement to be discussed by the Conference at Geneva, 1912, which was supported by an exhaustive and detailed report written for the Commission by Baron d'Estournelles.[3] After an interesting debate the proposal of the Commission was passed. It runs as follows.

The Seventeenth Interparliamentary Conference formally renews the wish expressed and adopted by the London Conference in 1906, as follows:

The Interparliamentary Conference, considering that the increase of military and naval expenditure which weighs upon the world is universally held to be intolerable, expresses the formal wish that the question of the limitation of armaments be included in the programme of the next Conference at The Hague.

The Conference decides that each Group belonging to the Interparliamentary Union shall without delay place this resolution before the Government of its country and exercise its most pressing action on the Parliament to which it belongs, in order that the question of the limitation be the subject of a national study necessary to the ultimate success of the international discussion.

The Seventeenth Interparliamentary Conference records that the problem of the limitation of armaments has not ceased to be, during the last six years, the anxiety of Governments and nations;

That the competition of armaments bids fair to bring about the most serious economic crisis which might have the worst consequences for social peace;

[1] CHR. L. LANGE, *The Conditions of a Lasting Peace* (pub. by the Interparliamentary Bureau, Christiania, 1917), pp. 46–53.

[2] Consisting of M. M. d'Estournelles de Constant (France); Conrad Haussmann (Germany); Milyukoff (Russia); and Lord Weardale (Great Britain).

[3] *Limitation of Naval and Military Expenditure*, 40 pages (Brussels, 1912). Also in French and German.

And that in consequence it is urgent, and it is the duty of Governments to seize the first opportunity to discuss the conditions which might bring such competition to an end.

The Interparliamentary Conference begs the different Groups to miss no opportunity, especially during the discussion of the budget, to raise this question and invites Governments to undertake without loss of time the necessary study to attain, either separately or by means of international agreements, to the realization of the wish expressed on two different occasions by their Conferences at The Hague.

It was however considered necessary to enter more deeply into the problem. In 1913 Professor L. Quidde, member of the Bavarian Diet, placed before the Interparliamentary Conference at The Hague a draft for an international agreement concerning the limitation of military preparations. He wished it to be considered as a contribution to a further discussion. The Central Commission within the Union which was charged with the task of coordinating the various resolutions and proposals passed by the Union with a view to the program of the third Peace Conference, recommended the establishment of a special commission with the object of studying "the possibility of preparing a draft agreement concerning the limitation of armaments." As will be seen, this is a question of purely technical character. Later on, in connection with these efforts there would be "a discussion of the political and legal conditions that would make it possible to check competitive armaments," in accordance with the resolution passed by the Geneva Conference.

The Interparliamentary Union has always considered a possible limitation of armaments as a *result* of the work for a trenchant reform of the international community of states, and this reform would undoubtedly be made more easy by better relations between the Powers.

The Executive Committee of the Union found the solution of the technical and legal question, concerning the possibility of drawing up a draft agreement for a possible limitation of armaments, to be a *sine qua non* for a further discussion, and a Commission of study with such a task was nominated in April, 1914. It consisted of the following members: *Chairman:* M. Tydeman (Holland); *Members:* Messrs. Erzberger (Germany); Exner (Austria); General Sir Ivor Herbert (Great Britain); Messimy, former minister of war (France); Neergaard, former Prime Minister (Denmark); Palmstierna (Sweden); Admiral Sparre, former Minister (Norway); Zwegintseff, chairman of the Army Commission of the Duma (Russia). — Professor Quidde, who had, as mentioned above, prepared an actual proposition, was to be invited to take part in the debates. The fact that the Bureau succeeded in winning over for the work politicians from practically all European countries and representing all shades of political opinions, shows how great was the interest roused by the problem.

In order to establish a firm basis for the work, the Bureau charged Dr. Hans Wehberg with the task of collecting and compiling the proposals issued on the subject during the course of time. This work[1] was printed just at the time when the war broke out, and therefore it did not rouse the interest or become as well known as it deserved. Nor could the meeting of the Commission planned for the autumn of 1914 take place. The Commission suffered a great loss by the death of its chairman in November, 1916.

The Secretary General[2] had drafted a list of questions which was submitted to the chairman at the end of July, 1914. This list is published below in order to serve as a basis for a possible exchange of views.

## DRAFT LIST OF QUESTIONS

THE MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION: To study the possibilities for preparing a draft for an international agreement concerning a limitation of armaments.

(The numbers refer to Dr. Wehberg's book.)

### I. THE FORM AND DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE DRAWN UP

11. What form should an agreement on the limitation of armaments assume? Should it be a universal agreement between all the States, or should a number of treaties be entered into, pledging the States two by two, or at least a limited number of them?

12. If the agreement ought to take the shape of a universal agreement, would it be desirable or necessary to work, all the same, for the establishment of separate agreements, which could serve as a possible preparation for the ultimate conclusion of a universal agreement?

13. If the result of the investigation of this problem be that the work for separate agreements is the only possibility, should then these agreements be considered as a final solution of the problem, or as a preparatory step towards the universal agreement?

14. Should the proposal for an agreement be drawn up with a view to the Great Powers only (or mainly), or should it embrace all States?

15. Should the draft be a simple formula (Wehberg No. 19) or should a fully detailed proposal for a complete agreement (W. No. 25) be prepared?

16. Should the agreement only fix a limitation (an arrest) of armaments, or should it possibly imply a further reduction in the future? (Nos. 32—33.)

[1] DR. HANS WEHBERG, *Limitation des armements* (Brussels, 1914), 144 pages. The work is printed in English translation on the foregoing pages.

[2] CHR. L. LANGE.

17. How long should the agreement last? Should it be renewed automatically?

18. Should it be made subject to ratification?

## II. THE OBJECTS OF THE LIMITATION

21. What branches of armaments on land and at sea should be affected by the agreement?

Should it include all means of attack and defense: military preparation on land, at sea and in the air, fortresses, colonial troops? Or should it except some of these, and in that case, which of them?

22. Should the standing armies be limited? And the period of military service?

23. Are there reasons for forbidding certain war material (submarines, ram-ships, airships (aeroplanes) or the introduction of new types of arms (guns and cannon) or of powder and other explosives? According to what principle should such items be ruled out?

24. Are there reasons for limiting the caliber of guns and cannon?

25. Are there reasons for limiting the tonnage of armored ships? Should there be a fixed age limit for the various types of ships?

26. Should the limitation concern the military and naval *budget?*

a) Should it be applied to the expenses only? or

b) May this principle be combined with a limitation of the *war material* proper? (see above questions 22—25). And in that case, with which of them?

27. Should a limitation of the cost affect

a) the whole budget of expense, or

b) the individual items on the military budget (army, navy, aviation, etc.)?

28. In the latter case:

a) How many and what items should be established?

b) Should it be permitted to transfer amounts from one heading to another? And in that case within what limits?

## III. BASIS OF THE LIMITATION

31. Would it be possible as a basis for the limitation of armaments to use:

a) The population (W. No. 1 and No. 28)?

b) Foreign trade (W. No. 22)?

c) Boundaries, their length and their character (W. No. 29)?

d) The whole of the budget of expense for the state (W. No. 17)?

32. What should be the proportion between one or other of these bases and the means of defense?

More especially: how should the fact be treated that the population, trade or total sum of budget do not increase in the same proportion in the various countries?

33. Can the standard be simply the present sum of military expenses
    a) for a year?
    b) or the average for a number of years? In that case for how many years?

34. If the basis of limitation should be the sum total of military expenses, should for the following year any regard be taken to 1) the population and its fluctuation? 2) foreign trade? or any other changing factor? In that case which?

35. Should the possibility of extraordinary expenses (expenses once for all) be assumed? And according to what rules?

36. Should the agreement include rules concerning movements of troops (thus, for instance, the employment of colonial troops), construction of strategic railways or of other means of communication?

37. Should it include rules concerning grants posted under non-military headings on a state budget, but which may influence the military preparations of that state?

## IV. CONTROL AND SANCTION — VALIDITY OF AGREEMENT

41. Should a special organ of control, a sort of "International Audit Office" be established with regard to armaments?

42. How should this institution be organized and what authority should it possess? Should it be an institution for summoning only, or should it make its own decisions? In the former case what sort of court of justice should be arranged?

43. Or should the control rest with the other states under the assumption that the questions be submitted to a verdict by some judicial authority?

44. How should such an authority be organized? As a court of arbitration? Or as a permanent court of justice, established beforehand with a view to possible conflicts?

45. Should there be an opportunity for appeal, or for a new trial of formal questions?

46. Should it be possible to annul the agreement? What consequence would the withdrawal of one individual Power have with regard to the validity of the agreement?

47. What effect should the outbreak of a war have on the validity of the agreement?
    a) between contracting Powers;
    b) between contracting and non-contracting Powers?

## V. OTHER MEANS TO FURTHER A LIMITATION OF MILITARY EXPENSE

51. Does the Commission think it would be an advantage if the war industry were made a state monopoly? (W. No. 9.)

52. Should we work for certain military *reforms* which may involve a limitation of expenses, *e. g.*, a militia system? (W. No. 30a.)

53. Should we work for an official exchange of information between the Powers concerning their military preparations?

54. Should we work for the arrangement of a "holiday" of one or more years' duration, especially with regard to ship-building?

55. Should we work for the abolition of military espionage by means of an international agreement?

56. Are there any reasons to work for an international agreement to abolish all military expenses which have a certain character of unnecessary luxury, *e. g.*, salute-guns, gala-uniforms, etc. . . . ?

## VI. PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS — REALIZATION

61. Should the Commission study the political and legal conditions which should be accomplished before the states will accept a proposal to an agreement concerning the limitation of armaments?

62. Which are these conditions? (See especially W. Nos. 5–7 and 10–11.)

63. Should we work for the including of the question of a limitation of armaments in the program of the third Peace Conference, and in that case should we work for the submission of the question by that Conference to a special commission, which may continue its work after the Conference?

64. Or should we work for a special conference — a conference *ad hoc* — for this question?

65. Should we work for the taking of special steps on the part of various nations, more especially the small nations (W. Nos. 12 and 15)?

Those groups who wish to take up the study of the problem of armaments will find in this list and also in Dr. Wehberg's work the necessary elements for their debates. The literature on this matter brought forth by the present war is not very rich. The two volumes published by the Central Organization, contain two reports *Limitation of Armaments by International Agreement*, and *Fabrication des armements*, both prepared by a commission of study nominated by the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad. Further, the Central Organisation has published as a special pamphlet an article *Peace and Reduction of Armaments* by the former Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs and Member of the States General, M. de Beaufort.

It is, surely, superfluous to point out the close connection between the armaments problem and the question of guaranteeing international law

(the problem of sanctions). The solution of the former question is dependent, in all respects, on the possible solution to be found for the problem of sanctions. In practise a limitation, not to say a reduction, of military preparations would seem inevitable for all belligerent Powers after the conclusion of the war now raging. Only through such a measure can the necessary economy be effected without damaging the vital interests of the nations. Only through a reduction of this item on their budget can the Powers recover part of the enormous, nay unthinkable expense incurred by the war: the payment of interest on, and instalments of, public debts, amounting to milliards, payment of pensions to invalids and widows, amounting to other milliards. Is there a possibility for hope that the nations of our much afflicted Europe, driven on one side by the horrors of the war to seek their safety in other measures than a senseless competition in military preparations, and forced on the other hand to a reduction of military expenses by the gigantic growth of national debts—may be induced to seek the only way out of the present international anarchy, the way towards an international organization safeguarded by active guarantees?

It is the obvious duty of every friend of Peace to work for such an end.

# INDEX OF PERSONS


Adams, J. Q., 9.
von Ahlefeld, 63.
Alberoni, 5.
Arnaud, 47.

Bagot, 8.
Bajer, 51.
von Bar, 53.
Barbosa, 53.
Barclay, 55.
Barker, 63.
Barrington, 23.
Bebel, 79.
Beernaert, 7.
Bennett, 34.
Bentham, 6.
Bertillon, 73.
von Bethmann-Hollweg, 35, 65.
von Bieberstein, 59.
Bildt, 16.
Bismarck, 12.
Blymyer, 67, 73, 78.
Borner, 5.
Bourgeois, 33.
Brentano, 49, 53.
von Bunsen, 73.
Butler, Charles Henry, 8, 9.
Butler, Nicholas Murray, 50.

Callahan, 8.
Campbell-Bannerman, 29.
Carmichale, 13.
Castlereagh, 7, 8.
Chamberlain, 26.
Churchill, 35, 38, 39, 64, 65, 70.
Clark, 55.
Clark, Champ, 65.
Coanda, 22.
Cobden, 10, 53.
Concha, 24, 25.
Courtney, 29.
Crispi, 13.
Crosby, 8.
Crozier, 20.

Daehne van Varick, 7, 12, 48.
Davignon, 57.
von Deines, 19.
Delassus, 33.
Desjardins, 9.
Disraeli, 10.
von Ditten, 26, 28.
Donoso, 23.
Drago, 24, 25.
Dubois, 5.
Dumas, 47, 52.
Duplessix, 46.
Durand, 50.
Duval, 12.

Eickhoff, 53.
von Einem, 34.
d'Estournelles de Constant, 25, 29.
Eversley, 29.

Farrer, 29.
Fatio, 68.
Field, 73.
Fischhof, 72.
Fisher, 21.
Foster, 9.
Fourier, 51.
Frederick the Great, 5.
Fried, 5, 7, 10, 12, 26, 47, 51, 55, 57, 76, 77.
Friedlaender, 66.
Fry, 31, 65.

von Gerlach, 55.
Gervais, 71.
Gilinsky, 14, 15, 20.
Glatzel, 48.
Gobat, 50, 55.
Gortshakow, 11.
Goschen, 26.
Gothein, 78.
de la Grasserie, 51, 72.
Grey, 13, 35, 55, 65.
Griess-Traut, 51.
Grosch, 5.

Harms, 65.
Haupt, 51.
Hirst, 51.
von Holtzendorff, 59.

Jaurès, 76.
Jefferson, 55.
Joseph II, 5.

Kalau vom Hofe, 71.
Kamarowski, 12, 59.
Kant, 6.
van Karnebeek, 21.
Kaunitz, 5.
Kolben, 45, 53.
Krantz, 51.

Lammasch, 16.
de Lapradelle, 14.
Ledebour, 29.
le Foyer, 66.
Lloyd George, 70.
Lorimer, 12, 78.
Lough, 57.
Louis-Philippe, 9.
Lowther, 23.

Macdonnell, 29, 53.
Mac Kenna, 55.
Maine, 53.
Marchand, 50.
de Martens, 7, 8, 31.
Mérignhac, 12, 14, 40, 72.
Messimy, 29.
Metternich, 7.
Meurer, 14.
Meyer, 5.
Michelson, 32, 54.
Mijatovitch, 40.
Miles, 73.
Moch, 29, 47, 51, 66, 76.
Moneta, 40.
Monroe, 8, 9.
Moore, 8.

Napoleon I, 7.
Napoleon III, 11.
Naquet, 55.
Naumann, 45.
Nippold, 57.
Novicow, 46.

Ostwald, 55.

Pandolfi, 48.
Paris, 45.
Pédoya, 76.
Peel, 10.
Pénhau, 21.
Perris, 26, 33, 78.
Persius, 64, 69.
Picard, 5, 7, 12, 14, 25, 73
Podebrad, 5.

Quidde, 34, 56, 79, 87

Reay, 29.
Renault, 16.
Reuter, 73.
Richet, 47.
Richter, 52.
Riddell, 8.
Robertson, 29, 33.
Rolin-Jaequemyns, 12.
Roosevelt, 70.
Rühle, 72.
Rush, 8.

Saint-Pierre, 5.
Salisbury, 13.
Satow, 53.
Scheine, 16, 21.
Schlief, 45.
Schlieper, 63.
Schücking, 45, 56.
von Schwarzhoff, 15, 17, 18.
Schwitzky, 5.
Scott, 8, 9, 16.
Simon, 55, 64, 77.
Souchon, 76.
Sully, 5.

Terry, 23.
von Tirpitz, 37, 56, 61, 63.
Tittoni, 55.
Toinet, 14, 25, 29, 55, 73, 76.
Turner, 29.

Umfrid, 45, 46.

Vesnitch, 5.
Viersen-Trip, 55.
Villiaumé, 73.

Wachtmeister, 26, 28.
Waechter, 46.
Waultrin, 8, 9.
Weardale, 29.
Wehberg, 14, 16, 25.
Welby, 29.
Westlake, 29.

Zorn, 16.